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Critiquing: Effective Decision Support In Time-Critical Domains
Abstract
The TraumAID system is a tool for assisting physicians during the initial definitive management phase of
patients with severe injuries. Originally, TraumAID was conceived as a rule-based expert system
combined with a planner. After this architecture had been implemented and evaluated, we began to face
the issue of how TraumAID could communicate its plans to physicians in order to influence their behavior
and have a positive effect on patient outcome. It was hypothesized that a critiquing approach, in which
the system is told what actions the user intends to carry out and produces a critique in response to those
intentions, might be appropriate.
To meet the needs of physicians engaged in managing trauma cases, critiques must be updated and
made available rapidly. They must be clear and succinct, containing only relevant information while still
including enough justification to make them convincing. To address the need for these features in the
system, I have developed a critiquing architecture consisting of three components, incremental plan
recognition, plan evaluation, and critique generation. I have implemented this architecture in TraumaTIQ, a
critiquing interface for the TraumAID system. Comparison of TraumaTIQs comments on 97 actual
management plans with comments made by three local trauma experts showed that TraumaTIQ
produced 48.3% of comments made by only one judge, and 70.27% of comments made by two or more
judges. This relationship between inter-judge agreement and judge-system agreement is statistically
significant. In addition, regression analysis shows that TraumaTIQs plan evaluator is a significant
predictor of the judges' overall case ratings.
This approach to communicating with physicians in time critical domains has the advantage that it is
user-focused, minimally intrusive, and quick to respond to potential errors even on the basis of partial
information. Unlike previously developed reminder and alert systems, TraumaTIQ evaluates the
physician's proposed plan and attempts to intervene before problems occur. And unlike previous
critiquing systems, it is able to provide ongoing decision support during the planning and delivery of care.
In the context of time-critical patient management it is, therefore, a more appropriate form of interaction.
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Abstract
Critiquing: Effective Decision Support in Time-Critical Domains

Abigail S. Gertner
Bonnie L. Webber (Supervisor)

The TraumAID system is a tool for assisting physicians during the initial de nitive
management phase of patients with severe injuries. Originally, TraumAID was conceived
as a rule-based expert system combined with a planner. After this architecture had been
implemented and evaluated, we began to face the issue of how TraumAID could communicate its plans to physicians in order to inuence their behavior and have a positive e ect
on patient outcome. It was hypothesized that a critiquing approach, in which the system
is told what actions the user intends to carry out and produces a critique in response to
those intentions, might be appropriate.
To meet the needs of physicians engaged in managing trauma cases, critiques must
be updated and made available rapidly. They must be clear and succinct, containing only
relevant information while still including enough justi cation to make them convincing. To
address the need for these features in the system, I have developed a critiquing architecture
consisting of three components: incremental plan recognition, plan evaluation, and critique
generation. I have implemented this architecture in TraumaTIQ, a critiquing interface for
the TraumAID system. Comparison of TraumaTIQ's comments on 97 actual management
plans with comments made by three local trauma experts showed that TraumaTIQ produced 48.3% of comments made by only one judge, and 70.27% of comments made by two
iv

or more judges. This relationship between inter-judge agreement and judge-system agreement is statistically signi cant. In addition, regression analysis shows that TraumaTIQ's
plan evaluator is a signi cant predictor of the judges' overall case ratings.
This approach to communicating with physicians in time-critical domains has the advantage that it is user-focused, minimally intrusive, and quick to respond to potential errors
even on the basis of partial information. Unlike previously developed reminder and alert
systems, TraumaTIQ evaluates the physician's proposed plan and attempts to intervene
before problems occur. And unlike previous critiquing systems, it is able to provide ongoing
decision support during the planning and delivery of care. In the context of time-critical
patient management it is, therefore, a more appropriate form of interaction.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1 The scenario
Imagine a situation in which a relatively inexperienced resident surgeon is treating a patient
who has just been brought in to the hospital with a gunshot wound in the abdomen. The
patient is in shock and is losing blood rapidly. The resident decides to do a CT-scan of
the abdomen to nd the source of the bleeding, and then go straight to the operating
room. The attending physician watching the procedure interrupts the resident to inform
him that an abdominal X-ray would provide the same information as a CT-scan and would
be faster. She also mentions that the resident should probably get an X-ray of the chest
to make sure that the bullet did not travel upward and cause injuries in the chest cavity.
What does the advisor have to do in order to provide this kind of assistance? She
must have a model of the resident's beliefs and goals, in order to evaluate and address any
misconceptions that might underlie the intention to carry out a less than optimal plan.
She also must understand the problem, and the approach he considers best for addressing
it, in order to be able to recognize errors and o er alternatives to the faulty plan. She
should be able to explain her own reasoning so as to justify her advice to the resident. In
addition, the advisor should have some idea of how to communicate cooperatively in order
to inuence the resident's future actions.
This dissertation describes an approach to providing real-time decision support in complex, task-oriented situations that is based on this model of advice giving. As the above
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example suggests, this problem has been addressed in the context of the management of
multiple trauma. This task typically involves reasoning about multiple goals, integrating
diagnosis and treatment into a single management plan, ecient allocation of resources,
and acting under time pressure. In such situations, we recognize both the need for intelligent decision support, and the obstacles to providing such support arising from both the
heavy cognitive demands of the task, and the reluctance of certain kinds of users to accept
advice from computers. We have attempted to minimize obstacles by providing support
in the form of concise, relevant, user-focused critiques.

1.2 The Need for Decision Support for Trauma Management
In his thesis, Rymon 75] presents a good argument for the usefulness of knowledge-based
decision support in the trauma domain. His work and the system he implemented, TraumAID 2.0, served as the starting point for my own work in this area. TraumAID was designed
to help physicians during the rst few hours after an injury, a period often referred to as
the initial de nitive management phase of trauma care. This phase of care takes place in
the hospital, after the patient has been resuscitated and stabilized and an initial assessment has been performed. It involves the performance of more de nitive diagnostic tests
to determine the extent of the patient's injuries, as well as some initial therapeutic activity.
As Rymon notes, there are several related ways in which computerized decision support
can help with the management of patients:
Supplementing physicians' expertise where it is lacking, such as in rural areas or
outside normal working hours.
Supporting standardization of care, which can help reduce health-care costs.
Providing on-line Quality Assurance (Q.A.), by monitoring deviations from standards
of care.
The TraumAID system, which has been under development at the University of Pennsylvania for over ten years, is a tool for assisting physicians during the initial de nitive
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management phase of patients with severe injuries 75, 92].1 During this phase of patient
care, which is often characterized by the need for urgent action, preliminary diagnoses of
the patients are pursued and initial treatments are carried out.
The current system, TraumAID 2.0, embodies a goal-directed approach to patient
management. The system architecture links a rule-based reasoner that derives conclusions
and goals to pursue from the available evidence about the patient, and a planner that
constructs a (partially ordered) plan for how best to address the currently relevant goals.
A more detailed discussion of TraumAID 2.0 appears in Chapter 2.
TraumAID 2.0's management plans have been retrospectively validated by a panel of
three experienced trauma surgeons. The data used in this study were the records of 97
actual cases from the Medical College of Pennsylvania (MCP) Trauma Center involving injuries that were covered by TraumAID's knowledge base. The judges performed a blinded
comparison of the actual care provided with the management plans produced by TraumAID 2.0 for the same cases. TraumAID's plans were preferred over the actual care to a
statistically signi cant extent 18]. We thus believed such plans could provide a valid basis
for producing critiques of physician plans which could lead to improvements in patient
care.

1.3 The Problem: Getting Doctors to Use Computers
The integration of medical decision-support systems into clinical environments has been
a widely recognized problem ever since such systems began to appear. While recognizing
their potential for improving the quality of patient care and for controlling costs, physicians
have tended to reject new technologies which they see as intrusive, time-consuming, or a
challenge to their judgment or autonomy as clinical decision-makers 3]. These observations
have been made about systems that are designed to assist physicians o-line, not while
they are actually engaged in a clinical task such as patient management. The problem is
likely to be exacerbated when we attempt to integrate decision-support systems into the
task environment to provide on-line support, which will be necessary if they are to be used
in situations like trauma management, in which time is a critical factor.
1

Currently, the system's knowledge base is restricted to penetrating injuries to the chest and abdomen.
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For a decision-support system to be clinically viable it is essential not only that it
produce valid advice, but also that its users can interact with it in a way that is both
simple and that does not interfere with the task in which they are engaged. In the case of
TraumAID this means solving both input and output problems.
To get information into TraumAID, we envision an electronic version of a standard
trauma ow sheet (TFS). Normally in the trauma team, one member is a nurse who functions as a scribe, documenting all the ndings, tests, and treatments in chronological order
for the record. The multiple page trauma ow sheet has designated areas for speci c information, such as demographics, mechanism of injury, physician response times, trauma
score, Glasgow coma score, vital signs, location of wounds, results of primary assessment,
intravenous therapy, diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, medications given, uid intake
and output, and disposition. Using our electronic TFS, relevant information entered by the
scribe nurse will be automatically passed to TraumAID. Most importantly for TraumAID,
all procedures ordered, clinical ndings, test results, and therapeutic actions done will be
available from the electronic TFS.
This dissertation is concerned with the problem of the system's output. In response
to any new information regarding the patient or the management procedures carried out
so far, TraumAID 2.0 outputs a listing of its current recommended management plan.
This plan can be taken literally as orders for subsequent action by the physician, or more
loosely as a guide for deciding on subsequent actions. Viewing TraumAID's output as
orders, though, fails to take into consideration the fact that physicians are intelligent,
autonomous agents, capable of reasoning on their own about how to manage their patients.
It is unreasonable to expect physicians to abandon their own decision-making skills to follow
the recommendations of a computer system. In addition to the psychological drawbacks
of letting the system pre-empt a physician's decision making, it is less ecient, since there
is actually no need for him to refer to the recommendations of the system unless there is
a problem with the way she is managing the patient.
However, if the system's recommended management plan is interpreted merely as a
guide for deciding on subsequent actions, the system will have nothing to say when the
physician's decisions diverge from its recommendations. Once she decides to go against
TraumAID's proposals, the physician is, in e ect, on her own. What is needed in this
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situation is a system that can detect problems with a physician's intended management
plan when they arise and present its recommendations in terms of explanations and possible
alternative courses of action in the context of the physician's intended actions. The system
should not aim to replace the physician's skills, but rather to augment them.
If we are interested in identifying problems with the intended management plan, the
obvious rst step is to identify what that plan is. Fortunately, in the trauma management
situation, we can exploit the fact that many procedures require resources and equipment
that must be ordered prior to carrying them out. In fact, those procedures that are most
signi cant in terms of their cost and e ect on the patient, and thus most important to
identify if they are in error, are also those that are most likely to be ordered ahead of time.
These orders will be recorded on the electronic TFS and so will be available to TraumAID.
Since there is a gap between the time actions are ordered and the time they are carried
out, it is possible for orders to be rescinded. By pointing out problems with orders (or
missing orders), it should therefore be possible to have a clinically signi cant e ect on
patient management.

1.4 Statement of Thesis
In this dissertation, I will present an approach to real-time decision-support that uses a
critiquing interface to produce advising behavior in a computer system. The approach I
present is particularly appropriate for decision-support in domains that have the following
features:
1.

Multiple goals: Trauma management often involves reasoning about multiple in-

teracting goals, some of which may be addressed together using a single procedure.
Therefore, the physician's proposed actions must be evaluated globally, within the
context of the entire plan. The presence of multiple goals with varying degrees of
urgency means that the critique must address not only what actions are performed
but also the order in which they are carried out.
2.

Time constraints: In trauma management, diagnosis and treatment of di erent
actions are carried out within the same time frame, and the urgency associated with
5

actions makes it important to intervene within a short period of time. The critiquing
system must therefore be capable of constantly updating its representation of the
situation and the user's plan, and revising its critique based on new information.
3.

Task-centered activity: In an emergency situation such as trauma resuscitation,

the physician's primary focus of attention is reserved for the task of caring for the
patient. Therefore, the amount of work that she has to do to understand the critique
should be kept to a minimum. The system should avoid saying anything that (a)
the physician already knows, (b) is \common knowledge" to anyone who would be
using the system, or (c) reects trivial di erences between the system's preferences
and the physician's.

4.

Gap between order and execution: Actions that involve resources that need to

be brought to the trauma bay or that can only be done elsewhere must be ordered
prior to being carried out. Since orders can be rescinded, comments pointing out
problems with an order can potentially make a clinically signi cant di erence to
patient management.

Similar approaches have been proposed for decision-support in domains such as aircraft
and marine control, power plant operation, and complex process control tasks 37, 73].
In Chapter 2, I present an argument that in such domains, human-computer interaction
based on a process-oriented propose-and-critique model is preferable to a more prescriptive
advising mode. Furthermore, I claim that the ability to critique e ectively depends on a
combination of integrated knowledge structures and reasoning capabilities:
1. A plan recognition component that uses knowledge about actions and goals in the
domain, together with knowledge about the speci c situation, to infer and continually
update a model of the user's goals and intentions from her proposed actions.
2. A plan evaluation component that makes use of knowledge about causal factors,
policy, practice guidelines, etc. and how they should shape behavior in a given
situation, in order to identify potentially signi cant errors that will then be mentioned
in the critique.
6

3. A critique generation component that converts the results of plan evaluation into a
concise and coherent natural language critique.
Finally, I will demonstrate that expert critiques can be provided by a computer system
through the description of TraumaTIQ, the critiquing module that I have implemented as
part of the TraumAID system for trauma management 29, 30, 31, 32]. TraumaTIQ monitors trauma management in real time and produces comments when it detects potential
errors that may have a negative e ect on the outcome of the case.
In addition to the implemented system, the contributions of this work include:
A situated approach to incremental plan recognition that is appropriate to the recognition of complex plans involving multiple goals and information seeking actions.
An exploration of the relationship between planning and plan recognition systems
in terms of the knowledge representation necessary to do both, and the process of
adapting a planning system for plan recognition.
A generic classi cation of erroneous actions from the perspective of their potential
impact on the outcome of the plans in which they participate, and a methodology
for evaluating the signi cance of errors for the purposes of critiquing.
An evaluation of the results of applying TraumaTIQ retrospectively to the management of 97 actual trauma cases.

1.5 Dissertation Outline
The next chapter explains the motivation for interacting using the critiquing approach,
and introduces the issues that I believe are important for the design of a critiquing system. Chapter 3 reviews the expert critiquing literature, relating the di erent theories and
implementations to issues discussed in the previous chapter. Chapter 4 discusses previous
approaches to plan recognition and describes the approach I have taken in TraumaTIQ.
Chapter 5 introduces the notion of evaluating a plan and shows how my system determines
those items that will be included in the nal critique. In Chapter 6 I discuss some of the
7

issues involved in realizing a critique in natural language. Chapter 7 describes my implementation of TraumaTIQ, the critiquing module for TraumAID. Chapter 8 describes the
results of applying the system to actual management plans. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes
by restating the main thesis and discussing the work that remains to be done as part of
this project.

8

Chapter 2

Issues for Critiquing System
Design
The rst version of TraumAID system (TraumAID 1.0), running on a laptop PC, was
introduced experimentally into the Emergency Room at MCP for a 15 month period in
1988-1990. To use it, physicians had to leave the patient's bedside, which itself discouraged
timely data entry. In addition, physicians objected to having to see TraumAID's entire
management plan, noting that
Much of the time, TraumAID's recommendation coincided with the physicians' own
plans.
It was dicult for physicians to determine what elements of the plan they should
focus on to get information that would actually help them improve their overall
performance.
In a sense, TraumAID was presenting both too much information { including items that the
physicians were already well aware of { but also too little information { failing to indicate
where the physicians should focus their attention to improve their plans.
These reactions led us to explore the possibility of an interface that could focus its
output on just those items that are both relevant to the intentions of the physician, and
clinically signi cant to the case at hand. This would address the two problems noted above
by (a) taking account of the physicians' plans and (b) only presenting information that
9

they should therefore focus on. The approach we decided on is based on the critiquing
model rst introduced by Perry Miller 54] in his work on the ATTENDING system.

2.1 The Critiquing Paradigm
Over the past decade, the term critiquing has been applied to a wide range of applications
including therapy planning, knowledge base acquisition, computer aided design, software
engineering, and desktop publishing (see 81]). Their common feature is that they take
a problem description and a proposed \solution" or \design" as input from the user and
produce some kind of commentary aimed at improving the correctness, eciency, clarity,
and/or workability of the solution. This is in contrast to more traditional expert systems,
which simply take a description of the problem and use their domain knowledge to produce
a solution. Figure 2.1 illustrates the di erence between expert systems and critiquing
systems.
problem
description

problem
description

solution

critique

proposed
solution

expert system

critiquing system

Figure 2.1: The expert system model vs. the critiquing model
In this dissertation, I present an approach to critiquing in real-time that is based on
a model of cooperative communication between intelligent agents. Each set of proposed
actions input by the user is treated as an implicit query: \Is this (partial) plan acceptable in
the current situation?" Like other models of cooperative response generation (CRG), I will
be concerned with issues of plan inference, plan evaluation, user modelling, and response
planning. (For a discussion of the range of work on CRG, see the literature review in 15].)
However, unlike other work in this area, which has focused on the interaction between an
\expert" system and a \novice" user, the model of cooperative communication my work is
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based on is the interaction of two experts or near-experts who share a common top-level
goal { managing the patient as e ectively as possible. The role of the system, therefore,
is that of an agent who observes and evaluates the user's behavior in terms of what it
considers to be the optimal plan according to a set of general and speci c metrics, and
responds only if a signi cant problem is detected.
As we will see in the next Chapter, the critiquing approach has been applied to a wide
range of domains and problems. Some of these, like trauma management, are procedural in nature and involve developing a plan or speci cation for action, while others are
more declarative and are concerned with producing a design speci cation. The critiquing
methodology I will present in this dissertation is developed for the former type of problem.
But while the problems are somewhat di erent, particularly in the types of constraints
they are concerned with (e.g. temporal vs. spatial), there are also a number of similarities
among problem domains that are suitable for critiquing.
In this Section, I consider three issues:
1. What features of the domain and the system are required for critiquing to be possible?
2. When is critiquing the preferred approach to communicating information to users?
3. What features of the domain inuence how critiquing is done?

2.1.1 Requirements for Critiquing
To make critiquing possible, three basic features are necessary:
1. The domain must be modelled to the extent that the constraints on solutions that
the critique will support have been de ned. This may be done by enumerating a
priori those constraints to be used in evaluating solutions, or by creating a planner
(or other solution generator) whose output can be compared to the user's proposed
solution at run time.
2. The actions peformed by the user must be suciently accessible to the system. Suchman's 84] example of an expert help system for a photocopier shows how information
that is crucial to understanding the users' behavior may be conveyed by actions, such
11

as spoken comments, that the system does not have access to. There will always be
actions that users perform that cannot be sensed by the systems they are using, but
the more information the system has about what the user is doing, the less likely it
will be to misinterpret the actions it knows about.
Related to this is the question of grain size. Systems that sense user actions at the
level of individual operations on the machine have a di erent problem of interpretation than those that get compound action descriptions as input.
3. The user's proposed or intended actions must be accessible to the system, either by
explicit noti cation or by prediction based on what has already been done. This is
necessary for on-line critiquing, where the purpose is to prevent errors from being
committed. If a post hoc evaluation is sucient, then it is not required that the
system know the user's intentions before they are carried out.

2.1.2 Motivations for critiquing
In general, there are several advantages of using a critiquing approach for decision-support
rather than the more standard expert system approach 54]:

Acceptability The di erence in perceived roles of human and computer can a ect the
psychological acceptability of the system to its users:

A critiquing system can be seen as assisting the user in developing her plan
rather than presenting a contrary solution.
Critiquing systems can be less intrusive by producing comments only when a
signi cant problem is detected.
While expert systems traditionally assume the primary decision-making capacity, treating the user as a passive follower, critiquing systems take a secondary
role in decision making, leaving the primary control in the hands of the user.
Rather than presenting a solution that may or may not be similar to what the
user was thinking of, the critiquing approach provides a user-centered evaluation
of the problem.
12

Flexibility Certain domains (such as medicine) in which expert systems have frequently

been developed, are characterized by a signi cant degree of variation in what can be
called an \acceptable solution."
Practice variability, due to di erences in training, expertise, and available resources, means that there is seldom one correct way to approach a problem.
Subjective judgments, which cannot easily be modelled as part of an expert
system, are often an essential aspect of decision-making.
Critiquing systems can accommodate these kinds of variation by allowing for a range
of acceptable solutions.

Given these characteristics, the domain of trauma management seems to be a promising
candidate for the critiquing approach. First, from the point of view of system acceptability
it is important to keep in mind that physicians engaged in the management of trauma
patients have multiple concurrent demands on their attention and must be able to make
crucial decisions under time pressure. A system that presented its recommended plan and
required the physician to interpret it in terms of her own reasoning about the case could
be rejected on the grounds that it was too distracting or presented too much irrelevant
information.
Another important factor is the level of experience of the intended users. The critiquing
mode of interaction was designed as a way of communicating information to users who have
some expertise in the domain of the system. Having some background and experience,
these users may be prone to interpret an advice-giving system as an attempt to replace
their judgment with that of a machine. The more prescriptive the advice produced by the
system, the worse this e ect will be. To address this problem, critiquing was proposed as
a way of providing a focussed discussion of the physician's proposed actions, serving to
remind her of items she may have overlooked while refraining from explicitly telling her
what to do.
On the other hand, users with slightly less experience who may not be completely
con dent in their decision-making abilities may be tempted, given a system that provides
them with a suggested or recommended solution, to follow that solution blindly without
13

questioning or understanding it. In a medical context this would be unacceptable, and a
critiquing approach will also remedy this type of problem by requiring the user to develop
her own plan initially without the help of the system.
The suitability of critiquing for communicating advice to experienced users means,
however, that it may not be the best approach when dealing with problems in which the
intended user is a novice in the domain and where the primary objective is to accomplish the
task at hand rather than to teach or provide experience to the user. In such circumstances,
the system serves as a guide or director and would do better to give direct suggestions for
action rather than critiquing.
The inherent exibility of a critique arises from the fact that it does not have to commit
to any particular solution to the problem it is presented with. Rather, it may accept a range
of solutions as long as they satisfy the relevant constraints reasonably well. This feature is
particularly applicable to the problem of upholding practice guidelines. Currently in the
medical community a great deal of attention is being paid to the speci cation of guidelines
or protocols for patient management.1 These guidelines are underspeci ed, skeletal plans
77], which must be eshed out by the physician during the course of practice. In this
sense, TraumAID's knowledge base can be taken as a validated set of guidelines for trauma
management.
This view of plans is similar to that put forth by Lucy Suchman 84], who argues
that rather than interpreting observed actions as being determined a priori by a plan,
it is essential to consider the speci c context in which actions are executed in order to
understand them. In this view, plans are necessarily vague because they cannot possibly
specify every detail of situated action at the executable level. Plans are taken more as
guiding action on an abstract level rather than determining it concretely.
This description ts the case of medical practice guidelines perfectly { there is much
that is left out of the guidelines and left to individual physicians to ll in simply because it
would be impossible to specify every possible contingency to the level of detail necessary
for action. Furthermore, it is not the guideline designers' purpose to specify actions that
precisely. Rather, the purpose of a guideline is to insure that certain goals are addressed
Guidelines are created for the purposes of quality assurance and provide general specications for
how to proceed in given situations. Protocols include more specic rules to follow and are used to insure
comparable samples in controlled clinical trials.
1
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and that certain constraints are satis ed. This is a task for which critiquing is well suited
because, like the guideline, it does not seek to direct action but simply to constrain it.
Following Suchman's description of situated action, the critiquing system I have developed
interprets actions in context and generates its responses in consideration of the current
situation.

2.1.3 Critiquing in Dierent Domains
As we will see in Chapter 3, the critiquing approach has been used in a wide variety of
applications in many di erent domains. It is not surprising that the interpretation of how
a critiquing system works varies quite a bit from one application to another:
Some critiquing systems develop their own solution to the problem and some do not.
Some require a complete solution before they present their critique, while others
generate an ongoing critique throughout the development of a solution or plan.
Some focus on the generation of the actual text of the critique, while others are more
concerned with the knowledge representation necessary to generate comments.
In general, then, one would like to be able to describe how the characteristics of a
system's domain inuences its requirements for critiquing. This issue was explored by
Perry Miller in a series of prototype critiquing systems 54]. Miller was interested in
identifying domain characteristics that would lend themselves to the critiquing approach.
He also looked at how di erent aspects of critiquing might be more or less important in
di erent domains. This experience led him to identify two dimensions along which domains
vary. Where a domain lies along these dimensions will a ect the requirements of a system
for critiquing in that domain.

2.1.4 Miller's Two Dimensions
The rst dimension is the degree of independence of decisions. Miller shows that treatment
plans in the domain of anesthetic management can be critiqued without a global analysis,
since actions are independent: the choice of intubation method is unrelated to the drug
chosen to induce anesthesia. On the other hand, in a domain like multiple trauma, the
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best way to handle a stab wound depends on the complete set of goals currently being
pursued, including those arising from other wounds. Here, a global evaluation of the plan
is important.
The second dimension is the depth of domain knowledge required to produce an e ective
critique. The most straightforward domains for critiquing are those in which there are
established approaches to management, such as the oncology protocols used in ONCOCIN
45]. Here, the critiquing system needs only to recognize where the user's solution deviates
from the established procedure. At the other extreme are problems that require reasoning
from basic principles. Miller also identi es an intermediate level of domain knowledge
that he refers to as the level of treatment goals. In the domain of ventilator management,
for which there is no standard protocol, his VQ-ATTENDING system identi es a set of
treatment goals from the patient description, using straightforward production rules. It
then bases its critique on how well the physician's treatment plan addresses these goals.2
The critiquing model I am developing is designed for domains in which decisions are
interrelated, requiring global plan evaluation. With respect to the second dimension, my
model is goal-directed rather than appealing directly to either standard protocols or basic
principles. The trauma domain does not have a standard protocol to handle every situation
that might arise.3 It is, however, possible to formulate an expert's knowledge of trauma
management in terms of diagnostic and therapeutic goals and how best to achieve them
in di erent situations. This is the approach that TraumAID 2.0 uses in developing its
plans. The level of goals provides an intuitive basis for reasoning about, and critiquing,
the management of patients with severe injuries.

Plan inference in this system is simple because the goals he considers for ventilator management are
independent, and each action can only be used to satisfy one goal. Hence there is a direct relationship
between the physician's treatment plan and the underlying treatment goals.
3
This is not the same as having standards for decision making, which do exist in trauma management:
e.g. goals are prioritized on the basis of logistic constraints, cost minimization (embodied in both staged
diagnosis and local procedure preferences), and according to the \ABC's" of trauma care, depending on
whether they address problems of the airway, breathing, circulation, etc.
2
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2.1.5 Two Additional Dimensions
My work on critiquing has led me to identify two additional dimensions that seem relevant
to the design of critiquing systems. The rst is the amount of time between plan development and plan execution. Unlike most critiquing systems, TraumAID functions in a
domain in which parts of a plan may be executed almost as soon as the plan is developed.
This means that:
1. The user does not have a great deal of time to attend to a computer-generated
critique.
2. The system must be able to draw inferences based on incomplete knowledge of the
situation and the physician's plan.
The second new dimension that can inuence critiquing system design is the extent to
which preferences are involved in decision-making. Where a domain lies on this dimension
a ects the amount of speci c decision-making knowledge that is required for critiquing.
Several researchers have pointed out that one of the advantages of critiquing is that it does
not require a complete speci cation of the domain in order to be able to critique proposed
solutions 22]. This does not mean, however, that such a speci cation is not useful, but
rather that if it is not available, a critiquing system can still be implemented since it is
possible to critique a proposal without having an alternative plan worked out. In some
domains, such as the domain of kitchen design considered by the critiquing system JANUS
22], almost all decisions are based on preferences, and the critiquing process basically
involves pointing out when certain constraints have not been satis ed. In such a domain
it would be unnecessary for the critic to be able to make speci c design decisions (such
as exactly where in the kitchen to place the stove) independently of the user. Thus, the
knowledge representation required for such systems is just a speci cation of the relevant
constraints.
On the other hand, in the domain of multiple trauma (as in other medical decisionmaking domains) few decisions are purely a matter of personal preference. Rather, there
are guidelines and strategies that have been developed by larger or smaller communities
as being the way in which medicine will be practiced. Critiquing in these domains is a
17

combination of enforcing hard constraints and making the physician aware when the plan
she is proposing is signi cantly worse than \optimal." A critiquing system with these
requirements must have access to a knowledge base that speci es as closely as possible
the \best" things to do in a particular situation. It makes sense, therefore, in this type of
critiquing system for the critic to develop its own solution to the problem, and to compare
it to the solution proposed by the user. Non-critical decisions can be left alone simply by
choosing not to comment if the user's plan di ers from the system's on these points.

2.2 An Analysis of Judges' Error Data
In order to discover what constitutes an error in trauma management, I rst looked at
the data from the retrospective evaluation of TraumAID's performance as a management
planner 18, 75] (see Chapter 1). These data consist of a step-by-step evaluation of the
management plans produced by two versions of the TraumAID system (TraumAID 1.0 and
TraumAID 2.0), as well as the actual care provided, for 97 real trauma cases. Three trauma
surgeons evaluated all three versions of each case. In addition to an overall assessment of
the quality of care, these evaluations include judgments about errors of commission, errors
of omission, and scheduling errors for individual actions in the plans. Errors that led to
assigning the plan an unacceptable or nearly unacceptable rating were marked as such.
In order to use these evaluations to classify errors, each judgment was transformed into
a \snapshot" of the case up to that point. These snapshots consisted of a list of attributes,
242 in all, including information about the wounds, the ndings determined, and actions
performed so far. The ndings attributes had three possible values: yes, no, and unknown.
The action attributes were binary: done or not done.
The snapshots were classi ed into ten categories for each possible action,  (following
each item in parentheses is the marking used to indicate that class):
1. Doing  in this situation is an error of commission (C).
2. Doing  in this situation is a critical error of commission (C*).4
Errors were classied as critical if they lead the judge to mark the case in the lower two categories of
acceptability.
4
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3. Not doing  in this situation is an error of omission (O).
4. Not doing  in this situation is a critical error of omission (O*).
5.  was done too early (E).
6.  was done critically too early (E*).
7.  was done too late (L).
8.  was done critically too late (L*).
9. Doing  is not an error (NIL).
10. Not doing  is not an error (ONIL).
The nal category was added for completeness, and it was assumed that whenever a
judge did not speci cally mention an action that was not part of the plan, it was not
considered an error not to do that action. The snapshot data were then split up into
separate les for each action in the domain.
Figure 2.2 shows the frequency of error judgments for the 35 out of 153 available actions
about which a total of 10 or more error judgments were made by all three judges. These
35 actions became the focus of the remaining analysis.
A subset of the data les for the actions which tended to draw more error judgments
was chosen for analysis. The classi cation program IND was used to generate classi cation
trees for these actions. By running IND on separate data for individual actions, the
trees produced represent predictions of error judgments for those actions separately. For
example, the tree constructed for peritoneal lavage (Figure 2.3) indicates the conditions
under which a lavage would be considered to be an error of commission (if it was done) or
an error of omission (if it was not done). Each node in the tree represents possible values
of a single variable (N = Negative, Y = Positive, U = Unknown). The leftmost (highest)
nodes are the most discriminating regarding the action in question. The leaves indicate
the frequency of each error type in order O, ONIL, C, C*, O, O*, E, E*, L, L*], followed
by the most likely judgment based on those frequencies.
According to the peritoneal lavage tree, the best indication of whether it is right to do
a lavage is whether or not the patient has abdominal scarring. This makes sense because
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C
C* O
O* E
E* L
L*
-----------------------------------------------------------------Abdomen Exam
0
0
40 81 0
0
0
0
Abdominal X-ray
5
2
1
4
0
0
0
0
Abdominal Scarring
20 0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Absent Rectal Tone
6
3
9
12 0
0
0
0
Antibiotics
44 37 14 5
1
0
7
2
Any LWE
6
8
10 5
0
0
0
1
Blood In Gastrointestinal Tract
0
0
18 29 0
0
0
0
Blood In Stool
1
3
12 13 0
0
0
0
Chest Exam
0
0
10 38 0
0
0
0
Cover Wound L Chest
0
0
3
4
2
2
5
3
Cover Wound R Chest
0
0
1
1
2
1
7
2
CT Scan Abdomen
3
5
3
1
0
0
0
0
Decr. Breath Sounds (Left)
0
0
13 7
0
0
0
0
Decr. Breath Sounds (Right)
0
0
13 7
0
0
0
0
Distended Neck Veins
0
0
10 14 1
1
31 4
IVP
5
11 0
17 0
0
0
0
Laparotomy
0
7
0
5
0
0
0
0
Muffled Heart Sounds
0
0
25 26 0
0
0
0
Neurologic Exam
4
0
39 43 0
0
0
0
Ng Aspiration P Lat Cxr
2
1
11 10 0
0
0
0
0
0
Objective Abdominal Evaluation
0
0
4
7
0
0
Pericardial Tamponade
0
0
12 70 0
0
0
0
Peritoneal Lavage
12 27 1
3
1
0
0
0
Physical Exam
0
0
2
10 0
0
0
0
Questions Re Heart Injury
0
0
32 26 0
0
0
0
Re-Evaluate Abdomen
0
0
12 3
0
0
0
0
Survey Chest Xray
5
2
5
40 2
1
9
8
Tenderness
4
5
3
4
0
0
0
1
Thoracic Aortogram
6
4
0
1
0
0
0
0
Thoracotomy (Left)
0
5
2
1
0
0
0
0
Thoracotomy (Right)
0
3
2
0
0
0
0
0
Urinalysis Rbc
4
2
11 5
0
0
0
1
Urologic Consult
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Vascular Injury
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
Verify Hidden P Asp Sac
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Figure 2.2: Frequency of judge's error comments on selected actions.
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Percentage accuracy for tree 1 = 95.271 +/- 0.720864
Mean square error for tree 1 = 0.0768723
Expected accuracy for tree 1 = 95.271
Average utility for tree 1 = 96.5975
Estimated accuracy from X-val = 93.951+/-0.80962
Leaf count for tree 1 = 15, expected = 15.000000
ABDOMINAL-SCARRING in Y,U:
|
NG-ASPIRATION in N,Y:
|
|
LAPAROTOMY = U:
|
|
|
WOUND1-YLOC in LC,UA,LA:
|
|
|
|
WOUND1-ZLOC in POST,LAT: +0+0+1+2+0+0+0+0+0+0] C*
|
|
|
|
WOUND1-ZLOC in ANT: +15+0+0+2+0+0+0+0+1+0] NIL
|
|
|
WOUND1-YLOC in UC: +0+9+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0] ONIL
|
|
LAPAROTOMY = Y: +0+18+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0] ONIL
|
NG-ASPIRATION in U:
|
|
BLOOD-IN-STOOL in U,N: +3+503+0+0+0+1+0+0+0+0] ONIL
|
|
BLOOD-IN-STOOL in Y: +3+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0] NIL
ABDOMINAL-SCARRING in N:
|
LAPAROTOMY = U:
|
|
TENDERNESS in U,Y:
|
|
|
WOUND1-ZLOC in ANT,LAT: +94+0+4+13+0+0+0+0+0+0] NIL
|
|
|
WOUND1-ZLOC in POST:
|
|
|
|
OBTUNDATION in N,U: +3+0+4+5+0+0+0+0+0+0] C*
|
|
|
|
OBTUNDATION in Y: +6+0+0+3+0+0+0+0+0+0] NIL
|
|
TENDERNESS in N:
|
|
|
OBSERVE-BLEED-PERIT-ABD = U:
|
|
|
|
REASSESS-L-CHEST = U:
|
|
|
|
|
REASSESS-R-CHEST = U:
|
|
|
|
|
|
NG-ASPIRATION in U,Y: +19+0+1+1+0+0+0+0+0+0] NIL
|
|
|
|
|
|
NG-ASPIRATION in N: +0+0+2+1+0+0+0+0+0+0] C
|
|
|
|
|
REASSESS-R-CHEST = Y: +0+3+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0] ONIL
|
|
|
|
REASSESS-L-CHEST = Y: +0+15+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0] ONIL
|
|
|
OBSERVE-BLEED-PERIT-ABD = Y: +0+27+0+0+1+2+0+0+0+0] ONIL
|
LAPAROTOMY = Y: +0+105+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0] ONIL

Figure 2.3: The tree produced for peritoneal lavage.
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# judges making comment
1 2 3
Commission 112 21 5
Omission
288 95 15
Table 2.1: Agreement between judges on actions
a lavage should not be done if the patient has a scarred abdomen. In addition, since
lavage is an abdominal procedure, all of the decision points on this tree have to do with
symptoms in the abdomen, or with the location of the wound being in the abdomen or
lower chest. A nal point about this tree is that the decision to do a laparotomy (operate
on the abdomen) obviates the need for a peritoneal lavage, since any information the lavage
would have provided will be made evident during the operation. Therefore, the decision
not to do a lavage when a laparotomy is called for is always put in the category ONIL (not
a mistake not to do it).
I generated trees for ve actions of di erent types, each of which had a high number of
errors associated with it in the judges evaluations. These actions were: peritoneal lavage,
survey chest X-ray, antibiotics, neurologic exam, and checking for distended neck veins.
The tree for peritoneal lavage has the highest accuracy of all the trees with an estimated
accuracy of 93.951%, and is the most intuitively understandable tree. The lowest estimated
accuracy for the actions I analyzed was 85.723% for the antibiotics tree.
The low predicted accuracy of these trees indicates a lack of agreement between the
judges as to what constitutes an error. In fact, as table 2.1 shows, the majority of comments
made regarding errors of commission and omission were made by only one judge. For errors
of commission, only 21 comments were produced by two of the three judges and only 5
comments were produced by all three judges, as compared to 112 comments that were
made by one judge alone. In the case of omissions, 288 omissions were noted by a single
judge, 95 by two judges, and just 15 by all three judges. There were no agreements on
errors of scheduling.
Even more problematic than the low accuracy is the fact that an error of any kind is
only predicted by a total of ve branches in three of the ve trees. Since the number of
errors marked is so small compared to the overall number of actions, and there is little
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agreement about the errors that are marked, it is generally more accurate to predict that
an action (or lack of action) is not an error.
It is probable that the lack of predictive power in these trees is due in large part to
the fact that the error data were not collected with this analysis in mind, but rather
for the purposes of an overall evaluation of the TraumAID system. The judges were not
asked to mark down every item they believed was an error, but were supposed to use their
individual markings to guide them in picking an overall ranking for the case. Looking at
the evaluation forms, it appears that the judges sometimes did not mark down any errors,
even when they gave the case a low rating.
It seems, therefore, that additional data would be necessary in order to nd out anything useful about the classi cation of errors in trauma care by this method. This analysis
led me to consider that rather than trying to de ne a classi cation scheme for errors
from scratch, it would be more productive to use the plans generated by TraumAID as
a gold-standard, comparing them to the physicians' intended plans and considering any
discrepancies as potential errors. Treating TraumAID's plans as a gold-standard for care
is justi ed because they have been judged to be globally acceptable by a panel of experts.

2.3 An Overview of TraumAID 2.0
At the core of the TraumAID system is the integration of a rule-based reasoner that reasons
from evidence to conclusions and management goals, with a planner that determines how
best to satisfy the set of currently active goals (see Figure 2.4). Using this approach,
TraumAID is able to exibly interleave diagnostic and therapeutic action, thus addressing
the competing needs arising from multiple injuries.
The representation of plans in TraumAID and TraumaTIQ will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 4. I will just outline it briey here.
TraumAID's plans are constructed out of three types of objects: goals, procedures, and
actions. Goals correspond to abstract plans which are addressed by performing actions in
the world. TraumAID's rule-based reasoner determines what goals are relevant to pursue,
given the current state of the patient, and its planner then constructs a plan consisting of
actions to address the relevant goals.
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Figure 2.4: System Architecture of TraumAID 2.0
TraumAID associates each goal with a disjunctive list of procedures for addressing
it. This association is called a goal-procedure mapping. In each mapping, the procedures
are ordered preferentially with respect to the goal. When planning to address a set of
goals, TraumAID's planner selects one procedure for each goal from the goal-procedure
mapping. Selection depends on both the local procedure preference rankings for each goal,
and global considerations resulting from the need to address multiple goals concurrently.
In the situation shown in Figure 2.5(b), procedure P1 can be used to address both relevant
goals, G1 and G2.
G1

G2

G1

G2

G1

G2
goals

P1

P1

P2

P1

procedures

P2

actions
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A2
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(a) Independent

A5

A6

A1

A2

A3

(b) Shared Procedure

A1

A2

A3

A4

A5

(c) Shared Action

Figure 2.5: Three possible multiple goal-procedure-action con gurations
24

A procedure comprises an ordered sequence of actions, stored in a procedure-action
mapping. Actions can participate in more than one procedure at a time, and thus can be
used in addressing more than one goal as shown in Figure 2.5(c). This concept of action
overloading is exploited by TraumAID's planner to produce globally ecient plans.
To determine the currently relevant goals for the planner to address, TraumAID's
reasoner makes use of two types of rules: evidential rules that map from evidence (observations, test results, intermediate conclusions, and information about the performance of
actions) to conclusions, and goal-setting rules that map from evidence and conclusions to
diagnostic and therapeutic goals. Whenever any new evidence is introduced, the reasoner
is triggered, forward chaining through its entire set of rules and posting the results of any
goal-setting rule that res to the list of currently pending goals. After the new set of
goals is complete, the planner is invoked to determine how best to satisfy this particular
combination of goals.
The reasoner controls information acquisition using a conservative, staged strategy for
selecting diagnosis and treatment goals 75]: goals whose satisfaction requires expensive
and/or risky, de nitive tests are not included in a plan until they are justi ed by less costly
tests or observations, and de nitive treatment is not recommended without the results of
sucient evidence from diagnostic tests. These strategies appear in the knowledge base as
a chain of related management goals, such as a goal to diagnose hematuria (blood in the
urine), which if present, triggers a goal to diagnose bladder injury, which in turn can lead
to a goal to treat bladder injury. Goals may also be related in a plan by being addressable
by the same action. For example, the goal of RO-hemothorax (\rule out blood in the
chest cavity") leads to doing a survey chest x-ray, as does the goal of RO-lacerateddiaphragm (\rule out a lacerated diaphragm"). There is no strategic relationship between
these two goals { the injuries may be caused by di erent wounds { yet they are related by
the fact that the same action can be used to address them.
Once a set of relevant goals has been determined, the planner's choice of how to address
each goal is based on both local and global considerations. Given a goal's goal-procedure
mapping, all else being equal, the rst procedure will be chosen. A less preferred procedure
may be selected if it would result in a globally more optimal (less costly) plan. Figure 2.5
shows three possible con gurations for a portion of a plan addressing two goals.
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The plans produced by TraumAID's planner are partially ordered according to both
logistical and clinical constraints. Logistical constraints are due to the fact that patients
are only moved in one direction through the Trauma Center { from the emergency center,
optionally to the radiology suite, then optionally to the operating suite, and nally either
to the trauma unit or discharged to go home. Actions with logistical constraints on their
performance are scheduled so as to avoid transferring the patient back to a place he has
already been.
Clinical constraints have to do with the urgency and priority of an action, which it
inherits from the goals it is being used to address. The urgency can be either catastrophic,
unstable, or stable, representing the patient's condition and thus how quickly the goal must
be addressed. Catastrophic goals must be addressed immediately. Unstable goals must
be addressed before stable goals. Priorities represent standard practices of trauma care:
if there are no di erences in urgency, problems involving the airway are addressed before
those involving breathing, which are addressed before those involving circulation, etc. (the
\ABC's of trauma care").
The planner initially uses a \greedy" algorithm that iterates throughout the current
set of goals ordered by urgency and priority, selecting a procedure to address each one not
addressed by an already selected procedure and then ordering those procedures according
to relative urgencies, logistical constraints, standardized priorities, and approximate temporal extent. After this initial planning phase, the beginning of the plan is optimized to
ensure that the plan takes advantage of all procedures that can be used to satisfy more
than one active goal 74, 75]. Only the beginning of the plan is optimized because complete optimization is NP-hard and because later parts of the plan may change when new
information is recorded.

2.4 The Trauma Team
The hospital personnel responsible for the initial de nitive management of trauma patients
are referred to as the \trauma team." A trauma team consists of ve to seven people,
including both physicians and nurses. For the purposes of TraumAID we are primarily
interested in two members of the trauma team:
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The chief surgical resident is the primary decision maker on the team5 and as such
is the person whose decisions TraumAID and TraumaTIQ are intended to inuence.
In the rest of this dissertation, the chief surgical resident will be referred to simply
as \the physician."
The scribe nurse is responsible for documenting all the ndings, tests, and treatments
in chronological order for the record. Normally, these data are recorded on a paper
form called a Trauma Flow Sheet (TFS). When TraumAID is in use, the scribe nurse
will enter information directly into the computer instead.

2.5 An Architecture for Critiquing Trauma Management
Plans
In designing an information-delivery system to provide decision support during trauma
care, it is helpful to look at some of the characteristics of the trauma situation and how
they reect on the information needs of the physician. In fact, the approach that I have
taken in designing this system could be applicable in any domain that exhibits these
features:
1.

Multiple goals: Trauma management often involves reasoning about multiple inter-

acting goals. Therefore, the physician's proposed actions must be evaluated globally,
in the context of the entire plan. Additionally, the presence of multiple goals with
varying degrees of urgency means that the critique must address not only what actions are performed but also the order in which they are carried out.

2.

Time constraints: In trauma management, diagnosis and treatment of di erent

actions are carried out within the same time frame, and the urgency associated with
actions makes it important to intervene within a short period of time. The critiquing
system must therefore be capable of constantly updating its representation of the
situation and the user's plan, and revising its critique based on new information.
5

Although she is supervised by a faculty attending physician.
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3.

Task-centered activity: In an emergency situation such as trauma resuscitation,

the physician's primary focus of attention is reserved for the task of caring for the
patient. Therefore, the amount of work that she has to do to understand the critique
should be kept to a minimum. The system should avoid saying anything that (a)
the physician already knows, (b) is \common knowledge" to anyone who would be
using the system, or (c) reects trivial di erences between the system's preferences
and the physician's.

4.

Gap between order and execution: Actions that involve resources that need to

be brought to the trauma bay or that can only be done elsewhere must be ordered
prior to being carried out. Since orders can be rescinded, comments pointing out
problems with an order can potentially make a clinically signi cant di erence to
patient management.

TraumaTIQ's critiquing process is triggered whenever new information is entered by the
scribe nurse and delivered to TraumAID. This information can be in the form of (1) bedside
ndings, (2) diagnostic test results (indicating both that a diagnostic action has been
performed and what the results of that action were), (3) therapeutic actions performed, or
(4) diagnostic or therapeutic actions ordered by the physician. From TraumaTIQ's point of
view, the orders represent the actions that the physician intends to perform, and therefore
provide the basis for formulating a critique.
Given some new input to the system, TraumaTIQ then interprets the physician's orders
in terms of their underlying goals, evaluates the inferred plan structure by comparing it
to TraumAID's recommended plan, and nally generates an English critique addressing
elements of the physician's plan that were found during the evaluation phase to represent
potential problems. Figure 2.6 shows the architecture of TraumaTIQ, comprising plan
recognition, plan evaluation, and critique generation.
The purpose of plan recognition is to understand why the physician is doing what she is
doing. This enables both suggesting alternatives to address the same goals, and explaining
why actions may not be justi ed. The plan recognition module will be described in detail
in Chapter 4.
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Plan evaluation is done to identify errors and determine whether they are signi cant
enough to report in the critique. Potential errors are identi ed by looking for discrepancies
between the physician's plan and TraumAID's plan. Errors may be due to omissions,
commissions, or violations of scheduling constraints in the physician's plan. The output of
the plan evaluator is the informational content of the critique. The plan evaluation module
is described in detail in Chapter 5.
Finally, the critique generation module takes the output of the plan evaluator, organizes
the comments by topic, and generates English sentences by lling slots in pre-written
templates with the relevant concepts. This process is described in Chapter 6.
TraumAID 2.0
Reasoner

goals
conclusions

patient
information

Changes to
the world

Planner
plan

actions
ordered

Plan
Recognition

physician
plan

Plan
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Physician
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contents

Figure 2.6: The TraumaTIQ module
Before going on to describe the components of the critiquing architecture in depth, the
next chapter provides some background on work in critiquing and related areas.
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Chapter 3

Related Work on Critiquing
While the term critiquing was rst used to describe systems that evaluated medical treatment plans, it has since been applied to a wide range of knowledge-based applications. The
basic approach of providing an evaluation of a user's solution has proved to be of use for
a variety of problems. As I suggested in the previous chapter, the design of a critiquing
system depends to a considerable extent on the features of the task domain in which the
system functions. Critiquing systems have been developed for diverse problems in a number of domains, ranging from medical therapy planning to computer aided design. Other
systems perform some of the functions of critiquing systems, although their developers
do not call what they do \critiquing." In this chapter, I present a review of some of the
literature relevant to critiquing and discuss their contributions and weaknesses.

3.1 Medical Critiquing Systems
The term critiquing was rst introduced by Perry Miller 53] in describing his ATTENDING
system for critiquing anesthesia management. Since then, much of the work on critiquing
has been done in medical domains. Providing decision-support to physicians lends itself to
the critiquing approach both because of the need for a user-focused, non-confrontational
style of interaction, and because of the variability inherent in solutions to medical problems.
In this section, I describe several medical critiquing systems, starting with the original
ATTENDING systems.
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3.1.1 The ATTENDING family of critics
The original ATTENDING system 53], which was the rst to be called a critiquing system,
was designed to critique the management of anesthesia for patients undergoing surgery.
Miller was motivated to introduce the critiquing approach by a desire to develop expert
consulting systems that would be useful in domains characterized by subjectivity and
variability in treatment practices. Many areas of medicine have the feature that there is
not always one \correct" way to do things. A physician's choice of procedure may depend
on her own personal experience or on nuances in the patient that are dicult to quantify in
a knowledge base. Traditional expert systems that produce a solution to a problem input
by the user are not well equipped to handle such situations. First, while their solutions
may be \good" in a general sense, they may not always be the \best" solution under the
circumstances because they do not take the physician's subjective preferences into account.
Furthermore, a consulting system that gives the impression of telling the doctor what is
the \right" thing to do may, on the one hand, lead to the doctor taking that advice too
literally without rst giving it a careful evaluation, or on the other hand it may lead to
frustration and disuse of the system if it is constantly presenting the doctor with solutions
that she does not agree with.
The original ATTENDING uses a system of rules implemented as Augmented Decision Networks (ADNs), based on the model of Augmented Transition Networks (ATNs), to
evaluate the user's proposals for anesthetic management. The ADNs represent choices that
must be made about a patient's anesthesia in a hierarchical structure that captures relationships between decisions and sub-decisions. Arcs in the ADN are connected to Problem
Management Frames that indicate the anesthetic implications of certain medical problems.
ATTENDING uses its knowledge of anesthesia and risks associated with various conditions
to evaluate the physician's proposed approach and suggest appropriate alternatives. Finally a prose generator based on ATNs produces a critique of the physician's solution
including a discussion of the risks associated with various techniques and con rmation of
decisions it nds acceptable.
Further investigation of the critiquing approach led to the development of a family of
critiquing systems based on the ATTENDING model. The motivation for developing these
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prototype systems was, as discussed in Chapter 2, to explore the critiquing approach in
di erent domains in order to identify features of domains that would lend themselves to
critiquing, and to explore di erent facets of critiquing applications. A complete description
of the ATTENDING family of critiquing systems is presented in Miller's book 54].
HT-ATTENDING is a critic for the pharmacologic management of essential hypertension. This domain has the properties that there are a huge number of drugs that can
be used to treat a patient with hypertension, and that clinical knowledge in the eld is in
rapid ux. Miller envisions a critiquing system for this domain as a sort of electronic survey
paper that is capable of explaining to the physician how his particular style of treatment
ts in with current thinking in the eld.
VQ-ATTENDING critiques ventilator management for patients on mechanical respiratory support. This domain is interesting because it lends itself to a form of goal-directed
critiquing. In designing a critiquing system for ventilator management, Miller found that
it was useful to separate the system's strategic knowledge about management goals from
the tactical knowledge about how to achieve those goals. The goal-directed approach seen
in VQ-ATTENDING is somewhat similar to my approach to critiquing trauma management. However, it is not able to handle interacting goals or to critique the choice of goals
as well as the management choices. Furthermore, it does not function on-line, during the
ventilation process, but rather critiques the entire ventilator management plan prior to its
execution.
PHEO-ATTENDING is a system for critiquing the laboratory and radiologic workup
of patients for suspected pheochromocytoma (a rare kind of tumor of the adrenal gland).
Workup is the process of performing tests and procedures in order to rule in or out a
particular diagnosis. Optimizing workup is important because the tests and procedures
involved can be costly. In TraumAID, this kind of diagnostic activity is treated in a
goal-directed manner, along with the planning of therapeutic activity.
From the problem of workup, Miller moved to critiquing di erential diagnosis in radiology with the ICON system. With ICON, a radiologist enters a set of ndings from a
chest x-ray and proposes a diagnosis in response to these ndings. The system produces
a discussion of how the ndings relate to the proposed diagnosis, and what additional
ndings might help to clarify the diagnosis further.
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Finally, Miller has developed a shell, E-ATTENDING, for the development of critiquing
systems that includes a di erential analyzer and a prose generator.
Miller has thus developed systems that start with a diagnosis and critiques proposed
therapy, and a system that starts with ndings and critiques proposed diagnoses. He does
not, however, take the step taken in TraumAID of combining diagnosis and therapy and
critiquing an integrated management plan. In part, this is a function of the domains she
has chosen to work with, which do not involve pressure to make decisions and act quickly to
address urgent problems. In a domain like trauma management it is necessary to interleave
diagnosis and therapy so that problems can be addressed within a limited time frame. In
less time-critical domains it is possible to carry out a complete di erential diagnosis before
beginning to plan appropriate therapy. Also, the focus of these systems on getting a correct
diagnosis before proceeding to treatment is not shared by TraumAID. It is less important
to TraumAID that the physician gets the correct diagnosis than that she does the right
thing.

3.1.2 ONCOCIN: User-guided critiquing
The ONCOCIN system 45] is an example of an expert consulting system that was adapted
to critique user solutions rather than present its own recommendations. In the course of
testing their original system, the developers of ONCOCIN found that its users had signi cant diculty with the fact that they had to justify their reasoning each time they wished
to override the system's decisions. In response to this complaint, the developers decided to
move to a critiquing interface that would allow the user greater autonomy in the decisionmaking process, and would therefore have a positive e ect on system acceptability. The
knowledge base in ONCOCIN was based on existing protocols for cancer treatment, but
there are cases where the physician may wish to vary from the protocol, and the critiquing
system allows for such deviations without requiring an irritating override procedure.
To convert ONCOCIN from a traditional consultation system to a critiquing system, a
hierarchical plan analyzer was added. The program still develops its own solution to the
patient's management, but rather than present this solution to the user immediately, it
waits and prompts the user to enter her proposed management plan. The user's solution
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is then formatted into a hierarchical structure and compared step by step to the \correct"
solution derived by the program.
The critiques produced by ONCOCIN are in the form of a user-guided explanation of
the system's reasoning. After the plan analyzer produces a list of the signi cant di erences
it nds between the user's plan and its own, it presents these di erences to the user and
asks if she would like further explanation of how ONCOCIN reached its conclusions. To
explain how a conclusion was reached, ONCOCIN presents an English translation of the
rule that caused it to form that conclusion. The facts that support that rule are then
added to the agenda { a list of items that the user may want to know more about. At
each point during the critiquing process the user is presented with the current agenda and
asked which item she wishes to have explained. In this way, rather than presenting all the
relevant information or using a user model to determine what information the user might
like to see, the critique is tailored to his speci c interests.
While this method of presentation allows the user to look at only those items in which
she is speci cally interested, it has the disadvantage that she must actively elicit the critique
using a process that is somewhat awkward and time-consuming. This may be acceptable
in the context of a pre-treatment consulting session in which ONCOCIN was designed to
be used, but it would not be feasible for a system that is intended to function during the
management of a patient in need of urgent medical attention.

3.1.3 HyperCritic: Critiquing from Automated Medical Records
The HyperCritic system developed by Van der Lei 90] looks at patient data stored in automated medical records of patients with hypertension and critiques the therapy reported
in those medical records. HyperCritic identi es signi cant events in the medical records
and then uses a set of domain-independent critiquing tasks to assign critiquing statements
to those events. From the point of view of system design, the main contribution of the HyperCritic system is the separation of domain knowledge from critiquing knowledge. Unlike
the decision rules in the ATTENDING family of systems, HyperCritic's four categories of
critiquing tasks { preparation, selection, monitoring, and responding { are not stated in
terms of speci c medical knowledge, but rather in terms of more general properties, such as
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side e ects, contraindications, and appropriate dosages. For example, one of the selection
tasks is triggered whenever a new drug is started, and checks to see if any contraindications
for that drug are present in the medical record. Speci c drugs and contraindications are
not mentioned in the speci cation of the critiquing task. In his thesis, Van der Lei shows
how this separation of domain knowledge and critiquing knowledge facilitates acquisition
and maintenance of the medical knowledge base in the HyperCritic system.
Another important contribution of Van der Lei's work is a thorough analysis of the
feasibility and e ectiveness of critiquing from automated medical records in the domain
of hypertension. He compared the critiques produced by his system to critiques produced
from the same medical records by eight physicians. He found that there were several areas
where the system failed to produce comments that were produced by the physicians, and
on the whole HyperCritic tended to be less critical than the physicians in terms of the
number of comments it produced. However, when the system did produce a comment it
was quite highly correlated with the physicians' opinions. The evaluation indicates that
the critiquing system can produce useful comments from the data in medical records.

3.1.4 Critiquing Guideline-Based Care
In 77] Shahar and Musen discuss the representation and reasoning needed to support
the application of clinical guidelines and protocols to patient care. These standardized
policies for care are used both to ensure the quality of care and (in the case of protocols)
to facilitate experimental analysis. These guidelines can be thought of as highly reusable
skeletal reactive plans which must be re ned over time in order to be used. They represent
these plans using language of temporal-abstraction patterns which describe events and
parameters that hold during intervals of time. The application of clinical guidelines can
be problematic because the guidelines are often ambiguous or incomplete, and require the
physician to interpret the intentions behind the guideline in order to decide how to act.
Shahar and Musen characterize the relationship between the physician and the automated decision-support system as a collaboration between two planners, each of which may
bring di erent knowledge and skills to the situation. They emphasize the importance of
plan recognition and reasoning about plan revision on the part of the system in order to
35

understand the relationship between the intentions of the designer of the clinical guideline
and the physician executing the guideline. When the executed treatment deviates from
the guideline, it is important for the system to be able to determine whether the deviation
upholds the spirit of the guideline, achieving the designer's intended goals, or whether it
represents a real violation of the guideline. In order to do this, it is necessary that the
actions and plans in the guideline be annotated with the intentions behind them, a feature
that is not currently available in clinical guidelines. The system must also have a representation of actions and plans in the domain so as to be able to infer the goals underlying
the executing physician's actions.
The work presented in this dissertation addresses a number of the issues presented in
77]. The information in TraumAID's knowledge base represents guidelines for trauma
management, which are re ned incrementally over time by TraumAID's planner. The role
of TraumaTIQ is to interpret the actions of the managing physician and determine when
they deviate signi cantly from TraumAID's guidelines. Chapters 4-7 describe the approach
to this problem that I have developed and implemented in TraumaTIQ.

3.2 Critiquing Designs
Another area in which the critiquing paradigm has been applied with some success is that
of design critiquing 23, 43, 72]. This is a rather di erent application of critiquing than
I am concerned with for this project. Critics have been implemented to assist with the
design of buildings, individual room layouts, computer programs, etc. In these programs,
the system is provided with a set of rules or constraints for evaluating a design. When the
proposed design violates any of these constraints, a critique is generated. One advantage of
this type of critic is that it can be embedded as part of a computerized design environment,
so that the design being critiqued is directly available to the critiquing system and there
is no concern with modelling external phenomena within the system. In addition, since
there is less of a sense of there being a \right answer" in design critiquing than in plan
critiquing, the system does not have to generate its own solution in order to produce a
critique.
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The Archie system 43] for assisting design in the domain of architecture uses a casebased approach to critiquing. The user interested in evaluating a potential building design
inputs a description of the conceptual design of the building, and the system searches its
database for relevant stories taken from evaluations of existing buildings. These stories
serve as a critique, pointing out potential problems with the design the user has suggested.
Another approach to design critiquing appears in LISP-CRITIC 22]. This is a system
that helps programmers to improve their lisp code by \suggesting transformations that will
make the code more cognitively ecient (i.e. easier to read and maintain) or more machine
ecient (i.e. faster or smaller)." 1 LISP-CRITIC generates its critiques on demand and
allows the user to accept or reject its suggestions. One shortcoming of this system is that
it is not able to evaluate the e ect of its suggested transformations on the correctness of
the code.
JANUS 22] is a design environment for the construction of kitchen designs. The
critiquing component of JANUS has knowledge about building codes, safety standards, and
functional preferences. When a rule is violated, the system displays a message explaining
the nature of the problem. An extension of this system, KID 24] allows the user to
specify their high-level goals and priorities for a particular design, thus introducing greater
exibility into the system. The KID system is user-extensible, allowing its users to add to
the rule-base if the speci c situation they are concerned with is not covered.

3.3 Critiquing Based on Cognitive Biases
In his research on developing automated critics, Silverman 79] has developed what he
calls a generative theory of \bugs" to produce a rule base of errors resulting from cognitive
biases and slips or lapses in memory. This work draws heavily from work in cognitive
psychology on identifying the causes of human error 41]. According to this theory, people often exhibit judgment biases in the performance of cognitive tasks, causing them to
commit errors. These errors occur in tasks involving information acquisition, information
processing, intended output, and paying attention to feedback.
This is similar to the Program Enhancement Advisor described in 60] except that the latter is more
concerned with the knowledge representations necessary to explain the system's reasoning.
1
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This rule base of errors is used as a basis for evaluating the domain of the critic and
determining which types of errors are likely to occur. Once the typical sources of error
have been identi ed, appropriate critiquing strategies can be developed to inform the user
about his errors.
In the application presented in 79], forecasting potential threats to Army equipment
during missions, the user's input is restricted to simple answers to queries from the system.
The system's explicit knowledge of judgment biases, along with some super cial knowledge
about when and where these biases may appear in the current domain, allow it to warn
the user when she is exhibiting judgment characteristic of any of these biases. The system
does not have any deep knowledge of the domain, or of the user's knowledge or reasoning
processes. No reasoning about plans is involved in this critic.

3.4 Language generation and critiquing
One of the key issues for any system that is intended to interact with users is how to
communicate its information as e ectively as possible. In the case of critiquing, this has
generally been done through natural language. The generation of critiques as coherent
natural language texts has been addressed most thoroughly by Rankin 70]. A discussion
of both deep and surface requirements of natural language critiques appears in 55], which
compares the linguistic tasks of explanation and critiquing. The following subsections
describe these papers.

3.4.1 The deep generation of critique text
As I have mentioned previously, one of the major motivations for developing critiquing
systems over more traditional consulting systems is the potential for increased acceptability to the user. Therefore, it is important that the output of these systems be easy to
understand. To this end, Rankin 70] has investigated methods for the deep generation of
text in critiquing systems. Deep generation, as opposed to surface generation, is concerned
with establishing the content and ordering of the comments that will make up the critique.
Surface generation { nding the actual words and phrases to express the content speci ed
during deep generation { is not addressed in this work.
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Rankin's investigation of critique generation was motivated by Miller's work with ATNs
and expressive frames to generate text. He rst examines these techniques in the context
of an experimental Miller-type implementation called CRIME (CRitiquing In MEdicine),
a system for critiquing the treatment of urinary tract infections (UTI). This is a simple domain, with a small number of decision points and a fairly standard protocol for treatment,
so the number of comments that the critic needs to produce is small and the choice of appropriate critiques is straightforward. While it was possible to develop an ATN to produce
reasonable critiques in this domain, Rankin concludes that this approach is inexible and
not suitable for large-scale applications or unpredictable domains. Another criticism he
makes is that the production of critiques in these systems does not take the individual user
into account, producing the same comment regardless of who it is addressing and what
that person might already know.
Rankin has developed a more general and reusable approach to deep critique generation
involving three stages. First, establish the expressive goals of the critique. Second, determine the exact content of the critique based on the speci c situation and knowledge about
the user. Finally, put the critique comments in an appropriate order. He rst considers
how to determine the goals of the critique. In the domain of UTI treatment, he identi es
four main types of comment that should be available: the system can CONFIRM correct
decisions, INFORM the user of information she may not be aware of, WARN the user when
a proposed treatment presents some risk to the patient, and JUSTIFY2 its conclusions by
explaining its reasoning. The rst step in critique generation in Rankin's model is to examine each part of the user's proposed treatment, generating comments corresponding to
these four types wherever they are appropriate. For example, when the user proposes a
treatment that the system nds to be correct, a CONFIRM comment is generated. When
some additional information is found to be relevant to a decision, an INFORM is generated
along with a JUSTIFY to explain the underlying reasoning. All these comments together
represent the goals of the critique.
The next step in the process is to determine the nal content of the critique by eliminating redundant or unnecessary comments. While all the comments produced in the rst
stage represent communicative goals, some of these goals may have already been achieved,
2

Justication is actually a set of sub-types including elaboration, motivation, cause, and sequence.
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some of them may be implicitly understood, and some of them can be assumed to be part of
the user's beliefs already. To tailor the critique contents to speci c users, Rankin's system
has a user model that keeps track of a representation of the user's beliefs at every point
during the consultation. For example, if the user prescribes an antibiotic, Trimetoprin, to
treat a patient's infection, the user model will be updated to include the belief that the
patient should be treated with an antibiotic, and the belief that the antibiotic should be
Trimetoprin. When the system informs the user of a fact, the user model is updated to
include a belief about that fact, and if the new belief conicts with a belief already in the
user model, the old belief is removed to maintain the consistency of the model. The user
model is used to determine which comments are relevant and should be shown to the user.
Information that the user already believes (according to the user model) is not included in
the critique.
The nal stage in deep critique generation is to organize the comments into a reasonable
order. To produce a coherent critique, it is desirable to link related statements together
in the nal output, either by juxtaposition or by marking certain relationships such as
elaborations or motivations with cue words. Rankin uses Rhetorical Structure Theory
(RST) 51] to organize the comments in his critiques into longer sequences. RST is a
model of text structure that uses prede ned schemas to represent relationships such as
elaboration, motivation, and causation, that can exist between di erent portions of text.
Rankin uses RST schemas to link statements to their justi cations in appropriate ways.
The schemas specify the order in which statements should be given, as well as appropriate
choices for cue words and phrases such as \because" in an elaboration schema or \may
result in" in a cause schema.
While his model does not have anything to say about plan analysis in complex and unpredictable domains, Rankin makes some interesting points about how to generate relevant,
coherent, and useful critiques. His rst insight is that a general procedure for producing
text can be initiated by classifying statements according to the goals they are supposed to
achieve. Another important point brought out in this paper is that communication with a
user can be facilitated by building and maintaining a model of that user's knowledge and
beliefs. Finally, Rankin demonstrates how relationships between statements in the critique
can be reected in the ordering of the text.
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3.4.2 The relationship between explanation and critiquing
In their analysis of the attitudes of physicians toward computer-based consultation systems,
Teach and Shortli e 86] found that while doctors do not demand that a consultation
system always be correct, it must be able to explain its decisions. In developing explainable
expert systems, researchers have been concerned primarily with such issues as the level of
knowledge representation necessary to provide good explanations, and how to organize
explanation into a coherent text 60]. More recently, more sophisticated approaches have
been proposed, integrating work from the natural language generation community with
work on explainable expert systems 61], and allowing for interactive explanation, where
the user can request additional clari cation or justi cation in response to the system's
explanations 57].
In 55], Mittal and Paris discuss the di erences between text generation for explanation
and for critiquing, both in terms of surface (tactical) generation and deep (strategic) generation. In critiquing, the interpersonal aspect of the interaction is much more important
than it is in explanation. With respect to surface generation, they point out that because
of the di erent roles of explanation and critique, phrasing in an explanation is not as important as it is in a critique. Since a critique is an evaluation of the user's reasoning, it
is important to present it in a manner which will not be insulting or argumentative. An
understanding of the impact of particular speech acts, words, and phrases is important for
this purpose 5].
Deep generation involves selecting the content and organization of text. Both of these
elements di er between explanation and critiquing. In terms of the content of the text,
unlike explanations, critiques need to present alternative solutions to a single problem. In
terms of the structure of the text, Mittal and Paris point out that the rhetorical relations
that appear most often in critiques, such as concession, exhortation, contrast, antithesis, and justi cation, di er from those that tend to appear in explanatory texts, such as
background, attributive, and elaboration.
In designing a critiquing system, it is important to keep in mind the speci c role of the
text it produces, using a critiquing style that is appropriate to the particular audience that
will be using the system. This issue will be explored further in the discussion of critique
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generation in Chapter 6.

3.5 Reminders and Alerts
Another approach to on-line decision support that is related to critiquing is represented
by reminder or alerting systems 7, 52]. These systems are designed to monitor the data
stored in computerized hospital information systems and produce alerts or reminders when
a situation arises that should potentially be attended to. The knowledge in these systems
consists of long lists of rules that when satis ed will produce an alert or reminder.
While studies have shown that these systems can be incorporated into the hospital
environment in such a way that health care providers will acknowledge them, they are
often not acknowledged until a signi cant amount of time has passed. Furthermore, even
when an alert is acknowledged, it is not clear how often it is acted upon.
Another drawback of these systems is that they do not have an inference engine capable
of accommodating interactions between di erent medical conditions. This means that they
can produce conicting or irrelevant advice if an interaction is present that is not accounted
for a priori in the individual rules. Furthermore, they may fail to suggest an action that
would be appropriate given a combination of two conditions, but not if only one of those
conditions were present.
Finally, these systems di er from the critiquing model in that they do not respond to
the intended actions of the physician. An alert or reminder will be provided regardless of
whether the physician has already indicated an intention to address that issue. Therefore,
these systems are bound to produce a number of unnecessary comments, which may be
the reason that physicians using the HELP system 7] indicated that the best method of
communicating alerts would be to relay them to a nurse, who could then evaluate them
and pass them on to the physician, thus adding a level of indirection between the system
and the primary care-giver.
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3.6 Related work in Human-Computer Interaction
The eld of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) has in recent years started to address the
problem of assisting operators of increasingly complex technological systems. As systems
become more complex, it is no longer possible to rely on system design and automation to
reduce the occurrence of human error. Rather it is necessary to develop systems that can
interpret their operators' performance, identify errors, and respond appropriately either
by providing necessary information or by automating certain parts of the task in progress.
To this end, architectures for an intelligent operator support interfaces have been proposed by Hollnagel 37] and by Rouse et. al. 73]. The former is primarily an implementation of a taxonomy for error classi cation that I will present in detail in Chapter 5. I
will discuss the latter here because it is a more comprehensive high level approach to the
problem.
Rouse et. al.'s architecture is intended primarily for the task of ghter aircraft operation, although its applicability in other domains such as marine operations, power production, and process control is mentioned. The interface architecture comprises four main
modules, all of which have access to representations of world, system, and operator state:
The operator model develops and maintains a model of the operators plans and goals
based on her observed actions. In addition, it predicts the resources she will need
based on her intended actions, and provides an overall evaluation of her performance.
The error monitor identi es and classi es errors, and responds to errors either by
monitoring their existence, supplying feedback, or recommending that the system
take over.
The adaptive aid module decides how to respond to errors, either by trying to make
the task easier for the human operator, by dividing the task between the system and
the operator, or by automating the task entirely.
The interface manager handles the communication between the system and operator,
scheduling comments and requests for information.
While this architecture and TraumaTIQ have several high-level features in common,
on a lower level they are quite di erent. The primary di erence is the fact that Rouse et.
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al.'s architecture is designed for an interface that has complete access to the system state
and operator actions, and can actually a ect the system directly. TraumaTIQ, on the
other hand, only has indirect access to information about the state of the patient and the
physician's actions, and it de nitely cannot a ect the patient directly. While a majority
of the e ort in the work on operator support has gone into determining when the system
should take over from the user, TraumaTIQ is much more dependent on the ability to
infer what the physician is doing on the basis of incomplete or uncertain information, and
how to respond in such a way as to correct or avoid errors. Thus, the plan recognition
technique used by TraumaTIQ is more sophisticated than that used in the operator model
described above.
In addition, since it is impossible for TraumAID to take over the management of the
patient, it is very important that the feedback generated by TraumaTIQ in the form of
critiques is understandable by and acceptable to physicians. The primary concerns for
TraumaTIQ's output interface are natural language issues: rst, that explanations and
justi cations are provided, and second that the critique is phrased in such a way as to get
a response from physicians, or at least not annoy them. Rouse et.al., on the other hand,
focus on interface management as a resource allocation problem, involving various input
and output modalities that must be available for the system's messages and requests to be
processed.

3.7 Critiquing vs. Tutoring
A nal body of work that is closely related to critiquing are intelligent tutoring systems.
These may be static problem-solving tutors designed to teach reasoning skills such as
diagnosis 4, 46, 50, 56], or training environments for teaching behavior skills in dynamic
situations 19, 40, 48, 91]. The latter give students the opportunity to perform the task they
are training on in a simulated environment that provides them with feedback as they learn
and gain experience. Both critiquing systems and training systems involve monitoring the
user, evaluating her performance, and responding on the basis of that evaluation. They
both require some representation of expert domain knowledge, a facility for modeling the
user's behavior, metrics for evaluating performance, and the ability to communicate with
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users. The similarities have led recently to a number of e orts to combine critiquing and
tutoring functions 25, 39], an idea that is also being pursued in the TraumAID project
(see Chapter 9).
Any attempt to combine critiquing and tutoring should, however, be sensitive to the
fundamental di erences between the two functions. A critiquing system is designed to
provide support for users who are already trained in the domain of application, and thus
are primarily concerned with correcting errors in judgment or lapses in memory. Tutoring
systems, on the other hand, are designed for novice users who may not be aware of the
correct use of the techniques and skills they are learning. Therefore, tutoring systems
must put more e ort into representing students' potential errors and providing adequate
explanation. For this reason, their domain is often restricted so that creating the knowledge
base is manageable.
Critiquing systems, on the other hand, can use the assumption that users will often act
correctly to minimize the amount of specialized a priori knowledge about errors that must
be encoded. In addition, while explanation is an important part of critiquing, the level
of detail required is much less than for tutoring since the users can be relied on to know
the basics of the domain. It is also less important for a critiquing system than it is for a
tutoring system to be able to con rm and reinforce the user's correct decisions. The added
depth and breadth of output required for intelligent tutoring means that the problem of
language generation is more complex in these systems.

3.8 Comparison of TraumaTIQ to other systems
As we have seen in this chapter, the critiquing approach has been applied to a wide
range of domains and applications, from architectural design to Lisp programming to
medicine. Table 3.1 is a summary of several medical critiquing systems, including TraumaTIQ, according to a number of features that are relevant to the problem of providing
e ective decision support for quality assurance.
Most medical critiquing systems have been designed to critique therapeutic management
plans, and thus they assume that the patient's diagnosis is known, and that therefore the
relevant therapeutic goals are shared by the physician and the system. The exception to
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System

Critiques Critiques Critiques Real-Time
Output
Therapy Diagnosis Scheduling Performance Generation
ATTENDING
Y
ICON
N
N
ATN
ONCOCIN
Y
N
N
N
Rule Trans.
CLAS
N
N
N
Y
Templates
Reminder
N
N
N
Y
Canned Text
HyperCritic
Y
N
N
N
Templates
Rankin
Y
N
Y
N
RST
TraumaTIQ
Y
Y
Y
Y
Templates
Table 3.1: Summary of Critiquing Systems
this was one of Miller's ATTENDING critics, called ICON 54], which was designed to
critique di erential diagnoses, but not in combination with therapy planning.
In contrast, TraumaTIQ starts with the diagnosis being unknown and critiques both
diagnostic and therapeutic actions. TraumaTIQ does not critique diagnostic conclusions
directly, but to the extent that incorrect diagnostic reasoning leads to incorrect action,
that reasoning is critiqued as well.
Very few of the systems presented here reason about the temporal aspects of plans, and
so they do not critique the scheduling of actions. In an urgent situation such as trauma,
the scheduling of actions can be critical, and so TraumaTIQ addresses this issue as well
by producing critiques when scheduling constraints are violated in the physician's plans.
A related issue is the question of real-time performance. Of the systems reviewed
here, only the reminder and alert systems, which bring problems to physicians' attention
after they manifest themselves, operate in real time. But these systems do not anticipate
problems. Real-time performance is necessary for TraumaTIQ to be able to a ect the
outcome of a case that may unfold very quickly.
Finally, these systems use a variety of more or less sophisticated methods for generating
natural language output. Some are focused on the surface generation of sentences by
techniques such as ATNs or rule translations, while others, such as Rankin's RST-based
generation, are more concerned with the global organization of text. TraumaTIQ currently
uses a template lling procedure to produce English sentences, and does only a rudimentary
organization of the text. Future work will address the issue of language generation in more
detail.
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Chapter 4

Recognizing the Physician's Plan
Intelligent interaction with another agent often depends on the ability to understand the
agent's underlying mental states leading her to act as she does. These mental states include
beliefs about the world, desires for the future state of the world, and intentions to act in
certain ways. The process of inferring these mental states is generally referred to as plan
recognition.
The necessity of making these kinds of inferences was rst observed in work on story
understanding 93] and cooperative response generation in dialogue systems 2, 9, 78]. In
studies of naturally occurring dialogues it was observed that the respondent to a question
would often provide information that was not explicitly requested, or correct perceived
mistakes in the questioner's plan. This type of behavior, it was argued, could only be
achieved with the ability to infer the plans that motivate questions that are asked.
Several systems have been implemented that make use of plan recognition to provide
cooperative responses in dialogue. Plan recognition has also been used e ectively in systems
for text understanding 47, 35], intelligent computer-assisted instruction (ICAI) 49, 48],
and automated help systems 6, 94]. In 34] Goodman and Litman present a comprehensive
review of the uses of plan recognition for intelligent interface design, and discuss the scope
and limitations of current plan recognition work.
Di erent approaches to plan recognition have tended to focus on recognizing di erent
aspects of agents' plans. Many researchers have been interested in identifying an agent's
beliefs given her intended actions (and possibly her desired goals as well) 2, 20, 65], in
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order to identify and correct erroneous beliefs that might lead to faulty plans. Others have
been concerned with predicting the agent's intended future actions in order to automate
their execution 6]. Still others are interested in inferring the agent's desires so as to suggest
alternative ways of achieving them 49], or to resolve ambiguities in dialogue interactions
44, 69].
The importance of plan recognition for automated decision support has been discussed
by Shahar and Musen 77]. They point out that by inferring the goals underlying physician
actions, a system can be more accommodating by accepting alternative ways of addressing
goals. As long as the physician is pursuing a goal that is acceptable to the system, it
may not be necessary to critique her behavior. In developing TraumaTIQ, I identi ed two
additional factors motivating plan recognition in support of critiquing:

Explanation One of the key features leading to acceptance of a decision-support system

is the system's ability to explain its reasoning 86]. In the case of TraumaTIQ, a
critique of a proposed action should include an explanation of why the system thinks
the physician is doing that action.

Proposing alternatives Understanding the goal(s) underlying a physician's action can

allow the system to see the action as an alternative to what it would recommend
for addressing that goal. If its recommendation has advantages in cost, speed, noninvasiveness, etc., it can be presented to the physician in this way, while supporting
the physicians' original intentions.

Plan recognition problems vary according to a number of features 42]. First, can
the inferring agent assume that the planning agent wants her intentions to be inferred
(intended recognition) or not (keyhole recognition)? Second, does the inferring agent have
complete knowledge of the domain about which it is reasoning, and the possible plans that
may be pursued? Third, is it possible that the performing agent's plan may be erroneous
or malformed in some way? The following section discusses three approaches to plan
recognition that have appeared in the literature, reecting di erent combinations of the
above features.
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4.1 Approaches to Plan Recognition
4.1.1 Inferring Plans in Cooperative Dialogue
A great deal of the literature on plan recognition has been concerned with the problem of
providing cooperative responses in dialogue. The early work in this area drew from the
more established work on classical planning, using a representational framework modeled
after the approach presented in STRIPS 21]. In the STRIPS formalism, a plan is represented as a sequence of operators leading from a starting state to a goal state. A plan
operator consists of an action description called a header, a list of parameters, a set of
predicates that represent preconditions, and an add list and a delete list that represent the
action's e ects. Classical planning systems start with an initial state of the world and a
goal state and determine a sequence of operators that together would have the e ect of
bringing about the goal state.
Plan-recognition systems based on this representation compare the observed actions
of an agent to the operators in a plan library and determine the potential plans of which
those actions could be a part. These systems work on the assumption that if an agent is
understood to have a plan that could be part of some higher level domain plan, then the
agent may actually be pursuing that higher level plan. In language understanding systems
2, 9, 78], the observed actions are utterances, which are assumed to t into an overall
plan on the part of the speaker. The recognition of domain plans is recursively generated
from the recognition of utterance-level intentions or speech acts using heuristic rules to
determine the most coherent relationship possible. The plan structure can then be used
as a context for the interpretation of future utterances in the discourse, as well as a means
to determine appropriate responses.
More recent work in this area has focused on the need for more exible representations
of plans to account for such phenomena as reasoning about plans that have not yet been
adopted, constructing alternative plans to achieve the same goal, and recognizing incorrect
plans 47, 44, 64]. This literature is interesting from the point of view of critiquing, since
it has a lot to say about detecting and correcting misconceptions in a speaker's plan. In
particular, Pollack 64, 65] has argued that a plan should be thought of not in terms of a
static recipe-for-action, but rather in terms of the complex mental attitudes that people
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have toward the actions that make up their plans. In her view, a plan is a collection of
beliefs about the world and intentions to perform certain actions. Thus a plan recognizer
must infer the speaker's beliefs and intentions in order to evaluate them and correct any
misconceptions that they might reect.

4.1.2 A Formal Model of Keyhole Recognition
Kautz's plan recognition algorithm 42] is a model of keyhole recognition.1 It relies on the
assumptions that the system has complete knowledge of the plans in the domain, and that
the agent's plans will always be correct in terms of achieving her goals.
Knowledge of plans is represented in a plan library comprising two interrelated hierarchies. The abstraction hierarchy represents inheritance relationships between plans and
is composed of IS-A links between plan schemas. The decomposition hierarchy determines
how the plans are executed. Each plan schema is decomposed into executable actions.
In addition, the decomposition hierarchy contains information about action preconditions,
e ects, and constraints.
At the top of the plan hierarchy is a special plan type called an End-Event, which is not
subsumed by or contained in any other plans. The goal of the plan recognition algorithm
is, given the plan library and user input in the form of action instantiations, to construct an
explanatory plan graph for those actions containing exactly one End-Event. The algorithm
recognizes plans incrementally, incorporating new actions into the explanatory plan graph
as they are input.
When there is more than one plan graph that will explain the observed behavior,
the algorithm tries to resolve the ambiguity by minimizing the number of actions that
are explained by di erent plan schemas. This solution is based on the assumption that
the simplest plan is most likely to be the actual plan. This assumption does not apply
in trauma management, however, since it is often the case that (1) there are multiple,
unrelated goals, all of which may require action, and (2) one action can be used to address
a number of di erent goals (for example, a single X-ray can be used to diagnose a number
of injuries in one area of the body). It would be inaccurate in such a domain always to
The metaphor here is that the observer is watching through a keyhole and attempting to recognize the
plans of an agent who is not acting cooperatively so as to have her plans be understood.
1
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assume that the simplest plan (i.e. the plan with the smallest number of goals needed to
explain all the observed actions) is the one being followed. A more realistic approach in
this case is to use information about the situation in which the plan is being developed in
order to infer the most likely plan that the physician would have developed that explains
all the observations.

4.1.3 Probabilistic approaches to plan recognition
Recently, interest has been increasing in applying probabilistic models to the problem of
plan recognition. This interest is due in part to the observation that plan recognition is
basically a problem of reasoning under uncertainty and so should be an appropriate application for techniques based on probability theory. A further motivation for this work is the
increasing interest in keyhole, as opposed to intended, recognition. Intended recognition
licenses a number of assumptions about the relationship between what is said and what
is intended that are not valid in a keyhole recognition situation. Lacking these simplifying assumptions, the observer's ability to disambiguate the actor's plans is considerably
reduced. The use of a reasoning mechanism that makes use of prior knowledge should
improve the accuracy of these systems.
Another reason for using probabilistic approaches for plan recognition is to provide a
theoretical basis for making default inferences to disambiguate plans. This is an important
concern for both intended and keyhole recognition:
Most approaches to plan recognition in dialogue systems have used heuristics for
preferring one plan over another when there is more than one valid explanation for
an observed action. These heuristics are usually based on properties of the dialogue in
progress, such as the current context and focus of attention. However, it is possible
that a speaker might intentionally fail to give explicit disambiguating information
under the assumption that the listener will use common sense default knowledge to
draw the necessary inferences.
In his work on keyhole recognition, Kautz used a principle of minimizing the number
of top-level goals in a hierarchy of plans to restrict the number of explanations his
algorithm would consider.
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In addition to the speci c problems I have mentioned, both of these approaches will
sometimes fail, in spite of their heuristics, to produce a unique explanation for the agent's
actions. What they are lacking is an understanding of the fact that some plans are inherently more likely than others to be pursued. Probabilistic reasoning can provide such an
understanding.

The three probabilistic plan recognition systems I have looked at make use of two
di erent formalisms for reasoning under uncertainty: one uses Bayesian belief networks
11, 63], and the other two use Dempster-Shafer theory 76]. The rst model 12, 13, 14]
addresses the problem of story understanding using Bayesian belief networks to reason
about the plans being pursued by characters in the stories. The second model 10] is
concerned with incorporating default inferences into reasoning about the plans of a user
of a natural language consultation system. Carberry uses the Dempster-Shafer theory of
evidence to generate default rules for deriving conclusions from observations. The third
model is an application of Dempster-Shafer theory to modeling user preferences in order
to facilitate keyhole recognition in a computerized help system 6]. This work is notable in
that it actually has a mechanism for acquiring the probabilistic information it needs from
previous observations of the user's behavior.

Probabilistic approaches to plan recognition have the advantage that they make use of
a well understood methodology for representing probabilistic relationships between goals
and actions, and for abductive reasoning from observed actions to goals. They also provide
a clear metric for prefering one explanation over another. However, the major drawback of
these approaches is that evaluation of probabilistic networks is NP-hard. Even relatively
small networks can take a long time to evaluate completely. In a real-time application in
which the response time is very important, this time complexity is unacceptable. Developing more tractable algorithms for network evaluation is currently an active area of research
and in the future may result in the possibility of practical probabilistic plan recognizers.
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4.2 Recognizing plans in trauma management
4.2.1 Representation
Plan recognition requires a representation of both the actions that agents can perform
in the domain, and the goals that they can serve. Because we already had a planning
system that produced validated management plans 18] and an extensive knowledge base
representing conclusions, goals, and actions in the domain, it seemed natural to use the
knowledge base and representation of plans from TraumAID in the plan recognizer as well.
Not only could TraumAID tell us what goals were possible explanations for the physician's
orders, but it could also tell us what goals were more likely to be pursued in the current
context, under the assumption that physicians are likely to pursue more urgent goals rst,
and other goals in conformance with the principles of trauma care encoded in TraumAID.
The importance of a shared knowledge representation for planning and plan recognition was rst recognized by Wilensky 93] in the domain of story understanding. Having
TraumaTIQ reuse TraumAID's knowledge is not only convenient, but also desirable because it facilitates comparison of the plans constructed by both subsystems { the plan generated by TraumAID's planner and the model of the physician's plan inferred by TraumaTIQ's plan recognizer. This allows the critiquing system to identify discrepancies between
the two plans, such as di erent approaches to addressing a goal, which it might want to
include in a critique. The advantages of using the same domain knowledge representation
for both plan generation and critiquing has been discussed by Forslund 25], although he
does not have an explicit representation of goals in his PPA system.
The disadvantage of reusing TraumAID's planning knowledge is that a knowledge base
that is designed for generating valid plans may still lack explanations for what people
actually do. We therefore have had to incorporate additional knowledge about goals and
plans that, while irrelevant to TraumAID's generating \gold standard" plans, may be
needed to understand actual patient management.
As I have outlined in Chapter 2, TraumAID's plans are composed of goals, procedures,
and actions. The complete set of goals, procedures, and actions and the relationships
between them can be represented as a plan graph, such as the one shown in Figure 4.1.
Goals correspond to the abstract plans in a hierarchical representation like the one
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Figure 4.1: An example plan graph. Dotted arrows indicate disjunctive goal-procedure
mappings, solid arrows indicate conjunctive procedure-action mappings
used in 42]. They represent high level objectives without specifying anything about how
to achieve them on the action level. Each goal has associated with it a level of urgency
and a medical priority derived from standard guidelines for trauma care, which are used
as constraints in constructing the plan. The rule-based reasoner in TraumAID 2.0 is
responsible for determining what goals are relevant to pursue, given the current state of
the patient.
Procedures are somewhat analogous to basic plans in Kautz's representation. They
are used to link abstract goals with the basic actions needed to address them. TraumAID
associates each goal with a disjunctive list of procedures for addressing it. This association,
represented by dotted arrows in Figure 4.1, is called a goal-procedure mapping. For example,
goal G3 can be addressed by either procedure P3 or P4 . In each mapping, the procedures
are ordered preferentially with respect to the goal. When planning to address a set of
goals, TraumAID's planner selects one procedure for each goal from the goal-procedure
mapping. Selection depends on both the local procedure preference rankings for each goal,
and global considerations resulting from the need to address multiple goals concurrently.
A procedure comprises an ordered sequence of actions and/or sub-goals, stored in a
procedure-action mapping, represented by solid arrows in Figure 4.1. Actions inherit their
urgency and priority from the goals they are being used to address. An action always
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inherits the urgency of the most urgent goal it is associated with. In addition to urgency,
action de nitions include:
the approximate amount of time needed to perform the action,
the sites in the hospital where the action can be done,
the cost of the action,2 ,
contraindications to performing the action, and
precedence constraints regarding other actions whose outcome could be inuenced
by the e ects of the action, and so should be done before it if they also appear in
the plan.
The use of sub-goals to address procedures allows TraumAID's planner to delay certain
decisions about how to address its top level goals. For example, in Figure 4.1 G3 is a subgoal
of P1 . If TraumAID is planning to address G1 by performing P1 it can commit early on
to the other actions in P1 , in this case a1 , while reasoning further to choose the optimal
procedure for addressing G3 based on the other currently relevant goals.
Actions and sub-goals can participate in more than one procedure at a time, and thus
can be used in addressing more than one goal, as illustrated by sub-goal G3 , which plays
a role in both procedures P1 and P2 . This concept of action overloading is exploited by
TraumAID's planner to produce globally ecient plans.
In the rest of this chapter, the words goal, procedure, and action will refer to the
concepts as I have just described them.

4.3 Plan Recognition with Diagnostic Actions
Diagnostic actions are actions that are taken to acquire knowledge about the world. They
can be linguistic, such as asking a question, or physical, such as listening to a patient's
breathing or taking an X-ray. Some diagnostic actions are sensing actions, and have an
immediate result. Others require a response from an external source, and may involve
The cost is a subjective disutility of experiencing the action. The way in which these costs were
determined is discussed in Chapter 5.
2
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a period of waiting between performing the diagnostic action and receiving the desired
information. In this section I will describe how knowledge about diagnostic goals and
actions used in the management of multiple trauma can be exploited to help recognize the
physician's plans 33].
Consider an agent as in 8] who reacts to the world by forming goals, who reasons to
decide which goals to adopt and attempt to satisfy in which order, and who then acts on
his or her decisions. Such an agent may carry out diagnostic actions for one or more of
the following reasons:
Goal Selection. The agent may desire information in order to decide whether or not
to adopt a goal suggested by the environment. For example, what it has seen of the
world may suggest to the agent that it adopt a goal of having lots of money. The
agent may then desire to know any down sides to attempting and possibly achieving
the goal (e.g., increased attention from the IRS), so that it can weigh its expected
bene ts against its expected costs.
Goal Re nement. The agent may desire information in order to decide how to re ne
an abstract goal like \return a patient to health" (What's wrong with the patient?)
or \live a good life" (What are the elements of a good life?).
Goal Decomposition. An agent may desire information in order to decide which of
several ways to satisfy a speci c goal like \travel to Washington" (What's the cost
to y, drive, or take the train? What's the overall transit time in each case?) or
\diagnose a possible kidney injury" (Is the patient in shock? If so, there's no time
to take the patient to radiology for an IVP). Notice in the latter case, that the goal
itself may be diagnostic.
Knowledge Preconditions. An agent may need information in order to carry out a particular action like \phone up Martha" (What's her area code?) or \give antibiotics"
(Which, if any, is the patient allergic to?)

In work to date on cooperative question-answering, the purpose of diagnostic actions
has mainly been for goal decomposition 44, 69] and knowledge preconditions 58, 59]. On
the other hand, in the initial de nitive management of multiple trauma, physicians carry
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out diagnostic actions primarily for purposes of goal selection and goal re nement. To
enable plan recognition techniques to be developed for these latter purposes as well, it is
essential to consider the notion of diagnostic strategy.
An agent lacking knowledge of the current situation may not even know what it needs
to know in order to satisfy its goals. A diagnostic strategy will direct the agent to gather
particular kinds of information { i.e., to perform particular kinds of diagnostic actions.
After gathering one piece of information, an agent who still lacks sucient information
may stick with the same strategy or mix strategies according to some algorithm or set of
heuristics. A sequence of strategically-motivated actions is desirable if it minimizes the
(agent's) cost to acquire the relevant information, where cost may be in terms of money,
time, risk of mortality or morbidity, or any combination of these or other costs.
These diagnostic strategies are similar to the problem-solving and plan-exploration
meta-plans represented in 44, 69], but we are concerned with a wider range of problem
solving activities, such as goal selection and goal re nement. Appealing to diagnostic
strategies requires that a plan recognition system understand the knowledge-changing capabilities of actions and relationships between knowledge and action.
Several medical expert systems make use, or have made use, of diagnostic strategies
in their reasoning. For example, Internist 66] was developed as an expert diagnostic
system in the area of general internal medicine. When Internist is given an initial set of
salient disease manifestations, it forms a list of plausible disease hypotheses (a dierential
diagnosis) and then bases its request for additional information on one of three diagnostic
strategies or \modes", depending on how many diseases, if any, are \close" to the highest
scoring hypothesis.
In the initial de nitive management of multiple trauma, the strategies used are determined by the urgency of addressing potentially life-threatening injuries, the high cost of
various procedures in terms of both risk and money, and the ability to appeal to surgical
procedures for both de nitive injury investigation and repair. Because in multiple trauma
the presence of multiple injuries means that practitioners need to integrate diagnostic and
therapeutic activity into a single management plan, I will use the term management strategy rather than diagnostic strategy when talking about goal selection in trauma. Such
strategies are embodied in the reasoning and planning knowledge used by TraumAID 2.0
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75].
Since trauma management requires the concurrent consideration of both diagnostic and
therapeutic issues, TraumAID's planner treats diagnostic goals and therapeutic goals as
the same type of object 75]. Both are concluded relevant by the reasoner as a result of the
appropriate evidence being known, and both are associated with procedures and actions in
the same way. In the plans generated by TraumAID, diagnostic and therapeutic procedures
can be interleaved in any order to improve the overall eciency of the plan. TraumaTIQ is
therefore able to treat diagnostic actions the same way as therapeutic actions in recognizing
their underlying goals: each diagnostic action may be done to address a small number of
goals, and the task of plan recognition upon observing one of these actions involves selecting
one or more of the associated goals to explain the action.
An understanding of typical management strategies can enhance the plan recognizer's
ability to infer goals underlying both diagnostic and therapeutic actions by linking related
goals which may become relevant in similar situations. For example, one strategy employed
in TraumAID is to lter out potential diagnoses using quick \bedside questions" before
going on to more de nitive diagnostic testing. These initial questions are used for the
purpose of goal re nement. They are usually not accurate enough to justify drawing any
de nite conclusions, but they can be valuable in pointing the physician in the right direction
and eliminating unnecessary diagnostic tests from the plan. If the physician is observed to
order a test that may be used to address a diagnostic goal that is not currently motivated
but may become motivated as a result of a currently pending bedside question, TraumaTIQ
can infer that the physician is pursuing that diagnostic goal, albeit prematurely.

4.3.1 Characteristics of the plan recognition problem
As Goodman and Litman 34] point out, formal models of plan recognition, while interesting in their own right, tell us little about how to implement a practical plan recognition
system. Practical system design often involves making assumptions about the user and the
domain in order to control computation and resolve ambiguities. These assumptions can
often take advantage of special features of the domain and the intended use of the system.
As we have seen in Section 4.1, previous approaches to plan recognition have relied on
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a number of assumptions about the user, the domain, and the system's knowledge, some
of which have been enumerated by London 48]:

Closed world assumption The system has complete knowledge of the plans and actions
that may be performed by the agent.

Plan correctness The agent always reasons with correct beliefs and acts according to a
coherent, well-formed plan.

Uni ed goal and plan The agent pursues a single top-level goal at a time.
Intended recognition The agent acts in such a way as to help the observer infer her
underlying plans.

No real-time requirement There is no bound on the amount of time that may pass
before the system responds to the agent's actions.

As London points out, most human activity violates all of these assumptions in various
ways, and making use of such assumptions in plan recognition can seriously restrict the
available uses of the resulting system. In the case of TraumaTIQ, we need to drop all of
them.
The closed world assumption is not valid for TraumaTIQ because the domain of TraumAID only covers a subset of plans that physicians may carry out in a hospital. Even when
the knowledge base is extended beyond penetrating injury to the chest and abdomen, there
are still many plans that may be followed in the context of a trauma case that will not be
anticipated ahead of time.
TraumaTIQ cannot assume that the physician's plans are always correct. The system
must have some guidelines to interpret orders that are motivated by misconceptions or
errors in judgment.
While TraumAID and the physician may be pursuing a single top-level goal (restore
the patient to health) this may involve many sub-goals, some of which address di erent
injuries possibly resulting from di erent wounds. But even these goals cannot be treated
as being independent, since a single action may often serve to address several goals. This
can lead to far more complex plans than have been dealt with in previous plan recognition
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systems, which generally assume that there is either a single top-level goal, or if there are
multiple top-level goals then they are independent of each other.
The plan recognition problem for TraumaTIQ is an instance of keyhole, rather than
intended recognition, meaning that the physician does not act with the intention of having
the system understand her actions. Its \keyhole" observations correspond to entries made
by the recording nurse:
actions that have been performed,

the results of those actions in terms of both changes in and new information gained
about the patient's condition, and
orders the physician has placed for actions she wants carried out.

One problem this poses is that orders will not necessarily be given and recorded in the
system in the order in which they are intended to be performed. TraumaTIQ therefore
cannot make the assumption that consecutive orders are likely to be related (i.e. addressing
the same or similar goals), as is done with utterances in dialogue understanding systems.
The urgency inherent in trauma management means that there is limited time available
to respond to physicians' actions. It is therefore very important to limit the amount of
computation necessary for the plan recognition algorithm.
Another feature of the plan recognition problem for TraumaTIQ is that plans must
be recognized incrementally, during patient management. Therefore, the plan recognition
algorithm must take into account that at any given time the physician's plan is only
partially speci ed.
In spite of these complexities, however, we have the advantage that TraumaTIQ has
access to a great deal of relevant information about the situation through the interface to
TraumAID, into which the scribe nurse enters data as it becomes available. Furthermore,
TraumAID's reasoning and planning components develop and maintain a complete model
of the situation, the goals it considers to be relevant, and the actions it would recommend
to be performed at all times.
Another advantage for plan recognition in TraumaTIQ is that the physician will have
training and experience in trauma management. This licenses two assumptions that can
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be used to guide plan recognition:
The physician is more likely to have appropriate goals but be addressing them in a
sub-optimal way than to be pursuing the wrong goals altogether.
While TraumAID follows a conservative strategy for pursuing diagnosis and treatment from observations, physicians sometimes proceed more rapidly, acting on the
basis of evidence that for TraumAID's reasoner would be insucient.
The rst assumption motivates a policy of giving the physician \the bene t of the
doubt": if an ordered action can be explained in terms of TraumAID's current goal set,
the physician will be assumed to be pursuing the explanatory goal(s). An ordered action
can be explained if it appears in TraumAID's plan for addressing a goal in the goal set,
or if TraumAID has chosen a di erent action to address this goal. A related aspect of
this policy is to ascribe goals that are partially supported according to TraumAID to the
physician in preference to goals that are not supported at all. The de nition of partial
support that we are using here is discussed later in this chapter.
In general, this policy biases the plan recognizer to ascribe fewer incorrect goals to the
physician. This bias is justi ed in our application because the main purpose is to identify
when an action would compromise patient care. If it wouldn't, it is not important for the
critique to identify why it is being done.
The second assumption allows the plan recognizer to interpret actions that could be
justi ed by more evidence. Identifying when physician orders may be motivated by a goal
that is partially, but not yet completely supported by the evidence requires a representation
of the strategic relationship between goals.

4.3.2 Using context to interpret actions
Several researchers have pointed out the advantages of using contextual knowledge and
basic domain principles to guide the search for an explanatory plan 40, 38, 49, 48]. The
basic idea behind these approaches to plan recognition is that the plan recognizer can use
its knowledge of what actions are appropriate to take in the current situation to reduce
ambiguities in interpreting observed actions.
61

Hu and Lesser 38] describe GRAPPLE, an incremental plan recognizer for intelligent
assistance that uses contextual knowledge to simplify computation in choosing the most
likely explanations for observed actions. GRAPPLE uses a truth maintenance system
(TMS) to reason about the hidden state of the system being worked on. When an action is
observed, candidate interpretations for that action are evaluated in terms of whether their
preconditions are satis ed, their constraints are met, and that the goals they address are
not already achieved or planned for in some other way. They do not, however, consider
the relevance of competing interpretations in the current context.
London's IMAGE student modeller for the Guidon2 tutor 49, 48] uses the reasoning
of the underlying knowledge-based system, NEOMYCIN 16], to form predictions about
the potential actions of the student that would be relevant relevant, given the current
knowledge of the situation. These predictions serve as a context in which to interpret the
student's observed actions.
Hill and Johnson's \situated plan attribution" 40] is an approach to plan recognition
for tutoring which uses knowledge about the task the student is trying to perform to
interpret and correct inappropriate actions. Their REACT system tracks the student's
actions and interprets them in terms of the currently relevant plans for accomplishing the
task. If an action cannot be matched with any relevant plan, an impasse is detected,
and further evaluation is used to resolve the impasse, either by recognizing it as a valid
deviation from the plan, or by informing the student of the error.
The student modelling systems presented in IMAGE and REACT rely on the assumption that students are likely to act in a way that an expert would see as being motivated by
the current situation. In tutoring applications, this is a rather weak assumption, since the
student is by de nition not an expert in the task domain. In the IMAGE domain, students'
actions directly agree with what NEOMYCIN would do only 50% of the time. By incorporating domain speci c knowledge about likely student errors, IMAGE is able to anticipate
58% of observations. In contrast, in a decision-support application, the user is expected to
be a domain expert, and so the assumption of user competence is much more strongly justi ed. In experiments with TraumaTIQ which will be discussed further in Chapter 8, 60%
of physician actions are in agreement with TraumAID's current plan. Including actions
that can be considered potentially relevant given a small amount of additional knowledge,
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this gure jumps to 75%.
Plan recognition in TraumaTIQ takes advantage of three types of contextual information that inuence the likelihood that the physician is pursuing a certain goal:

The likely goals to be pursued in the current situation Given TraumAID's current
information about the state of the patient, TraumaTIQ is able to make certain inferences about what goals are more or less relevant to pursue.

The physician's actions The more evidence TraumaTIQ has that the physician is performing a procedure, the more likely it is that she is actually performing it.

The likelihood of procedures being used to pursue a goal While it may be possi-

ble to pursue a goal in a number of ways, some of them may be quite uncommon.
This is reected in the preference ordering for procedures in TraumAID's knowledge
base.

4.3.3 The Plan Recognition algorithm
The task of the plan recognizer is to build incrementally a model of the physician's plan
based on the actions being ordered. Following the assumptions given above, TraumaTIQ's
plan recognizer prefers to explain the physician's actions in terms of goals (and procedures)
that TraumAID currently considers relevant to the case.
A formal description of the plan recognition algorithm appears in Figure 4.2. Basically,
it works as follows: It rst enumerates the set of possible explanations for all actions that
have been ordered. Each explanation consists of a path in the plan graph from the ordered
action to a procedure in which the action plays a part, back to a top level goal. The path
may pass through a series of sub-goals and procedures before reaching a top level goal.
Since the same goal may be addressed by more than one procedure, it is possible for an
action to be explained by a goal in the context of two di erent procedures. For example,
in Figure 4.1, action a3 is explained by goal G3 through both procedures P3 and P4 .
The possible explanations are evaluated in two phases. The rst phase considers the
goals in the explanations. These are sorted according to their relevance in the current
situation. The plan recognizer categorizes potential explanatory goals according to a 4level scale of relevance:
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1. Relevant goals: goals that are in TraumAID's set of goals to be pursued.
2. Potentially relevant goals: goals that are part of a currently active diagnostic strategy. As described in Chapter 2, diagnostic strategies are represented implicitly in
TraumAID's knowledge base. They comprise chains of goals each of which, given
the appropriate result, leads to the formation of the next goal in the strategy. So,
for example, if the goal of diagnosing a fractured rib is currently relevant, then the
goal of treating a fractured rib is potentially relevant, depending on the result of the
diagnostic test.
3. Previously relevant goals: goals that were once relevant but are no longer relevant,
either because they have been addressed or because some additional evidence has
ruled them out.
4. Irrelevant goals: all other goals are classi ed as irrelevant.
The assumption underlying this phase of plan recognition is that the higher a goal is on
this scale, the more likely the physician is to be pursuing it. The most relevant ones are
selected as candidate explanations for the orders.
The likelihood that a goal is being pursued depends not just on its relevance, but also
on the likelihood that the ordered actions would be used to address it. Therefore, goals
that are potentially or previously relevant are not accepted as explanations unless the
ordered actions play a role in the most preferred procedure for addressing those goals.
As others have pointed out 89], depending on the reason for doing plan recognition, it
is not always necessary to infer a unique goal or goals for every action. For the purpose
of critiquing, we do not want to spend time interpreting actions that are clearly incorrect,
since they are harder to understand and will be mentioned as being unmotivated in the
critique regardless of the physician's reason for doing them. Therefore, if there is more
than one possible explanatory goal, none of which is relevant, the algorithm does not try
to disambiguate the explanation further and the process halts here. Otherwise, the highest
ranking (most relevant) non-empty subset of explanatory goals is selected to be evaluated
in phase two.
The second phase considers the procedures in the remaining explanations. These are
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evaluated according to how strongly the physician's other actions/orders provide additional
evidence for them. The more actions in the procedure have been ordered, the more evidence
there is in support of the explanation. For simplicity, the procedures are actually sorted
according to a four-level scale of evidence:
1. Completed procedures: procedures for which all the actions have been ordered by
the physician.
2. Partially completed procedures: procedures for which some of the actions have been
ordered.
3. Relevant procedures: procedures that are currently in TraumAID's plan. This means
that if an action could address a goal by playing a role in two di erent procedures,
the procedure that TraumAID has selected in its plan is preferred as the explanation
for the physician's action.
4. All other procedures.
All procedures in the highest non-empty category are accepted as explanations for the
action.
Finally, the explanations with the most relevant top-level goals and the greatest amount
of observed evidence are ascribed to the physician and incorporated into TraumaTIQ's
model of the physician's plan. Incorporating a new explanation into the plan involves
adding new procedures and goals if they are not already present, and adding links between
items that are not already connected.
Note that there may be more than one explanation for a given action, as long as
the explanatory goals are equally relevant, and the procedures have the same amount of
observed evidence supporting them. For example, in Figure 4.1 both G1 and G2 might be
accepted as explanatory goals for the action a3, provided that both goals are in the same
category of relevance, and are not irrelevant.
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1. For each action  ordered, TraumaTIQ's plan recognizer extracts from TraumAID's
knowledge base a set of explanatory procedure-goal chains, PG , that could explain
the presence of that action:

PG = fhP : : :Gi1 : : : hP : : :Ging
where P is a procedure containing  in its decomposition, and hP : : :Gii is a backward
path through the plan graph ending with the goal G.
2. Now consider the set ; = fGi g where Gi is the top level goal ending hP : : :Gii. In

rank order, ; consists of ;1 the relevant goals, ;2 the potentially relevant goals, ;3
the previously relevant goals, and ;5 all other goals. Let ; = fGj g be the highest
ranking non-empty subset of ;. If ; is the set of irrelevant goals, halt here and add
 to the plan with no explanatory procedure-goal chains.
3. Let P = fPj g where Pj is the procedure that is the child of Gj in PG . In rank
order, P consists of: P1, procedures for which all the actions have been ordered, P2 ,
procedures for which some of the actions have been ordered, P3 , procedures that are
currently in TraumAID's plan, and P4, all other procedures. Let P be the highest
ranking non-empty subset of P .
4. Select the paths PG  PG such that PG contains all paths ending with goals in ;
with children in P .
5. The paths in PG are then incorporated into TraumaTIQ's model of the physician's
plan, connected to the action .
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Figure 4.2: The plan recognition algorithm

4.3.4 Complexity of the plan recognition algorithm
A serious criticism of previous approaches to plan recognition is that they are computationally intractable. For example, Goodman and Litman explore the design of plan recognition algorithms through CHECS, an implementation of Kautz's algorithm in the domain
of chemical process design 34]. They remark that the system experiences a computational
explosion during search for explanatory plans, and thus \although CHECS eventually got
the correct answer, it was slow getting there" (34], page 104). Similarly, the computational resources required by the probabilistic plan recognizer implemented by Charniak
and Goldman 14] grow exponentially with the number of actions in the input, causing the
system to run unacceptably slowly.
As I have pointed out previously, in a time-critical domain like trauma management it is
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essential for TraumaTIQ to respond quickly. The complexity of the algorithm is not really
a problem in the current implementation of TraumaTIQ because of the limited domain for
which the knowledge base is designed. To get an idea of the size of the problems we are
dealing with, here are some relevant statistics:
In the database of 97 actual cases, there is an average of 6 actions in each management
plan. The plan recognizer builds an explanatory plan for every order that has not yet
been executed, so even if all the actions are ordered before any of them are carried
out, the plan recognition algorithm will on average have to explain no more than 6
orders at one time.
The branching factor is generally small. Of the 105 diagnostic and therapeutic actions
in TraumAID's knowledge base, 76 of them participate in only one procedure, 15 in
two procedures, 4 in three procedures, 2 in 5 procedures, and 1 each in 13 and 19
procedures.
Of the 95 procedures in TraumAID's knowledge base, 62 of them can be used to
address only one goal, 14 to address two goals, 3 to address three goals, 5 to address
4 goals, 2 to address 6 goals, 1 to address 7 goals and 2 to address 9 goals.
So in general, the plans TraumaTIQ has to recognize are quite small, and the branching
factor of plans in TraumAID's knowledge base is small as well.
To demonstrate how fast the implementation actually is in practice: TraumaTIQ's plan
recognizer, implemented in Lucid Common Lisp and compiled on a Sun 4 processed 584
actions in an average of 0.023 cpu seconds per action.
The problem arises when we consider extending the system to cover other areas of the
body and/or blunt injury. This will result in increasing the number of procedures and
goals that might explain an action in the knowledge base. To allow for the growth of the
system, it is important that the plan recognition algorithm scale up eciently.
As Rymon 75] points out, plan recognition can be formalized as a set-covering problem in which two sets of observations, symptoms and actions, are mapped onto a set of
goals which covers both of them (every symptom motivates some goal and every action
is motivated by some goal in the covering set { see Figure 4.3). The covering set is optimized according to some cost function (e.g. in Kautz's plan recognition formulation the
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Figure 4.3: Plan Recognition as a set covering problem
cost function is minimization of the goal set). Since the set covering problem in general is
NP-hard, so is this formalization of plan recognition.
Actually, the relationship between symptoms and goals in plan recognition is not the
same as the relationship between goals and actions: it is important for the inferred goal
set to be complete in its coverage of all the observed actions, but it is not necessary that
the inferred goals cover all of the observed symptoms { we do not assume that the agent
is addressing all of the goals that are motivated by her environment.
In general, any plan recognition algorithm that considers all possible combinations of
explanatory goals for the observed actions is going to grow exponentially with the number
of actions. The algorithm I have presented here avoids the need for an exponential search
by grouping the potential explanations according to relevance and then greedily accepting
all the explanations in the most relevant group. One way to look at this is that rather than
trying to optimize the covering goal set according to a cost function, we simply choose to
maximize the number of relevant goals in the covering set.
In doing this, for each ordered action , the algorithm only has to consider j;j goals,
P
where ; is the set of possible explanatory goals for , and ; jP;j j procedures, where ;
is the most relevant non-empty subset of ;, and P;j are the procedures linked to each goal
;j in ; . For each procedure, it has to look at jA j actions in the procedure, and compare
them with at most all of the actions that have been ordered. So the total cost of inferring
a plan for a set of orders, A, is at most
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. Thus, this algorithm is polynomial in the number of ordered actions, and linear in the
number of possible goals per action, the number of goals in the most relevant goals set,
and the number of possible procedures per action.
In this situated view of plans, in which we interpret actions using the context in which
the agent is acting, an optimal explanation would be one that both maximized the number of relevant goals and minimized the number of irrelevant goals. TraumaTIQ's greedy
selection of relevant goals achieves the former { the selection of all possible relevant goals
is justi ed by the observation that overloading actions to address multiple goals is advantageous, and because we have chosen to give physicians the bene t of the doubt when they
seem to be acting in accordance with TraumAID's goals. On the other hand, the algorithm
does not generate a minimal global explanation of the set of unmotivated ordered actions.
This has the result that it produces less re ned explanations of these actions. For example,
if two unmotivated actions { giving antibiotics and immobilizing the patient { are ordered,
TraumaTIQ will not be able to ascribe a unique goal to either action even though there
is only one goal { treating a compound fracture of the vertebrae { that calls for both of
them.
This weakness in interpreting unmotivated actions reects a design decision not to
devote computational resources to understanding erroneous behavior. Instead, TraumaTIQ
simply responds to these actions by commenting that none of the goals that might possibly
motivate the action are currently relevant according to its information about the patient.
As long as one of these possible motivations is the one the physician is pursuing, she should
be able to understand the comment and either rescind the order or provide the missing
information to the system.
This greedy selection of relevant covering goals works only because we have an idea of
which goals are relevant given the patient's symptoms, and because we make the assumption that an experienced physician is likely to pursue relevant goals. When the observed
actions cannot be interpreted as addressing any relevant or potentially relevant goal, the
algorithm breaks down. The restriction to experienced users could be loosened if the system were able to model the relationship between di erent situations and the typical goals
of less experienced users. Rather than accept all goals that are relevant according to a
correct model of the domain, we might accept the goals that the user we are working with
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would consider relevant.
In general then, this approach to plan recognition is applicable in any domain in which
the user's typical behavior can be modeled in context, and in which it is less important to
understand irrelevant or atypical behavior. For example, if we knew that medical students
usually try to treat a hemothorax by ordering a chest tube when they hear mu#ed heart
sounds, even though the appropriate goal is to rule out a pericardial tamponade by getting
a needle aspiration of the chest, we would be able to understand the order of a chest tube
in that situation as being related to the mu#ed heart sounds. But if we had never seen
a student diagnose a hemothorax on the basis of mu#ed heart sounds, we could simply
respond that: \Getting a chest tube seems unmotivated. Please provide more information
regarding this order."

4.4 Evaluation of the Plan Recognition Algorithm
To evaluate its performance, I have applied the plan recognition algorithm to the management plans from 97 actual trauma cases from the Medical College of Pennsylvania.
These cases have been abstracted for the purpose of comparing them to plans generated
by TraumAID 18], and only contain actions that are in TraumAID's knowledge base. The
plan recognition algorithm is designed so that it always identi es a goal or goals underlying
actions that are in TraumAID's plan at the time they are ordered. The dicult actions to
interpret are the ones that do not appear in TraumAID's plan, since they cannot easily be
explained in terms of TraumAID's current goals.
Out of 584 actions, 234 of them were not also part of TraumAID's plan at the time
that they were ordered. Of these 234, 15 of them could be explained by a goal that was
currently in TraumAID's relevant goal set. Of the remaining 219, 69 could be explained by
a goal that was considered to be potentially relevant, given TraumAID's current knowledge
about the state of the patient. The plan recognizer failed to explain the remaining 148
actions in terms of relevant or potentially relevant goals.
Part of the reason for these plan recognition failures is that the knowledge base designed
for TraumAID's planner is insucient for the needs of plan recognition. First, many of
the actions that TraumaTIQ fails to infer a goal for are broad diagnostic tests that can
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be used to look for a number of conditions, and the physician may not actually have a
speci c goal in mind when ordering them. To understand physicians' plans in such cases
it is necessary to have a representation of abstract goals that is not currently available in
TraumAID 2.0. Since the knowledge base was implemented in support of plan generation
rather than plan recognition, only goals that could be directly operationalized as actions
were included.
Second, some goals that physicians may pursue in these cases are not included in
TraumAID's knowledge base because its designers opted not to pursue these goals under
any circumstances relevant to the current domain of the system. To have a complete
plan recognition system, it is necessary to include such goals in the knowledge base. In
Chapter 7, I will discuss these and other additions to TraumAID's knowledge base that
are necessary to support plan recognition.
Another weakness in the plan recognition algorithm comes from the method for comparing the amount of observed evidence for di erent explanatory procedures. To compare
hypotheses, I have grouped procedures that have been totally ordered in one category,
and procedures that have been partially ordered in another. This method is not ideal,
however, because some actions are more central or important in a procedure than others.
For example, the procedure for performing a peritoneal lavage involves inserting a Foley
catheter and then lavaging the abdominal cavity. The rst of these actions is preparatory,
while the second is the main part of the procedure.
Ideally, we would like to be able to determine how often the plan recognition algorithm
infers the correct goal(s) for an action. This evaluation is not possible, however, without
data that includes both the actions performed and the underlying goals motivating them.
Unfortunately, this information is not available in the abstracted cases we have available to
us so far. Therefore, an evaluation on this level cannot yet be done.3 During the planned
prospective evaluation of TraumAID, physicians will be asked in a debrie ng questionairre
to give their reasons for doing certain actions. This information can then be used to
evaluate the accuracy of the plan recognizer.
3

To my knowledge, no plan recognition system has yet been evaluated on this level.
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4.4.1 Relevance and a possible probabilistic approach
This algorithm relies on the identi cation of partially relevant goals to discriminate between
more or less likely explanations for ordered actions. Consequently, the inability to make
ne-grained distinctions between degrees of relevance of goals limits its accuracy. Goals
are classi ed as relevant as long as TraumAID has enough evidence to justify pursuing
them, but some relevant goals may well be more relevant than others and still other goals
may be almost relevant.
I have attempted to capture the concept of almost relevant goals using the concept of
potential relevance, which says that if a goal has a reasonable chance of becoming relevant
in the future, then it is not completely irrelevant in the present. However, a goal may
also be considered almost relevant if some, but not all, of the evidence needed to make
it relevant is now available. I have not been able to model this in my system because it
is not possible to tell how strongly a conclusion is supported simply on the basis of the
number of items of evidence associated with it. The evidence supporting conclusions does
so with varying degrees of strength, and without any indication of the relative inuences
of di erent pieces of evidence, which is not available in TraumAID's rule base, we cannot
determine the proportion of support for a conclusion that is not fully supported.
A probabilistic framework would make these distinctions possible. While it is dicult to
accurately model the likely behavior of individual physicians, this problem can be greatly
simpli ed by assuming that the probability that a goal will be pursued is close to the
probability that the goal should be pursued, as measured by the expert system, perhaps in
terms of the expected utility of pursuing the goal. This expected utility can be thought of
as an approximation of the prior probability that a goal will be pursued, given the current
state of the case.
Given an expert system that is capable of producing a numerical value for the probability that a goal should be pursued, a probabilistic model of plan recognition in the
trauma domain could be developed which would be able to make much more ne-grained
distinctions between hypothesized explanatory goals than the current algorithm is capable
of. For example, consider a Bayes net representation of plans such as the one presented in
14]. Charniak and Goldman used a uniform distribution over all events in their universe
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to initialize the prior probabilities in their networks, so in reading a story it is equally likely
a priori that the word go will refer to going to the liquor store or going to the movies.
In contrast, in the model I envision, the prior probabilities for goals could be taken
from the expected goal utilities, and used to condition the inferences resulting from future
observations. So, if the expected utility of pursuing a diagnosis of hemothorax is higher
than the expected utility of pursuing a diagnosis of pneumothorax because the clinical
indications of hemothorax are stronger, then the prior probability that the physician will
try to rule out a hemothorax will be higher than that for a pneumothorax. Consequently,
after observing the physician ordering a chest x-ray, the system could infer that the goal
of ruling out a hemothorax is the most likely explanation for that action, given that both
ruling out hemothorax and ruling out pneumothorax can be done by getting a chest x-ray.
I have begun exploring the possibility of such a model using the IDEAL system for
representing and solving Bayesian belief networks 83]. However, as mentioned earlier, the
complexity of network evaluation currently poses a problem for the practical application
of this approach.
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Chapter 5

Outcome-Driven Plan Evaluation
If physicians always developed and executed plans that were in perfect compliance with
what would accord with perfect knowledge and perfect judgment, there would be no need
for a system like TraumAID. Unfortunately, however, the care given by even experienced
trauma surgeons is often sub-optimal, although these problems do not always have an e ect
on the patient outcome. Support for this claim comes from the analysis of data from a study
evaluating the performance of TraumAID 2.0 (see 18, 75]). This analysis suggests that the
actual performance of physicians on real cases is not always acceptable to experts in the
eld of trauma surgery. When expert judges were asked to compare the management plans
created by TraumAID 2.0 to the actual care given to patients, they rated the actual care
as unacceptable in 14 out of 97 cases, compared to 4 unacceptable ratings for TraumAID
2.0. Some of the most common errors pointed out in the physicians' management were
(1) the overuse of unjusti ed and risky diagnostic procedures, (2) omission of appropriate
therapy, and (3) failure to perform urgent actions promptly.
Plan recognition allows TraumaTIQ to develop a global picture of what the physician
is doing based on the actions she has ordered. But it is not enough for a critiquing system
to understand what is being done in a given situation: it must also be able to identify
potential errors in the plan and determine how to respond to the user. This is the role
of plan evaluation, which uses both the inferred representation of the physician's plan,
together with TraumAID's current understanding of the case to generate a set of critique
comments.
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5.1 Di erential vs. Analytical plan evaluation
In general, plan evaluation can be done using a dierential or an analytical approach
23, 22]. The former method compares the user's plan to a target plan generated by
the system, while the latter evaluates plans with respect to a prede ned speci cation of
constraints on the solution without actually generating its own solution.
One advantage of the di erential approach is that it provides a standard on which the
system can base its critique. By comparing the physician's plan to a target plan that can be
assumed to be a broadly acceptable (if not optimal) way of approaching the problem, the
system has an alternative solution to suggest when it does not agree with the physician's
plan. Furthermore, the reasons for choosing a particular course of action can be encoded
in the system and used to produce an explanation of the system's behavior.
Another advantage of di erential evaluation is that it allows a global analysis of the
plan. In developing its plan, the planner detects possible interactions between goals, and
nd the most ecient way to address that particular combination of goals (see Figure 2.5).
A di erential evaluation of a user's plan can determine when the user is not reacting
to potential interactions between goals simply by looking at the interactions that were
identi ed in forming the target plan.
On the other hand, the analytical approach has the advantage that it does not depend
on a single solution as the basis for critiquing the user. Rather, an analytical system de nes
a space of possible plans within which a solution is more or less acceptable. This a ords
the system some exibility in dealing with domains where variability and subjectivity are
inherent in the decision making process. In addition, the analytical approach has the
advantage that the system does not have to be able to generate its own solution to the
problem in order to critique a proposal. This makes critiquing possible in domains which
are too complex or unconstrained to represent using decision rules.
Finally, while a di erential evaluation allows the system to explain why its solution
is the right way to handle the problem, analytical constraints can be used to generate
explanations as to what is wrong with the user's solution. For example, the ONCOCIN
critiquing interface used purely di erential critiquing, comparing the user's treatment plan
to the plan generated according to the system's coded oncology protocols. As a result, the
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Figure 5.1: The plan evaluator
system was able to point out where the user's plan di ered from the system's, and could
produce, upon request, a translation of the rules that led the system to its conclusions,
but it had no capability for explaining what was wrong with the way the user wanted to
do things. On the other hand, an analytical system for kitchen design, such as the JANUS
system 22], might include a rule that the stove should be no less than ve feet from the
sink. If this rule is violated in a proposed design, the system can cite it as a reason for not
accepting the design.
The approach to plan evaluation that I have developed for TraumaTIQ makes use of the
best features of both di erential and analytical approaches. It combines the ability to o er
speci c advice and to evaluate the plan globally that the di erential approach provides,
with the exibility and additional explanatory capabilities of analytical evaluation.
The plan evaluator is primarily di erential. It uses the plan generated by TraumAID's
planner as the target plan, and compares it with the plan inferred by the plan recognizer.
However, by augmenting the planner to record the decisions made during the planning
process, I have made it possible to explain not only why TraumAID's plan includes the
actions it does, but also why certain actions are not in the plan.
I have also made the plan evaluator more tolerant of minor deviations from the target
plan than a purely di erential analysis would allow. Using knowledge about the magnitude
of di erent types of errors, it lters the output so that only non-trivial errors are critiqued.
This ltering process also results in a classi cation of the remaining errors as either critical
or non-critical, which is later used to determine the nal organization and form of the
output.
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Plan evaluation is done in three phases, as shown in Figure 5.1. First, the physician's
plan is compared to TraumAID's plan and all discrepancies between the two are identi ed.
Next, the discrepancies are classi ed using a taxonomy of error types. Finally, each error
that has been classi ed is evaluated on a three-level scale of signi cance using information
from TraumAID's knowledge about goals, procedures and actions to determine the nal
contents of the critique.

5.2 Identifying and classifying human errors
Determining what kinds of errors people make and when they are likely to make them has
been a primary concern of work in the eld of human-computer interaction. Of particular
relevance to this thesis is work on the development of decision-support systems for process
control environments 37, 71, 73]. These models are intended to identify errors committed
by operators of complex technological systems, and to respond such a way as to minimize
the e ect of the errors. Work in this area began by drawing from evidence from cognitive
psychology regarding the evaluation and classi cation of human errors. The idea was to
develop an operational de nition of di erent types of errors based on the understanding
of what causes those errors to occur. In the next section I will discuss the psychological
theory of biases in judgment and decision making, and describe an approach to critiquing
that makes use of this theory 80].

5.2.1 Recognizing the causes of error
The occurrence of errors in management plans suggests that the physicians responsible
for the delivery of care sometimes have incorrect or missing knowledge, which can be
counteracted with a simple reminder, or they experience lapses in judgment, such as those
described in the literature on heuristic biases in decision-making 41]. From the point of
view of critiquing, it may be advantageous to be able to detect when such biases might be
inuencing a physician's decision-making.
The process by which people make judgments and come to conclusions with incomplete
knowledge and in uncertain situations has been the subject of numerous studies in cognitive
psychology, such as those presented in 41]. It has often been observed that people make
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use of heuristic rules when forming judgments based on uncertain information. These
heuristics are derived from everyday experience and, as such, are often useful in simplifying
complicated situations in order to decide what to do. In certain circumstances, however,
it has been claimed that these heuristics can lead to systematic, predictable biases 87].
These biases have been demonstrated not just in untrained subjects reasoning about an
unfamiliar domain, but also in the reasoning of experts, such as surgeons, who are trained
in their area of expertise and may also have some background in statistics and formal
reasoning 17, 79].
There are three types of reasoning that have been associated with this heuristic process,
and in which biases have been observed: probabilistic reasoning, causal reasoning and logical
deduction. One heuristic used in probabilistic reasoning is referred to as the availability
heuristic, which is often used to judge the frequency of items in a class or the expected
likelihood of a particular event. The more easily members of the class can be recalled,
or an occurrence of the event can be imagined, the higher the judgment of frequency will
be. This rule is reasonable in many cases because, all else being equal, a more frequent
item or event will be easier to bring to mind. However, there are several other factors that
contribute to the cognitive availability of a class, such as the salience of its members or the
complexity of the procedure needed to conceptualize them. The availability heuristic has
been shown to bias judgments in favor of the more easily conceptualized classes. In the
context of patient management, the availability bias suggests that physicians might tend
to omit relevant tests and jump to conclusions about a diagnosis on the basis of insucient
but highly salient evidence.
Errors in causal reasoning include a phenomenon that is referred to as the fundamental
attribution error, in which observers tend to attribute the actions of others to personal
disposition, while the actors themselves attribute their actions more strongly to situational
factors.
An example of a typical error in logical deduction is the con rmation bias. This is
a phenomenon in which people tend to test only instances which support their current
hypothesis, and not those that would refute it. This strategy allows hypotheses to be
con rmed more quickly, but may result in erroneous conclusions if the hypotheses are not
correct.
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In Chapter 3 I introduced an approach to critiquing that makes explicit use of knowledge
about these types of judgment biases 79, 80, 82]. Silverman's approach is to develop
operational rules for identifying errors resulting from the underlying catalog of biases. For
example, a rule for the availability bias might say that if a person is observed to be using
only easily available knowledge or ignoring knowledge that is not easily available, then the
availability bias is likely to have occurred. The resulting critique can explain the negative
e ect of this bias and propose a di erent approach.
Silverman's approach is interesting in that it attempts to identify and correct the
underlying causes of human error. However, it relies on the correctness of the particular
theory of cognition and action put forth by Kahneman, Tversky and others. Unfortunately,
it is not clear that this theory has been validated enough to be used in this way 28]. The
experimental evidence for many of the biases and errors reported in the literature has been
contradicted or has failed to be replicated in di erent contexts. It may be the case that
certain biases only appear in very speci c (perhaps arti cial) situations, the characteristics
of which have not yet been suciently explored. In addition, in the case of some of the
biases described in the literature, it has been argued that the de nition of normative or
\correct" behavior is not well de ned, and that in fact the observed behavior cannot really
be called erroneous.
Furthermore, as Silverman himself points out, even if a proven cognitive theory did
exist, de ning the observable manifestations of each bias in any given domain would be
nearly impossible. The rules he gives for recognizing occurrences of errors due to cognitive
bias are much too high-level to apply in any real situation, and re ning them further is a
costly and highly domain-speci c task. For example, in looking for the availability bias,
how can we de ne what information is easily available? The availability of information
may depend on user-, domain- and situation-speci c factors, such as the memory of the
user, the possible information sources, and the physical location of those sources. Any rule
for identifying the availability bias would only be valid in a very small range of situations.
A nal objection to this approach is that it seems to be at odds with the spirit of critiquing. The purpose of a critiquing system is to provide assistance to a trained individual
during the performance of a task. As such, the system should be able to identify when a
speci c error is being made and to correct or avoid that error. Silverman's approach of
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recognizing when particular cognitive biases are likely to a ect the user's behavior looks
much more like a tutoring approach, aimed at reducing the occurrence of those biases in
the long run. While combining critiquing and tutoring capabilities may be a good idea
in some applications, it is important to recognize the di erence between the two. Addressing the underlying causes of errors is both more complex and more time consuming
than addressing their observable manifestations, and so would not be desirable in some
applications of critiquing, particularly those that are designed for time-critical tasks. In
the next section, I will describe an approach that focuses on identifying the observable
manifestations of errors rather than their underlying causes.

5.2.2 Recognizing the manifestations of error
In his work on identifying human errors in process control environments, Hollnagel 36,
37] has made an important distinction between the underlying cause or genotype of an
error, and the observable manifestation or phenotype of the error. Silverman is concerned
primarily with the former, and has de ned categories of observable erroneous actions based
on the underlying theory of cognitive bias described by Kahneman and Tversky. Other
work on classifying human error 71] has also been primarily concerned with the causes of
error rather than the errors themselves.
But, as Hollnagel points out, it is often a mistake to mix the classi cation of observable
phenomena with the interpretation of their causes. For example, an agent who fails to
carry out an action will often be said to have \forgotten" the action, when actually the
observable manifestation of the error can only be seen as an omission, which may or may
not be caused by forgetting. Furthermore, depending on the purpose of identifying the
error, the cause of the omission may be irrelevant. Once the agent is \reminded" to do the
action, the reason he had omitted it may not be an issue.
In 36, 37], Hollnagel sets out to de ne a classi cation of observable errors, or what
he calls error phenotypes. Rather than relying on an analysis of actions and plans in a
limited domain, he begins by enumerating all possible errors involving a single action that
can occur in a generic plan, de ned as a totally ordered sequence of actions all of which
address a single goal.
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The phenotypes are classi ed according to the level of observation or inference needed to
identify them. 0-order phenotypes are those that can be detected based on the observation
of a single action together with an expectation for what the next action will be. The more
complex 1-order phenotypes are derived from the combination of two or more 0-order
phenotypes.
The identi cation of errors from observation of a sequence of actions requires reasoning
about the temporal constraints on actions. There are two separate but related factors to
consider here: the relative ordering of actions with respect to each other, and the absolute
constraints on when actions must be done with respect to the real time line. The 0-order
phenotypes are divided into those that can be identi ed on the basis of the ordinal sequence
of actions, and those that are de ned in terms of external temporal constraints.

Sequence-based error phenotypes
Hollnagel's error phenotypes are de ned in terms of a generic plan consisting of a totally
ordered sequence of actions, Step1 Step2 : : : Stepn], which is assumed to be necessary
and sucient to achieve a goal G. In the de nitions that follow, the assumption is made
that a single goal is being pursued at a time. It is also assumed that actions in a plan are
executed one at a time, and that the results of an action are available immediately.
On the other hand, there is no assumption made about how the current goal, G, is
determined { whether it is selected by the actor and inferred by the observer who would
then interpret subsequent actions in terms of whether they contribute to the actor's initial
goal, or whether the observer interprets all actions with reference to a goal that she herself
has determined to be relevant. In either case, it is possible for the goal to change at any
time as a result as information gained during the plan execution process.
The complete set of 0-order error phenotypes that are based purely on sequence are:
Correct action: In any classi cation of erroneous action, it is necessary to de ne when
an action is not in error. A correct action is de ned as an action that is correctly
placed in the currently executing plan. If Stepi has just been executed, then Stepi+1
if seen next would be considered a correct action.
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Jump forward: An action that belongs further forward in the plan than the expected next action. In the observed action sequence : : : Stepi Stepi+2  : : :], Stepi+2
is considered a jump forward because it is being done before Stepi+1 .
Omission: This is de ned as a jump forward of just one action.
Jump backward: An action reverts to an already executed part of the plan. For example, in the observed sequence : : : Stepi 2  Stepi 1 Stepi Stepi 2  : : :], the second
occurrence of Stepi 2 is a jump backwards because it appears earlier in the plan.
;

;

;

;

Repetition: A jump backwards of just one action, so that the last action is repeated.
Intrusion: the occurrence of an extraneous action in a plan. If the expected sequence
is : : : Step1 Step2 Step3 : : :] and what is observed is : : : Step1 X Step3 : : :],
where X is an action that does not appear anywhere in the plan for G, an intrusion
has occured.

Absolute time-based error phenotypes
The absolute time constraints on actions arise from the situation and intrinsic properties of
the actions themselves rather than their relationships with other actions. These properties
include the urgency of the goal being addressed by an action and the duration of the action,
which together can be used to specify the latest possible time the action can be started in
order to have it completed in the time available to address the goal. If the goal is to change
the value of a uent variable (e.g. reducing pressure in the chest cavity), the amount of
time between onset of the action (e.g. aspirating the chest) and initial achievement of the
goal may also be relevant.
Hollnagel bases his time-based error phenotypes on the formalism for reasoning about
actions and time that was developed by Allen 1]. In Allen's logic, actions are de ned as
events that are caused by agents and that occur over speci c intervals of time. There is a
small set of relationships that can exist between two time intervals X and Y:
BEFORE(X,Y): X is completely before Y and there is a non-zero interval between
them.
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EQUAL(X,Y): X and Y are the same interval.
MEETS(X,Y): X is completely before Y but there is no interval between them.
OVERLAPS(X,Y): X starts before Y and Y ends after X.
DURING(X,Y): X is fully contained in Y.
STARTS(X,Y): X and Y begin at the same time, but X ends before Y.
FINISHES(X,Y): X and Y end at the same time, but X starts after Y.
In order to talk about actions with exible time constraints on when they should start
and nish, each action has associated with it an Earliest Starting Time (EST), a Latest
Starting Time (LST), an Earliest Finishing Time (EFT), and a Latest Finishing Time
(LFT). Following Allen, these time \points" are treated as extremely small intervals. These
constraints, together with the temporal interval relationships above, are used to de ne an
additional set of 0-order phenotypes in terms of absolute temporal constraints. These
errors all assume that the action in question is the correct next action in the sequence, but
that it is being done at the wrong time. In the following de nitions, A denotes the interval
during which the action occurs:
Correctly timed action: BEFORE(EST,A) ^ DURING(LST,A) ^ DURING(EFT,A)
^ BEFORE(A,LFT). The action occurs during the correct intervals.
Premature start of action: DURING(EST,A). The action begins before the earliest
starting time.
Delayed start of action: BEFORE(LST,A). The action begins after the latest starting
time.
Premature nishing of action: BEFORE(A,EFT). The action ends before the earliest
nishing time.
Delayed nishing of action: DURING(LFT,A). The action ends after the latest
nishing time.
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Omission: BEFORE(LFT,A). The action begins after the latest nishing time, e ectively rendering it useless with respect to the plan. No distinction is made between
the action being done too late and not being done at all since if the action is done
after the LFT it will no longer be relevant and will be interpreted as an intrusion.
The 0-order error phenotypes are simple to de ne and can be identi ed immediately
in a plan since they only involve a single action.1 On the other hand, they do not allow
us to get a bigger picture of what is going wrong with the plan, since the underlying
cause of the error may e ect a whole sequence or sequences of actions. Looking at errors
involving sequences of actions, the simple phenotypes listed above can be expanded into a
larger, more complex set of 1-order phenotypes. The 1-order phenotypes have the serious
disadvantage that they cannot be recognized unambiguously on the basis of a single action.
Since the goal of TraumaTIQ is to respond as quickly as possible to a potential error, the
1-order phenotypes are not as useful as the 0-order. Furthermore, the added complexity
of the 1-order phenotypes would make them dicult to explain briey in the context of a
real emergency. For a discussion of the 1-order phenotypes the reader is referred to 37].
Hollnagel's error de nitions rely on the characterization of a plan as a totally ordered
sequence of actions that are necessary and sucient for achieving a goal. This implies that
once the observer has determined the actor's goal, she then knows every action that the
actor should perform to achieve that goal, and in what order they should be performed.
This assumption is not justi ed in most realistic situations for a number of reasons.
First, this characterization of plans does not take into account the possibility of alternative ways of addressing a goal. Therefore it does not allow the classi cation of situations
in which the actor is addressing her goal, but in a sub-optimal manner. Second, it also
does not consider the interactions that may occur when multiple plans are executed concurrently. For example, a realistic system must be able to recognize which of the currently
active plans an action is intended to participate in.
Finally, while Hollnagel de nes plans in terms of totally ordered action sequences, in
general, the actions in a plan do not have to be totally ordered. It may be up to the agent
This is true provided the EST, LST, EFT and LFT are not dependent on other actions in the plan.
For example, actions may be done temporarily \buy time," increasing the amount of time available for
denitive action.
1
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executing the plan to decide what to do rst, and some actions may be done in parallel.
The relative ordering of actions in a plan can be constrained by a number of relationships
or interactions, including precondition achievement, logistical or resource constraints, and
avoidance of contraindications. Violations of these constraints de ne a certain class of
erroneous action.

5.3 Outcome-driven Error Classication
The main concern in developing a taxonomy of error phenotypes, as Hollnagel notes, is to
constrain the de nitions to rely only on observable ndings. This will allow the de nitions
to be operationalized in the implementation of computer systems designed to detect and
respond to erroneous actions. Thinking about plans abstractly as generic sequences of
actions can help to develop a complete classi cation of the types of errors that may occur
in any plan. Applying these de nitions to a real domain involves thinking about which of
them are relevant to the problem.
Ultimately, our goal in providing automated real-time decision support is not to identify
errors when they occur, but to prevent them from occuring in the rst place. This requires
the ability to recognize and respond to potential errors as quickly as possible, while they
still may be preventable. Since some of the error types de ned by Hollnagel, such as
premature start of action, cannot be identi ed until they are committed, we will not be
concerned with these error types in TraumaTIQ.
In order to anticipate potential errors, TraumaTIQ must rely on the information available from the physician's orders for actions rather than waiting until the action is performed. Because of this, we must keep in mind that there will be less information available
about when actions will actually be performed and what order they will be done in. The
time an action is ordered only constrains the earliest possible starting time of the action.
An arbitrary amount of time may pass between an order being placed and the action being
performed. In addition, the actions that have been ordered so far may be performed in
any order with respect to each other.
TraumaTIQ recognizes three basic discrepancies that can occur between a physician's
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proposed plan and the target plan constructed by TraumAID. Of the time-based discrepancies, we are concerned only with instances of delayed start of action. We divide
the sequence-based error phenotypes into two broad categories: unexpected actions and
scheduling errors.

Omission Theoretically, an error of omission occurs when an action appears in the target
plan but not in the proposed plan. In practice, we identify a potential error of
omission when observing a delayed start of action, where the action does not begin
until after the latest starting time. Of the remaining time-based errors, premature
start of action, premature nishing of action and true omission (when the action
does not begin until after the latest nishing time) are not useful categories because
these errors are not preventable once they have been identi ed. The remaining
time-based error type, delayed nishing of action, is not a signi cant problem in
trauma management, assuming that the action is correct and is correctly executed
(a requirement that TraumaTIQ cannot verify).

Unexpected Action An action that appears in the proposed plan but not in the target
plan is an unexpected action. This corresponds to Hollnagel's categories of intrusion,
jump backwards, and repetition. At this level, we are not concerned with whether
the action has been done before, just that it is not correct at the present time.
Unexpected actions can play a useful role in the plan, serving as an alternative way
of addressing a relevant goal, in which case they are treated as procedure choice
errors. Otherwise, they are treated as true errors of commission.

Scheduling Actions that are done in a di erent order in the proposed plan than in the

target plan represent a scheduling error. Since it is not possible to assume that
actions will be performed in the order in which they are ordered by the physician, it
is necessary to make a judgment as to when an error of this type is actually likely
to occur. To minimize intrusiveness, TraumaTIQ withholds its comments if it is
possible that the correct scheduling is intended. If TraumAID has a constraint to
do A before B, and the physician has ordered B and then ordered A, TraumaTIQ
does not identify this as a scheduling error, since it is impossible to determine the
actual order of execution. On the other hand, if the physician has ordered B and
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not A, a scheduling error is noted. By this de nition, observations of the sequencebased errors of omission or jump forward are recognized as potential violations of
scheduling constraints, since a later action is being done before an earlier action in
the plan.
Rather than identifying more complex permutations of erroneous action sequences, further classi cation of these basic errors is based on the potential impact of the error on the
outcome of the plan. This is a feature that is not speci ed in other error classi cation
systems I have been able to discover, but which is crucial to the ability to respond appropriately to erroneous actions. For example, an error of commission in which the action
may need to be done in the near future is more tolerable than an error of commission for
which it has been determined that the action should never be done. Each sub-category
has a di erent evaluation function associated with it for calculating the error's level of
signi cance. The relevant inuences vary depending on the type of error, as I discuss in
the following subsections. The entire taxonomy of errors is shown in Figure 5.2.
The taxonomy is sound in that it does not misclassify errors. Any discrepancy that is
found by TraumaTIQ between the physician's plan and TraumAID's plan will be treated
appropriately. On the other hand, the taxonomy is not complete because it does not
include discrepancies that are not speci cally of interest to TraumaTIQ. For example, as
I mentioned above, TraumaTIQ does not recognize time-based errors other than delayed
start of action because the other time-based error types either cannot be prevented by a
critique (premature start or nish of action and true omission) or cannot be identi ed using
TraumAID's current representation of actions (delayed nish of action). In addition, other
basic error types are treated in the same class by TraumaTIQ since they are functionally
equivalent from the point of view of potential outcome. Furthermore, the classi cation
of scheduling errors is limited to the scheduling constraints that are relevant to trauma
management. Clearly, other domains may have di erent constraints on the scheduling of
actions.
It is important to recognize that this taxonomy is just one way of classifying erroneous
actions. Any classi cation scheme must necessarily be driven by the purposes of the
designer, which in this case are to determine the potential signi cance of errors on patient
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outcome. Thus I am not claiming that this classi cation is unique { di erent problems
may require a di erent basis for classifying errors. However, classifying errors in this way
would be useful in any system that is designed to tailor its responses based on the potential
seriousness of what it is responding to. Any system that provides quality assurance would
belong in this category.

5.3.1 Errors of omission
In a situation that involves pursuing multiple goals, we must consider not just what actions
have been omitted in the plan to address a single goal, but also what relevant goals are
not being addressed. An error of omission is identi ed whenever a goal that TraumAID
considers relevant is not being addressed by the physician in a timely manner. Errors of
omission are further classi ed according to whether:
1. the goal is not being addressed at all, or
2. the goal is only being partially addressed { some but not all the actions in the
procedure addressing the goal have been ordered.
In either case, all the actions that are missing from the physician's plan are included in
the resulting critique in connection with the omitted goal.
TraumaTIQ identi es a partial omission when a goal recommended by TraumAID is
only being partially addressed using the preferred procedure. It does not treat as errors of
omission cases in which the physician has partially pursued an unmotivated goal (errors of
commission), or partially executed an incorrect procedure (procedure-choice errors). This
is because of a design decision not to have TraumaTIQ assist physicians in pursuing suboptimal or incorrect courses of action. Rather, the response to an unexpected action being
ordered will be to critique the order until it is either rescinded or the action is executed.
The omission routine is sensitive to the fact that, due to the real-time nature of the
critiquing task, the speci cation the system has of the physician's plan is likely to be incomplete at any given time. Rather than commenting immediately when a goal TraumAID
considers relevant is not addressed in the physician's proposed plan, TraumaTIQ identi es
a latest starting time (LST) for the action as a certain period of time after TraumAID
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concluded the goal to be relevant. If the LST passes without the goal being addressed,
TraumaTIQ identi es an error of omission.
The amount of time between TraumAID's goal formation and the LST for addressing
the goal depends on the urgency of the goal. A goal's urgency is classi ed as either
catastrophic, unstable, or stable. These categories correspond roughly to having either
2, 20, or 200 minutes respectively in which to address the goal. TraumaTIQ sets the
LST for catastrophic goals to be immediately after the goal is concluded, unstable goals
two minutes later, and stable goals ve minutes later. This is the amount of time after
TraumAID has concluded a goal to be relevant that it will wait before commenting if the
goal is not being addressed.
The omission routine is also sensitive to whether the goal underlying an action is
dependent on any actions that are scheduled to be done before it. An action, , is considered
to be dependent on another action,  , if there is some possible outcome of  that could
cause the goal/s motivating  to become irrelevant.2 If it is possible that an action will
be removed from TraumAID's plan before it is done, it will not be mentioned as an error
of omission in the critique.
0

0

5.3.2 Unexpected actions
When the physician orders an action that is not in TraumAID's plan, how it is handled in
the critique depends on whether it addresses a goal that is in TraumAID's plan. If so, it
is treated as a procedure choice error { the goal is correct, but the manner of addressing it
is not. If, on the other hand, the action is not associated with a relevant goal, it is treated
as an error of commission.

Procedure-choice errors
A procedure choice error is an unexpected action which addresses a goal that is also
currently pursued in the target plan. Procedure choice errors are classi ed according to
the reason TraumAID selected the procedure it did to address the goal. There are three
reasons that TraumAID may have for choosing one alternative procedure over another:
Because of the unless clauses in TraumAID's rules, it is possible for a relevant goal to become irrelevant
as a result of new information.
2

90

1. TraumAID selected a less preferred procedure due to the presence of a scheduling
constraint or contraindication for the preferred procedure.
2. The chosen procedure is preferred for addressing the goal.
3. The procedure that TraumAID proposes was chosen as a global optimization in which
it was determined that one procedure could be used to address multiple goals (action
overloading).
When the physician and TraumAID disagree about how to address a goal, TraumaTIQ
will point out that disagreement together with TraumAID's reason for having made the
decision it did.
There is a slight complication here in that the third case can occur at the same time
as either of the rst two cases. The preferred procedure for a goal may be contraindicated
at the same time that using another procedure results in a more optimal plan, or the
preferred procedure may also be used to address some other relevant goal. Because the
concept of action overloading requires a more complex and lengthy explanation, if either of
these combinations occur, the action overloading explanation will be left out of the critique
in favor of the simpler explanation.
For example, the goal of ruling out abdominal bleeding can be addressed by a peritoneal
lavage or a CT scan, but the lavage cannot be done if there is extensive abdominal scarring.
If the physician orders a lavage for a patient with a scarred abdomen, and there is also
another reason for doing a CT scan (ruling out a renal injury, for example), the system
will suggest doing a CT scan rather than a lavage to rule out abdominal bleeding on the
basis of the lavage being contraindicated, without mentioning that the CT scan will also
address the possibility of renal injury.

Errors of commission
An error of commission is identi ed when an action is observed that does not have a
relevant goal associated with it. If any goal (or goals) has been selected as the reason
for ordering the action3 , this routine will seek to determine why that goal is not currently
relevant.
3

See the discussion of plan recognition for how this may be done.
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There are six subcategories of errors of commission:
1. The plan recognizer failed to infer a goal or goals underlying the action.
2. The goal associated with the action is potentially relevant, implying that the action
is being done prematurely.
3. The goal has been found to be irrelevant by the failure of all of TraumAID's rules
associated with that goal.
4. The goal has already been addressed.
5. The goal is relevant, but TraumAID's planner was unable to address it in the plan
due to some conicting constraint.
Since the plan recognition algorithm infers relevant goals to explain actions whenever
possible, an action will not be identi ed as an error of commission unless there is no possible
reason for doing it that is currently relevant. The only way the third, fourth or fth type
of commission will be identi ed is if the goal in question is the only possible reason for
doing the action. Otherwise the goal is left unspeci ed by the plan recognizer, and the
error is found to be the rst type of commission.
In the case of the sixth type of error of commission, if TraumaTIQ is going to critique
an action as an error of commission on the grounds that it could not be scheduled in the
current plan, it is very important to be able to explain to the physician why it couldn't be
scheduled. For this purpose, I have modi ed the planner to keep a record of such planning
failures, so that they could be explained in the critique. This modi cation will be discussed
further in Chapter 7.

5.3.3 Scheduling errors
The scheduling routine is concerned with enforcing temporal ordering in the plan. A
scheduling error is identi ed when an action is ordered that is constrained to be done after
another action that has not yet been ordered. This decision to consider a scheduling error
only if it involves an omitted action (in the sequence sense of omission) means that the
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critique will often include an error of omission along with a scheduling error. In Chapter 6
I will discuss the possibility of combining such related comments.
Scheduling errors are classi ed according to the reason for the scheduling constraint.
The possible reasons are as follows:
1. Site: Since TraumAID plans for the patient to be moved through the necessary sites
in a xed order { Emergency Center, Radiology Suite, Operating Suite, Trauma Unit
{ actions that must be done in an earlier site are constrained to be performed before
actions that must be done in a later site.
2. Urgency: Each action has a level of urgency associated with it that is inherited from
the goals it addresses. An action  cannot precede another action  in the plan if 
takes more time than the urgency level of  indicates is available.
0

0

3. Priority: If there are no di erences in urgency, standards of trauma practice recommend addressing problems in order of the subsystem of the body they a ect: airway
before breathing before circulation, etc.
4. Precondition: Certain actions have preconditions that must be satis ed before they
can be done. In TraumAID's plans, these preconditions are enforced implicitly by the
ordering of actions within procedures. For the purposes of critiquing, I have added
explicit preconditions to TraumAID's action de nitions, as described in Chapter 7.
5. Precedence constraints: Some combinations of actions must always be done in a
prede ned order because the performance of one could a ect the outcome of the
other.
6. Informational Dependencies: Since the plans produced by TraumAID are conditional
plans, in some cases the relevance of a goal that is addressed later in the plan may
be dependent on the results of information to be acquired earlier in the plan. In that
case, we want to be sure that the actions are done in the appropriate order, since the
later actions may turn out to be altogether unnecessary.
When a scheduling error is commented on in the critique, it will include the reason that
TraumAID has scheduled one action before the other.
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Note that the precondition category is unique in that it is the only time that TraumaTIQ will recommend doing an action that is not in TraumAID's plan. This will be the case
if an unexpected action, , with an unsatis ed precondition,  , is ordered. In addition to
an error of commission, TraumaTIQ will identify a scheduling error regarding the precondition. The resulting critique will say both \Do not do ," and \Before doing  do  ."4
This contradicts the general philosophy that TraumaTIQ should not assist physicians in
executing incorrect plans, because in this case the consequences of doing  without doing
 are great enough that the physician should be made aware of them.

5.4 Determining the signicance of errors
To provide e ective decision support in a time-critical, task centered activity such as
trauma management, the plan evaluator must be designed with the cognitive demands on
the physician in mind. For this reason, TraumaTIQ limits its critique to those items that
may have a signi cant negative impact on the outcome of the case. Unlike other critiquing
systems 54, 70], TraumaTIQ does not comment on correct decisions. While it may be
desirable in some situations to encourage the user with positive feedback, in an urgent
situation the need to reserve the physician's attention for the primary task outweighs such
psychological bene ts. Therefore, in TraumaTIQ the absence of a critique will be taken as
acceptance of the proposed plan.
Beyond not commenting on correct actions, the approach I have taken also refrains
from producing a comment when the physician's proposed plan diverges only in minor ways
from the plan recommended by TraumAID. In this section I will discuss how TraumaTIQ
determines when a divergence is signi cant enough to warrant a critique.
The rst two stages of plan evaluation identify and classify places where TraumAID
and the physician disagree as to how best to manage the patient. However, it does not
provide any information about the signi cance of these disagreements. For example, the
physician may have ordered an unmotivated peritoneal lavage (an invasive test to check
for blood or other uids in the abdominal cavity). This would seem to be a signi cant
This is another example of critiques that should ultimately be combined in the output (e.g. \ is not
recommended, but if you decide to do anyway, be sure to do  rst.")
4
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error since it has costs in terms of both time and invasiveness. On the other hand, an
unmotivated administration of intravenous uids would not be considered as important to
correct since the costs involved are not high.
While TraumAID's knowledge base has been carefully designed to reect nationally
accepted practice guidelines, in some cases it may be possible to stray from these guidelines
without incurring an unacceptable amount of additional cost or risk to the patient. In
such cases, it is more important to allow the physician to attend to the task of patient
management than it is to correct her minor deviations from protocol. In addition, some
physicians may have more experience performing one procedure than another, and following
the practice guidelines may not be the optimal approach in such cases.
There are two reasons for incorporating this knowledge into the system:
1. It will reduce the number of comments in the critique that reect insigni cant differences between the preferences coded in TraumAID's knowledge base and the preferences of the physician using the system. This ltering should increase the acceptability of the system by reducing the total number of comments produced, while
increasing the average importance of those comments that remain.
2. Errors that are important enough to appear in the critique will still vary as to their
potential impact on the patient. It is important for the system to be able to identify
those errors of a particularly serious nature and emphasize them in the critique.
The third stage of plan evaluation evaluates the error instances classi ed during the second
stage according to knowledge about the clinical signi cance of various types of error. For
the purposes of critiquing, each error is classi ed as either:
1. Tolerable, probably harmless.
2. Non-critical, but potentially harmful.
3. Critical, potentially fatal.
Which of these classes a particular error belongs to determines how it will be handled
in the critique. Errors in the rst class are not mentioned at all, errors in the second
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class appear as simple statements or reminders, while errors in the third class appear as
warnings.5

5.4.1 Representing disutilities for errors
In order to evaluate the signi cance of individual errors, it is necessary to determine how
much worse o the patient will be as a result of those errors. To do this we can use
the decision-theoretic concept of disutility 76]. Decision theory is usually concerned with
nding the course of action that will maximize expected utility. In this case, we are
interested in the dierence in expected utility between the physician's proposed plan and
TraumAID's plan. If that di erence is suciently high it will motivate producing a critique.
In the absence of a \gold standard" for evaluating trauma management plans, I took
advantage of a set of disutilities, or negative utilities, associated with actions and outcomes
that was generated during the development of the TraumAID system. The procedure for
determining these disutilities was as follows:
The subjects were four surgeons who were knowledgeable about the procedures and
outcomes relevant to the management of trauma. These physicians were asked to make
judgments from the point of view of a patient undergoing trauma care. There were two
potential problems with this procedure: the physicians' perception of outcomes is probably
somewhat di erent from the average trauma patient simply on the basis of greater experience, and their judgments may also be biased in that they do not represent a random
sample of society. However, the advantage of their greater knowledge and experience was
seen to outweigh potential biases for the purposes of this task.
The subjects were presented with a list of trauma management procedures and a list
of adverse outcomes (failures to address diagnosed problems). They were asked to rank
each item on a scale of 0-100 where 0 is best and 100 is worst, on the basis of how they
would feel about having to undergo that procedure or experience that outcome. These
judgments incorporated assessments of pain and discomfort, recovery time, and prognostic
implications. They did not, however, include consideration of nancial cost, since they
The system could be enhanced by allowing the physician to select a level of \pickyness" in which case
whether or not errors in the rst two classes would be mentioned would be dependent on the preferences
of the user.
5
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were intended to be used primarily to maximize the patient's physical well-being.
After the initial ranking, the disutilities were re ned using an iterative series of standard
gamble comparisons. In a standard gamble a subject is asked to choose between a de nite
intermediate outcome or a probabilistic outcome which is either better or worse. For
example, a subject might be asked to choose whether they would rather have a 100%
chance of getting $50 or a 50% chance of getting either $100 or nothing.
To determine relative disutilities between all procedures and outcomes in the trauma
domain, a sequence of standard gamble comparisons was necessary. To begin, the worst
possible outcome was anchored at 100, and the best outcome was anchored at 0. Starting
with the worst outcome, an item was chosen that had initially been assigned a disutility of
half of that outcome. The subject was then asked whether they would rather experience
the one with the lower disutility or have a 50% chance of experiencing the one with the
higher disutility. If a preference was indicated, the probability of experiencing the higher
disutility was adjusted until the subject did not have a preference. The relative disutility
of the lower item was then adjusted to reect this new value. For example, if the subject
did not have a preference between de nitely having a tube thoracostomy and having a 10%
chance of having an ER thoracotomy, then the disutility of the tube thoracostomy would
be adjusted to be equal to 10% of the disutility of the ER thoracotomy.
This process was then repeated with the newly adjusted item, and another item that
had initially been assigned half of that adjusted disutility. In this way, procedures and
outcomes were compared until a globally stable assignment of disutilities was reached.
The result of this procedure was a \cost" associated with each action in TraumAID's
knowledge base, and a \penalty" for failure to address each of the goals.

Action costs
The disutilities associated with procedures were assigned as \costs" to the TraumAID
actions involved in those procedures. In TraumAID 2.0, these costs are used by the planner
to choose between two alternative plans that address the same set of goals: given such a
choice, the plan with the lower total costs is selected.
In TraumaTIQ's plan evaluation, action costs are used to determine the signi cance
of errors of commission and procedure choice. In the former, the higher the cost of the
97

action being done unnecessarily, the more signi cant the error. In the latter, the dierence
between the costs of the alternative procedures is the relevant metric.

Penalties for omission
These disutilities relate to the failures to address problems. In contrast to the costs for
undergoing procedures, these values were not used by TraumAID 2.0's planner. However,
they are quite valuable for TraumaTIQ's plan evaluator to assess the signi cance of errors
of omission. While the disutilities for undergoing procedures were translated into costs
of actions in TraumAID, the disutilities for omitted treatments correspond more closely
to the goal level of TraumAID's representation: they indicate the penalty for failing to
address a therapeutic goal, regardless of what actions may be involved in addressing that
goal.

5.4.2 Approximating disutilities of errors
The concept of expected disutility provides a convenient way to evaluate the signi cance of
di erent types of error on a single scale. Each error is assigned a value between 1 and 100
which can then be used to decide whether the error will be considered critical, non-critical,
or tolerable.
The expected disutility of a course of action is a function of both the disutility of the
various outcomes and their probabilities. This can be calculated using a decision tree representing both choice (decision) nodes and chance (probabilistic) nodes. Since TraumAID
does not actually calculate a numerical probability for the diagnoses it considers or for
the expected outcomes of actions, it was necessary to make some assumptions about these
probabilities to approximate the di erence in expected disutility between TraumAID's and
the physician's plans:6
When TraumAID has a therapeutic goal, assume that the probability of the diagnosis
is 100%. As a result, the expected disutility of failing to address a therapeutic goal
is equal to the di erence between the penalty for failing to address the goal and the
cost of addressing it.
These approximations were determined in consultation with Dr. John Clarke, an experienced trauma
surgeon and decision theorist.
6
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This also leads to calculating the expected disutility of a redundant diagnostic action as being equal to the cost of the action, since it de nitely will not appear in
TraumAID's plan in the future.
When TraumAID has a diagnostic goal, assume that the probability of the diagnosis
is 50%. This means that the expected disutility of failing to address a diagnostic
goal is equal to the di erence between half the penalty for failing to treat the injury
and the cost of doing the diagnosis.
This assumption also leads to calculating the expected disutility of a premature action
error as half the cost of the action, since we have assumed a 50% probability that
the action will eventually be included in TraumAID's plan.
When TraumAID has concluded a diagnosis to be false, assume that the probability
of that diagnosis is 0%. This means that the expected disutility of an error of
commission of either a diagnostic or therapeutic action is equal to the cost of the
action, since there is no chance that the action will be included in TraumAID's plan.
When TraumAID has not concluded a diagnostic goal to be either relevant or irrelevant, assume that the probability of the diagnosis is 10%. This means that the
expected disutility of an unmotivated error of commission is 90% of the cost of the
action since there is a small chance that the action will appear in TraumAID's plan.
Assume that all procedures for addressing a goal are equally e ective. This means
that the expected disutility of a procedure choice error is equal to the di erence in
cost between the plans containing the alternative procedures.
These assumptions allow us to calculate expected disutilities for many of the error
types enumerated in the previous section. In addition, we need to be able to estimate the
disutility when a goal has been partially addressed, and we need to know the disutility of
violating the constraints that lead to action prohibitions and the scheduling constraints.
When a goal has been partially addressed by the physician's orders, the disutility
should be proportional to the amount of the goal that has been addressed. Unfortunately,
TraumAID's procedure de nitions do not include information about how important each
action is to the procedure as a whole. To approximate this value, I make the assumption
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that the higher the proportion of the procedure cost contributed by an individual action,
the more central a role that action has in the procedure. The disutility for partially failing
to address a goal is thus calculated as
(PG  CA ) ; CA

CG

Where PG is the penalty for not addressing the goal if it is relevant, CA is the cost of the
actions that have been omitted, and CG is the total cost of addressing the goal.
The disutility of doing a prohibited action depends on the reason it is prohibited.
This applies both to errors of commission involving prohibited actions and to procedurechoice errors where the procedure involving the prohibited action has been replaced by
an alternative procedure. Actions can be prohibited by TraumAID due to either hard
constraints (contraindications or lack of resources) or soft constraints (scheduling conicts
or site constraints). If an action is in violation of a hard constraint the potential disutility
is very high, while violating a soft constraint does not have such serious consequences.
For scheduling errors, the disutilities depend on the type of scheduling constraint concerned: If the scheduling constraint is due to urgency, the disutility depends on the urgency
of the more urgent action. If due to medical priority, the disutility is always low enough
to prompt a comment but not a warning.
If the ordering is due to the fact that the second action has to be done in a later site,
the disutility depends on whether the later site is the operating room, the X-ray room,
or some other site. If it is the operating room, the error will be ignored because almost
anything can be done in the operating room. On the other hand, if the second site is the
X-ray room, the scheduling error will result in a warning, since patients often spend a long
time in the X-ray room and very few actions are possible there.
If the ordering is due to precedence constraints or precondition constraints, a comment
is always produced. Finally, if the ordering is due to informational dependencies, the
disutility is taken to be half the cost of the action that is erroneously being done rst,
since it may not actually have to be done at all.
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of comment disutilities

5.4.3 Thresholds for error magnitude
In order to classify the signi cance of errors, two disutility thresholds are needed: one for
critical errors and one for non-critical errors. An error with a disutility that is above the
rst threshold will result in a warning, and an error with a disutility that is between the
two thresholds will result in a comment. Errors with disutility values below the non-critical
threshold are considered tolerable and are not mentioned in the critique.
One of the advantages of this method for evaluating errors is that it is very easy to
adjust the pickyness of the system simply by adjusting the two thresholds. Ideally, the
thresholds should be set in such a way as to make the system comment on every signi cant
item during a case, while minimizing the amount of unimportant and/or unnecessary
comments. For now, the threshold values have been tentatively determined by consultation
with Dr. Clarke. The current thresholds are set so that a disutility between 1 and 6 will
result in a comment, and a disutility of 7 or higher will result in a warning.
Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of comment disutilities for all the comments produced
by TraumaTIQ on the database of 97 management plans. The mean disutility is 11.28, with
a standard distribution of 12.61. The median disutility is 6. With the current thresholds for
comment and warning, this means that approximately equal numbers of errors will result
in comments and warnings, and very few will be ignored. The thresholds will probably
need to be adjusted based on experience with physicians using the system in real cases.
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5.5 Output of plan evaluation
The output of the plan evaluator is a set of comment speci cations each of which is a triple,
hT M Ai, where T is the comment type, M is the magnitude { either inform or warn,
tolerable errors are ltered from the output { and A is a list of arguments specifying what
the comment is about.
For example, the comment

hproc-choice3, inform,
flocal-wound-exploration, peritoneal-lavage, RO-abdominal-wall-injurygi
means that a procedure choice error was identi ed in which the physician is doing a peritoneal lavage to address the goal of ruling out an abdominal wall injury while the system
would have chosen a local wound exploration to address that procedure. The magnitude
of inform indicates that this error has been classi ed as a non-critical error.
These comment speci cations become the input for the language generation phase,
which is described in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6

Critique Generation
The output of plan evaluation represents the communicative goals of the critique, i.e. what
information will be conveyed to the physician. The next stage is to realize those goals via
the generation of linguistic output. In keeping with the approach seen in the language
generation literature 62], the generation process in TraumaTIQ will be separated into two
stages: strategic (deep) generation, which involves determining the content and structure
of the output, and tactical (surface) generation, in which the actual words and phrases
are chosen and put together to produce written or spoken natural language. For the
purposes of this thesis, I have been concerned primarily with the issues associated with
strategic generation { determining what to say, how to represent concepts for the purposes
of language generation, and how to organize the output. I will be leaving the problem of
tactical generation to others (see 68] for an approach to tactical generation, speci cally
the generation of contextually appropriate intonation contours, applied to the language of
trauma domain), although I will consider some of the issues involved in presenting spoken
versus written critiques.

6.1 Towards Strategic Generation
6.1.1 Determining critique content
In TraumaTIQ, the contents of the critique are derived from the output of the plan evaluation routines (see Chapter 8). Corresponding to the error types recognized during plan
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evaluation, the propositions to be conveyed to the physician will concern errors of omission,
errors of commission, procedure choice errors, and scheduling errors.
Depending on the level of signi cance of the particular error, the comment will be
assigned an illocutionary force of either INFORM or WARN. The illocutionary force of a
comment will inuence the phrasing and, in the case of spoken critiques, the intonation of
the output. Note that I do not adopt the strategy taken by Rankin 70] of commenting
on every action proposed by the physician. While this strategy has the advantage of
convincing the physician that the system has considered all of her proposals, it is probably
not appropriate or necessary in a crisis management situation to con rm each undisputed
action.

6.1.2 Explanations
In addition to informing the physician of potential errors in her plan, justi cations must be
included in support of important points. The importance of explanation for enhancing the
acceptance of expert systems is well known 86]. Techniques for generating explanations
based on the knowledge and reasoning process have been described in 57, 60, 61, 85]. It
is also understood that explanations should be tailored to the user's current goals 9, 88].
The level of explanation currently available by directly accessing TraumAID's knowledgebase is limited to the information needed by the system for its planning and reasoning.
Since TraumAID's knowledge is encoded in rules that tend to gloss over the details of
the biomedical knowledge underlying them, explanations derived from these rules will not
contain such details. On the other hand, since the system is designed to be used by trained
physicians who presumably already have a background in this area, detailed explanations
may not be necessary, or even desirable.
For example, consider the following possible critique:
\A chest tube should be inserted to treat the massive hemothorax before getting an X-ray of the abdomen. This is because of the urgency of treating the
hemothorax."
This comment presupposes that the physician knows that a massive hemothorax must be
attended to urgently, but suggests that she may have overlooked it for some reason. Further
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explanation as to why the goal of treating a massive hemothorax is urgent is not currently
available in the knowledge base of TraumAID 2.0. Future extensions of the system might
include more explicit medical knowledge, so that the system could present more detailed
explanations at the level of basic biomedical reasoning if desired.
In addition to the explanations included with critiques, TraumAID also has the capacity
to provide interactive explanations of its reasoning at the request of the user. At any point,
TraumAID can answer queries regarding what rules lead to a particular conclusion or goal,
or what goals it is addressing by including a particular action in the plan.

6.1.3 Repetition or duration of critiques
In an on-line critique, it is necessary to take into account what has already been said to the
physician. Therefore, the system keeps a record of the comments it has already produced,
and assumes that the physician is aware of the information they contain. The question of
whether, or how often to repeat comments is an open one. If the physician continues with
her current course of action in spite of a critique, it is probably necessary to repeat the
comment since she may not have heard it or paid attention to it the rst time. However, it
may be the case that the physician has heard the critique and has simply chosen to ignore
it. In such a case, it would be undesirable for the system to keep repeating its comment.
In the case of visual text presentation of the critique, the question is how long a
comment should remain on the screen after it is rst displayed if it remains relevant.
Currently, TraumaTIQ leaves comments on the screen as long as they remain relevant.
However, a policy of removing comments after a short period and removing warnings after
a somewhat longer period is probably motivated under the assumption that the more
clinically signi cant the information contained in a comment, the more important it is to
make sure the physician is aware of it. The appropriate length of time to persevere with a
comment will be resolved through on-site experimentation with the system.

6.1.4 Structure of the critique output
To emphasize the more signi cant comments, TraumaTIQ displays all warnings before
other comments. To further organize the comments making up the critique, TraumaTIQ
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has a \topic slot" for each comment type it produces. The topic of a comment is the
concept lling the topic slot. The topics are determined as follows:
For errors of omission, the topic is the goal that is not being addressed.
For errors of commission, the topic is the action that has been ordered.
For procedure choice errors, the topic is the goal being addressed by both procedures.
For scheduling errors, the topic is the action that is supposed to be done rst.
Comments are sorted by topic so that all comments about the same concept are grouped
together and presented sequentially.
Since the critiques produced by this system are to be delivered during a time-critical
management session, they will not be constructed as multi-sentence texts. I will therefore
not be concerned in this project with issues such as the rhetorical relations necessary for
producing coherent critiquing prose (cf. 55, 70]).
There are, however, situations in which multiple comments may be combined to improve
the coherence of the overall critique. For example, the following two comments may be
produced in a case with a possible fractured vertebra and a possible abdominal injury, in
which the physician has ordered a peritoneal lavage but not a lateral chest x-ray.
\Consider doing a lateral chest X-ray to rule out a fractured vertebra."
and
\Do a lateral chest X-ray before doing the peritoneal lavage because the latter
may a ect the results of the former."
These two comments are related in that they are both about doing a lateral chest X-ray,
and can be combined into a more compact (but longer) statement:
\Consider doing a lateral chest X-ray to rule out a fractured vertebra. Do it
before doing the peritoneal lavage because the latter may a ect the results of
the former."
This example also points out the discourse-related issue of selecting appropriate referring expressions, including determiners and pronouns. The second sentence of the rst
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example should really say \do the lateral chest X-ray," not \do a lateral chest X-ray,"
since the procedure was referred to in the preceding sentence. In the second example, the
pronoun \it" is used to refer to the aforementioned X-ray.
Another example of a situation in which multiple comments can be combined is in the
case of multiple errors of omission. Errors of omission in TraumaTIQ refer to goals that
are being omitted, so if the same action is suggested for addressing more than one goal, two
separate comments will be produced. In such a situation, the number of comments could
be reduced by combining all comments regarding errors of omission that suggest doing the
same action or actions into one comment. For example:
\Consider getting a chest X-ray to rule out a hemothorax, rule out a pneumothorax, and evaluate the airway."

6.2 Towards Tactical Generation
The tactical generation of natural language from a semantic representation of propositional
content is an important area of research in its own right, and one that I have not set out
to solve in this dissertation. This section describes the template lling algorithm that I
have used in TraumaTIQ to generate natural sounding sentences. I will also include a brief
discussion of an approach that could be used in the future to generate comments in both
written text and natural-sounding synthesized speech.

6.2.1 Templates
The rst component of sentence generation in TraumaTIQ is a set of templates corresponding to the comment types identi ed by the plan evaluation module. For each comment
type, there are two templates, one for warnings and one for statements. The templates are
as follows:
Errors of Omission:

{ omission of some actions in a procedure:
 INFORM: \Consider as part of ."
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 WARN: \Caution: immediately as part of ."

{ failure to address a goal:
 INFORM: \Consider now to ."
 WARN: \Caution: immediately to ."

{ omission of bedside question(s):
 INFORM: \Consider checking for to assess the possibility of ."
 WARN: \Caution: check for to assess the possibility of ."
Errors of Commission:

{ unexplained action:
 INFORM: \ seems unmotivated. Please reconsider this action."
 WARN: \Caution: is not justi ed based on the information currently
available."

{ premature pursuit of goal:
 INFORM: \ seems premature at this point. There is not yet enough

information to justify ."
 WARN: \Caution: is premature. There is not yet enough information to
support \

{ erroneous pursuit of goal:
 INFORM: \ seems unmotivated because has been proven to be unnecessary."

 WARN: \Caution: is not justi ed because has been proven to be unnecessary."

{ redundant pursuit of goal:
 INFORM: \ seems unmotivated because was already addressed."
 WARN: \Caution: is not justi ed because was already addressed."

{ unmotivated pursuit of goal:
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 INFORM: \ seems unmotivated. There is not enough information to con-

clude the relevance of ."
 WARN: \Caution: is not justi ed. There is not enough information to
support ."

{ unperformable action:
 INFORM: \Do not now because ."
 WARN: \Caution: do not now because ."
Procedure Choice Errors:

{ alternative to unperformable action:
 INFORM: \Please consider , rather than , to . The latter cannot be

done because ."
 WARN: \ , rather than , to . The latter cannot be done because ."

{ default preference:
 INFORM: \ is preferred over for ."
 WARN: \ is highly preferred over for \

{ optimization:
 INFORM: \Please consider rather than to . The former can also be

used to ."
 WARN: \ rather than to . The former can also be used to ."
Scheduling Errors:

{ urgency:
 INFORM: \Please before because it is more urgent."
 WARN: \Caution: before because it is very urgent."

{ medical priority:
 INFORM: \Please before because it has a higher priority."
 WARN: \Caution: before because it has a very high priority."
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{ site constraint:
 INFORM: \Please before going to to ."
 WARN: \Caution: before going to to ."

{ precondition:
 INFORM: \Please remember to before ."
 WARN: \Do not forget to before ."

{ precedence constraint:
 INFORM: \Please before because the latter may a ect the results of

the former."
 WARN: \ before because the latter may a ect the results of the former."

{ informational dependency:
 INFORM: \Do not until you have . The outcome of the latter may
a ect the need to do the former."
 WARN: \Caution: do not until you have . The outcome of the latter
may a ect the need for the former."

6.2.2 Filling the slots in the templates
The slot llers for the templates are constructed from TraumAID's action, procedure, and
goal concepts. For each of these concepts in TraumAID's knowledge base, I have associated
a phrasal translation. For example, the action Close Chest Wound is translated as \*close
$a chest wound." The asterisk before the word \close" indicates that it is a verb that needs
to be conjugated. The string \$a" indicates a determiner that will be realized either as
\the" or \a" (or \an") depending on the status of the concept containing it in TraumAID's
current representation of the case (and the next word).
There are three di erent kinds of noun phrases that appear in the translations of
TraumAID's goal, procedure, and action concepts: (1) anatomical parts (eg. the heart),
(2) action names (eg. a urinalysis), and (3) injuries (eg. a/the lacerated diaphragm). As I
have indicated in these examples, anatomical parts will always get a de nite article since
their presence is assumed to be common knowledge, while action names always get an
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inde nite article because they are generally being introduced into the discourse by the
critique.1
References to injuries are either de nite or inde nite depending on whether the comment assumes that the presence of the injury is common knowledge. For that reason,
injuries that are the object of diagnostic goals are always inde nite. Injuries that are the
object of therapeutic goals that are not supported by TraumAID are referred to inde nitely
(eg. \Covering a chest wound is unjusti ed at this time. There is not enough evidence
to support treating an open sucking chest wound"). On the other hand, therapeutic goals
that are supported by TraumAID result in a de nite reference (eg. \Consider covering the
chest wound now as part of treating the open sucking chest wound."), implying that the
system believes that the physician is aware of the diagnosis, but has just forgotten to act
on it.2
Each slot in a template has a label indicating how the main verb or verbs in the phrase
it contains should be conjugated. In the rst template, for example, the rst slot ller is
to be realized as a gerundive phrase (eg. \Consider getting a chest X-ray]..."), while the
second is untensed (eg. \...to rule out a hemothorax.]")
A slot may be lled with a single concept, or with a list of concept, in which case the
list will be marked as either conjunctive or disjunctive and realized as a list of translated
phrases separated by either \and" or \or." For example, \Consider checking for medication
allergies, giving antibiotics, and doing a laparotomy now to treat the lacerated diaphragm."

6.2.3 Generating spoken critiques
Currently, TraumaTIQ displays its critiques as single-sentence comments produced by
inserting speci c action and goal names into stored templates.
In 67], Prevost and Steedman describe an approach to tactical generation using a
Combinatory Categorial Grammar (CCG) formalism. They discuss how this approach can
be used to generate situationally appropriate prosodic stress contours in spoken language
output. Given a semantic representation of the output, in which the theme (what the
If a concept is mentioned more than once in a set of comments, it should really get a dierent referring
expression after the rst time, but this is a discourse issue that I have not dealt with here.
2
The issue of politeness in phrasing the critiques is an important and delicate matter that I will discuss
briey later in this chapter.
1

111

proposition is about) and rheme (what new information the proposition has to say about
the theme) are marked, a surface string is generated that is marked with pitch accents
appropriate to the information content and the contextual meaning of the proposition.
This technique can dramatically increase the hearer's ability to grasp the meaning of
an utterance, particularly in a situation where a contrast is being made. For example,
using a default lexical stress pattern for the word \thoracotomy," with the primary lexical
stress on the third syllable, would produce the following spoken output:
\A left thoraCOTomy is more appropriate than a right thoraCOTomy for this
patient."
Where the contextually correct intonation would be:
\A LEFT thoracotomy is more appropriate than a RIGHT thoracotomy for
this patient."
The latter would be much easier for a listener to interpret and ascribe the correct meaning
to because it emphasizes the contrast between the two elements being compared. However,
the former intonation would be more appropriate in some cases, such as in the sentence:
\A left thoraCOTomy is more appropriate than a left thoraCOSTomy for this
patient."
The fact that di erent intonational contours are appropriate depending on the context of
the sentence shows that no default algorithm will work for every utterance. Rather, a
procedure that takes account of the semantics of the utterance is needed.
The underlying problem is that the representation of concepts in the system's knowledge
base was designed for the purposes of reasoning and planning, not for generating English
sentences. To improve the quality of the output, a more general semantic decomposition of
these concepts must be available, representing the relationships between the main action,
its recipient, and their various modi ers. This representation, together with an appropriate
grammar and lexicon, could then be used to generate sentences conveying any number of
propositions that we may decide should be included in the critique.
This concept decomposition has the important property that it makes it possible to
identify contrast elements within a single comment. An important function of the critique is
112

to suggest alternatives to proposed actions. These contrasted actions can be quite similar,
such as an AP abdominal X-ray3 compared to a lateral abdominal X-ray. The ability to
pick out the point of contrast between these two actions (in this case AP vs. lateral) will
allow us to stress that contrast, either with larger or bolder text in a written critique, or
with prosodic stress in a spoken critique.

3

AP stands for anterior-posterior, i.e. the view from front to back.
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Chapter 7

TraumaTIQ: a Real-Time
Critiquing Interface for Trauma
Care
The ideas presented in the preceding three chapters have been implemented in TraumaTIQ,
the critiquing interface for TraumAID. TraumaTIQ is implemented in Common Lisp and
runs in conjunction with TraumAID on both Unix/X-Windows and Macintosh platforms.
In contrast to the critiquing systems presented in Chapter 3, which produce their critiques o -line during a consultation session with the physician, this is a process-oriented
approach to critiquing. Rather than presenting one critique based on a complete speci cation of the problem and the proposed solution, TraumaTIQ produces a series of critiques as
patient management progresses. The critiques are continually updated as the information
available to the system changes.
TraumaTIQ takes advantage of the fact that many actions require resources to be
brought to the emergency room or must be done elsewhere, and these actions must be
ordered ahead of time. Since orders can be rescinded, a well-timed critique could prevent
an inappropriate order from being carried out.
The critiquing process is triggered whenever a new piece of relevant information is
made available to the system. This information can be in the form of (1) bedside ndings,
(2) diagnostic test results, (3) therapeutic actions performed, or (4) actions ordered by the
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Figure 7.1: The TraumaTIQ module
physician. Critiques are generated based on the complete set of orders that are pending
at a given time, so that pending orders that were previously accepted as appropriate may
later be critiqued on the basis of new evidence. Once an action has been done, however, it
will no longer be considered as an object of the critique, whether or not it was appropriate.
The architecture of TraumaTIQ is shown in Figure 7.1, which was seen earlier at the
end of Chapter 2. TraumaTIQ's plan recognizer is an implementation of the algorithm
presented in Chapter 4. It uses knowledge about the situational context and about the
plan so far to control the search for explanations of new orders.
The plan evaluation module rst compares the explanatory plan constructed by the
plan recognizer with the target plan constructed by TraumAID and identi es errors in the
plan according to the classi cation described in Chapter 5. These errors are then evaluated
to determine their potential signi cance to the outcome of the plan. Only errors that have
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the potential to a ect the outcome are reported in the critique.
The critique generator converts the output of the plan evaluator into English sentences,
using a simple template lling procedure which generates natural sounding sentences by
adjusting the slot llers depending on the template they are lling. Finally, the sentences
are sorted by signi cance and topic, and displayed in a window on the monitor. In the
Macintosh implementation, the critique sentences are also processed by the Macintosh
Speech Manager and output as synthesized speech.
The next section presents a discussion of the changes to TraumAID's knowledge base
and planner that were necessary for the implementation of TraumaTIQ. Following this
discussion the next section goes through an example of a actual trauma case, and how
TraumaTIQ would have responded at each point had it been operating during the case.

7.1 Changes to TraumAID
Because we already had a planning system that produced validated management plans and
an extensive knowledge base representing conclusions, goals, and actions in the domain,
it seemed natural to use the knowledge base and representation of plans from TraumAID
verbatim for the plan recognizer as well. Not only could TraumAID tell us what goals were
possible explanations for the actions we observed, but it could also tell us what goals were
more likely to be pursued in the current context, under the assumption that physicians are
likely to pursue relevant goals. The main disadvantage of this approach is that a knowledge
base that is sucient for generation of valid plans is not necessarily complete in terms of
the plans that people actually carry out. We therefore have had to incorporate additional
knowledge about goals and plans that, while they would not be produced by TraumAID,
are likely to be seen in actual patient management.
Implementing the system necessitated several changes and additions to the core TraumAID system. These changes occurred in two places: the knowledge base, and the planner.
In the next two sections I will describe these additions.
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7.1.1 Knowledge representation
The knowledge base used by TraumAID was designed to generate complete and ecient
plans. Since the range of possible plans can be much less constrained in the plan recognition
task than in plan generation, it is more important for plan recognition that knowledge of
plans and actions be represented in an explicit, declarative form 93].
Several types of knowledge that are necessary for plan recognition and evaluation were
not represented explicitly in the knowledge base of TraumAID 2.0, as it was not designed
to support those functions. Other types knowledge were not included at all. The following
features were added to TraumAID's knowledge base to support the implementation of
TraumaTIQ.

7.1.2 Conceptual links between goals
Since TraumAID's planner generates a new plan each time new information is entered about
the case, it has no reason to maintain an explicit representation of the relationships between
goals over time. Consequently, no explicit connection was made between diagnostic actions
and their related therapeutic actions in TraumAID's knowledge base. For example, there
is no explicit link between the diagnostic goal RO-hemothorax (\rule out hemothorax")
and the therapeutic goal RX-hemothorax (\treat hemothorax").
Adequate critiquing, on the other hand, requires that such relationships between goals
be accessible in order to understand physicians' behavior. The fact that the goal of ruling
out a hemothorax is currently being pursued makes the goal of treating one more likely to
be in the physician's focus of attention.
Therefore, for plan recognition links between goals were added to TraumAID's knowledge base, so that each goal is connected to all of the goals that may become relevant as
a result of addressing it. This allows the plan recognizer to understand which goals are
potentially relevant as a result of the current goal set.
In addition, TraumAID's reasoner has a facility for suspecting concepts, in order to
drive the acquisition of relevant information. When a concept that was suspected becomes
true, it triggers the conclusion of new goals. For plan recognition, links were added between
concepts that may be suspected and the goals that would be triggered were they to be
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true. When a goal's relevant concepts are suspected, the goal can be considered potentially
relevant by the plan recognizer.
There is actually a related form of information in TraumAID 2.0's knowledge base
called the goal hierarchy, which was implemented to allow the inhibition of goals when
they are superseded by other goals or concepts. The goal hierarchy indicates when the
knowledge of one goal or concept should cause another goal or concept to be concluded
false. Most often this results in inhibiting diagnostic goals when the related therapeutic
goal is concluded, or when the information sought by the diagnostic goal is already known.
Unfortunately, since its implementation was guided by the restricted needs of the planner, the goal hierarchy is not complete in that it does not represent all such relationships
between concepts. Another drawback of the goal hierarchy is that it is compiled into
TraumAID's rules when the knowledge base is loaded, and so is not available during run
time. In fact, it may be the case in the future that the declarative information added
to the concept de nitions for plan recognition may be useful for further development of
TraumAID's planner.

7.1.3 Abstract Goals
When TraumaTIQ's plan recognizer was tested o -line on actual management plans, most
of the actions that were not explained were actions with broad-ranging e ects: either
diagnostic tests with several possible outcomes, such as X-rays, or therapeutic procedures
that could be done to address several di erent problems, such as giving antibiotics. It is
frequently the case that such procedures are done for routine screening purposes rather
than to address a speci c goal.1 In such cases, a single more abstract goal that subsumed
these more speci c goals could eliminate any need to choose among them and provide a
simpler explanation.
While the number of levels of abstraction in the knowledge base is sucient for planning, it is not suciently strati ed for the plan recognizer to be able to draw general
conclusions when it is not able to draw more speci c ones. For example, a chest X-ray
may be done to rule out a bullet in the chest, rule out a simple pneumothorax, rule out a
1

Fortunately, it is also the case that most of these actions do not incur a large cost to the patient.
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simple hemothorax, rule out a lacerated diaphragm, rule out an intra abdominal gastrointestinal tract injury, or survey the airway. Each of these goals is triggered by a di erent
combination of ndings.
In plan recognition, the aim is to identify the most speci c goal or goals underlying an
observed action. If no speci c explanation can be found, a more general explanation may
be necessary. For this reason, summarizing all of the goals motivating an action in terms
of an abstract goal is desirable. In the case of the chest X-ray, all of the goals listed above
can be summarized as the goal \rule out thoracic injury."

7.1.4 Additional goals
While TraumAID has all the necessary goals in its knowledge base to produce good plans,
its knowledge base does not indicate all the goals that people might actually pursue while
managing a trauma patient, or all the actions they might order. To recognize and appeal
to such possibilities in its critiques, it is necessary to add knowledge about goals not in the
original knowledge base.
For example, the action of giving analgesics (pain-killers) is done in TraumAID only
as part of the procedure for treating a fractured sternum. While physicians often give
analgesics in other situations, TraumAID's rules have been designed to avoid giving them
in most situations because they can mask reactions that could provide useful diagnostic
information. In spite of this, the plan recognition system still has to be aware that analgesics may be given for other reasons than treating a fractured sternum, which can be
summarized as the goal of \treating pain."
There are other ways that the physician may act that are outside TraumAID's knowledge base. Some actions, like giving analgesics to relieve pain, are superseded by more
critical goals and so are prohibited by TraumAID. Still other actions may be \optional"
rather than strictly prohibited, so that while they may not appear in TraumAID's knowledge base, their appearance is not necessarily detrimental to the overall plan. Other actions
may relate to injuries (or other features of the patient) that are not covered by TraumAID.
In all of these cases, it is necessary to include additional goals for plan recognition.
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Goal penalties
Another item missing from the knowledge base were the disutilities for omission of goals
that were discussed in Chapter 5. These were added to the knowledge base for each of
TraumAID's goals. Some goals were assigned a disutility directly by the expert panel.
Other goals (primarily the diagnostic ones) had not been assigned a disutility since it is
impossible to quantify the disutility of not pursuing a diagnostic goal without knowing the
probability that the diagnosis is true. As a rough estimate, I used the assumption that if
a diagnostic test is called for, the diagnosis will be present 50% of the time, and so I gave
diagnostic goals half of the disutility of the related therapeutic goal. For example, if the
disutility of not treating a tension pneumothorax is 100 then the disutility of not pursuing
a diagnosis of tension pneumothorax, given the relevant ndings of shock, decreased breath
sounds, and distended neck veins is taken to be 50.

7.1.5 Scheduling of procedures
TraumaTIQ is intended to critique errors in the scheduling of actions. At any time during
the management of a case, TraumAID's plan is a partial ordering, in which an action's
position in the ordering may reect its urgency, medical priority, logistics, possible interactions between actions, as well as the a priori ordering of actions within a procedure, as
speci ed in the procedure's de nition. Plans constructed by TraumAID's planner always
conform to this ordering.
However, while the ordering of actions within a procedure is sometimes meaningful,
it is sometimes arbitrary. Some actions must be done before others in order to set up
the necessary conditions or insure the absence of contraindications, such as checking for
allergies before administering a drug. Other actions have no such temporal relationship.
For example, the procedure for treating a compound fracture of the sternum (breast-bone),
calls for checking for allergies to medication and then administering both antibiotics and
analgesics. For obvious reasons, the allergy check must be done before giving either drug,
but the drugs can be given in any order with respect to each other.
TraumaTIQ should be able to critique a plan if an important scheduling constraint is
being violated, but should not comment when the ordering is arbitrary. For this reason,
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meaningful scheduling constraints have been explicitly noted in the procedure de nitions,
not for TraumAID itself, but as the basis for critiques regarding scheduling errors. Future
work on TraumAID's planner may also use this information to generate plans more exibly
based on the presence of constraints.

7.1.6 Changes to the planner
As discussed in Chapter 6, it has often been pointed out that for a planning system to be
understood and accepted by its users, it must have some ability to explain its reasoning.
TraumAID 2.0 was designed for the purpose of generating quality management plans, not
explaining those plans to people. Therefore, issues such as explanation and comparison of
plans were not considered in the original design of the planner. In implementing TraumaTIQ, therefore, I have added two features to TraumAID's planner to enhance its ability to
explain its plans.

Reasons for scheduling
Since TraumaTIQ produces comments when a scheduling constraint is being violated, it
is important for it to be able to explain the reason for that constraint. As mentioned in
the previous section, there are several reasons that TraumAID might schedule one action
before another. In the original planner, these reasons were not saved after the scheduling
constraint had been added to the plan. For the purposes of the critique, I have modi ed
the planner so that whenever it adds a scheduling constraint to a plan it saves the reason
for that constraint to be included in a comment if necessary.

Reasons for elimination of procedures
TraumAID is able to justify the actions selected by the planner by referring to the goals
they address. When the planner is being used in conjunction with a system for critiquing
proposed plans, it is also very important to be able to explain the reasons for not including
certain procedures in the plan.
The second feature I have added to the planner is that when it rejects a procedure as
a way of addressing a relevant goal, the reason for that procedure's rejection is recorded.
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The possible reasons for not using a procedure are: contraindication, lack of resources,
being in a site where the procedure cannot be done, or problems scheduling the action
with respect to other actions in the plan. If one of these situations arises, the planner
records it in connection with the goal being pursued. Then, if the physician orders the
rejected procedure, TraumaTIQ can present a reason for not choosing that procedure to
address the goal.

7.2 An Example Case
In this section, I will go step by step through an actual management plan taken from one
of the 97 actual trauma cases used in the validation of TraumAID's plans (case #AP6900463). At each point in the case, I will describe the output TraumaTIQ would produce.
The information I used for this example comes from an abstracted description of the
case that was shown to the judges in the validation study. The abstracted case includes
an ordered list of actions that were done, and when relevant gives their results. However,
it lacks information about the timing of the case. First, there is no sense of the amount
of time that passed between consecutive actions. Second, only the order in which actions
were performed is recorded, not when they were ordered, so there is no way to tell when
the intention to do an action rst became known. Third, tests are listed in the order in
which their results became available, so there is no indication of when a test was done as
compared to when the results were returned. I have added some temporal information to
this case for the purposes of the example.
At the start of the case we are presented with a patient with an epigastric stab wound
(the epigastrium is in the center of the upper abdomen, right below the sternum or breastbone). The initial ndings (see Figure 7.2) show that the patient is not in shock or
unconscious but is obtunded, meaning in a state close to unconsciousness. In addition,
the evaluation of the abdomen shows no clinical signs of intra-abdominal injury, including
no distended abdomen, no abdominal tenderness, and no evisceration of the abdominal
contents through the stab wound.
The fact that the patient is obtunded but does not show any signs of intra-abdominal
injury leads TraumAID to derive the goal of ruling out an abdominal wall injury. To
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Figure 7.2: The stab wound and initial ndings
address this goal, TraumAID's planner adds the action local-wound-exploration to
its plan. A second goal, rule-out-hematuria is concluded on the basis of the abdominal
injury, and results in the addition of a urinalysis to the plan. In addition, the presence
of an abdominal wound triggers the suspicion of a possible simple pneumothorax (air in
the chest cavity), which causes TraumAID to ask about the patient's breath sounds.2
Figure 7.2 shows the input to TraumAID and its resulting goals and plan contents at this
point.
At this point in the case, the physician ordered two actions, a naso-gastric aspiration,
and a survey chest X-ray, neither of which was recommended by TraumAID on the basis
of the initial information. In the plan recognition phase, TraumaTIQ infers that the
naso-gastric aspiration is being done to rule out an esophageal injury, because that is the
only reason it knows about for doing that action. On the other hand, there are many
possible reasons for doing a survey chest X-ray, none of which are currently relevant since
TraumAID's notation uses the prex RO, for \Rule Out," to signify a diagnostic goal calling for
denitive testing, and RX, for \Treat," to signify a therapeutic goal. Conclusions preceded by the word
\Possible" signify that the nding is suggested by the physical evidence so far, calling for additional physical
examination, but that there is not yet enough evidence to justify a denitive diagnostic test.
2
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Figure 7.3: Errors of commission
the patient's wound is in the abdomen and there are no clinical signs suggesting that
there might be a chest injury. The only goal that might suggest getting a chest X-ray in
this situation is the remote possibility of a simple pneumothorax. TraumaTIQ therefore
infers that the physician has ordered the chest X-ray to rule out a possible pneumothorax.
Figure 7.3 shows TraumaTIQ's inferences, represented by upward dashed arrows in the
diagram.
During plan evaluation, TraumaTIQ identi es both the naso-gastric aspiration and the
chest X-ray as errors of commission, since they are in the physician's plan and not in
TraumAID's plan. The naso-gastric aspiration is classi ed as an incorrect action because
TraumAID has eliminated the goal of ruling out esophageal injury on the basis of its
knowledge of the case so far. On the other hand, since the goal of ruling out a pneumothorax
is potentially relevant, pending the nding of decreased breath sounds, the chest X-ray is
classi ed as a premature action.
Both of these errors of commission, denoted by dashed boxes in Figure 7.3, are classi ed as non-critical errors, which results in the two comments shown in Figure 7.4 being
produced in the language generation phase.
At this point, a urinalysis is done, and is removed from TraumAID's plan, as shown in
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Figure 7.4: Critique for errors of commission
Figure 7.5. There are two procedures in which a urinalysis can participate in TraumAID's
knowledge base: Get-Urinalysis, which is simply done to rule out hematuria, as in
Figure 7.3, and Get-Peritoneal-Lavage, which can be done either to RO-SuspiciousAbdominal-Wall-Injury or to RO-Abdominal-Bleeding. Note that the rst goal
motivating a lavage is also relevant at this point, but TraumaTIQ infers that the urinalysis
was done only to rule out hematuria, since there are several other actions in the lavage
procedure that have not yet been ordered.
However, enough time has passed without the physician having addressed the goal of
ruling out a suspicious abdominal wall injury, that TraumaTIQ identi es it as an error
of omission. In addition, the presence of an abdominal stab wound suggests the remote
possibility of a pneumothorax, which requires checking the patient for decreased breath
sounds. Since this has not yet been done, it is also considered an error of omission, and
the critique shown in Figure 7.6 is displayed.
The redundancy seen in the rst two sentences of the critique is due to the fact that
TraumaTIQ identi es errors of omission in terms of the goals that are being omitted. While
these two comments involve the same action, it is aimed at two di erent goals { checking
for a left or right pneumothorax. In Chapter 9 I will discuss the possibility of reducing
this kind of redundancy by doing global sentence planning during the language generation
phase.
In Figure 7.7 the physician has ordered a peritoneal lavage. At this point, the only
relevant explanatory goals for the lavage action is RO-Suspicious-Abdominal-WallInjury, so TraumaTIQ infers that as the reason for doing the lavage. The absence of
decreased breath sounds has also been reported, ruling out the suspicion of a possible
pneumothorax.
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Figure 7.5: Errors of omission
During plan evaluation, TraumaTIQ notices that this goal is being addressed by di erent procedures in TraumAID's plan (local wound exploration) and in the physician's plan
(peritoneal lavage). It identi es this discrepancy as a procedure choice error.
Even though the lavage is not TraumAID's preferred procedure for ruling out abdominal
wall injury, the plan evaluator notes a scheduling error resulting from the fact that the
physician has not yet checked for abdominal scarring, which is a precondition for doing
lavage. This will be commented on in the critique.

Figure 7.6: Critique for errors of omission
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Figure 7.7: Procedure choice error
On the other hand, since the physician is now addressing the goal RO-SuspiciousAbdominal-Wall-Injury that was the topic of the earlier error of omission comment,
this error is no longer present in the physician's plan, and so the comment is not repeated
in the resulting critique, shown in Figure 7.8.
In the next stage of the case, Figure 7.9, the lavage is still pending.3 The physician
now orders observation of the patient for abdominal bleeding or peritonitis, an action that
would be taken in case of a diagnosed abdominal wall injury.
Since the results of the lavage are not yet available, the diagnosis of abdominal wall
injury is not yet justi ed. However, because the goal of treating an abdominal wall injury
is a later stage of the diagnostic strategy currently being pursued by doing a peritoneal
lavage, the action of observing the patient is interpreted as a premature action, rather than
Since the physician managing this case did not have access to TraumaTIQ's comments, I assume that
the original order for a lavage remains after it has been critiqued as a procedure-choice error.
3
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Figure 7.8: Critique for procedure choice error
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Figure 7.9: Premature Action
being completely unmotivated. This results in the critique shown in Figure 7.10.
After a period of time the results of the peritoneal lavage, which was negative, are
entered. The goal of treating an abdominal wall injury is now no longer potentially relevant,
so the pending action of observing the patient for bleeding or peritonitis is no longer
explainable in terms of a unique goal. In addition, since the patient remains obtunded
with no signs of intra-abdominal injury, TraumAID derives a goal of retaining the catheter

Figure 7.10: Critique for premature action
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Figure 7.11: Critical error of omission
that was used for the lavage and relavaging after 6 hours. The plan at this point is shown
in Figure 7.11.

Figure 7.12: Critique for critical error of omission
During plan evaluation, TraumaTIQ notes the omission of the relavage procedure,
which it classi es as a critical error. It also classi es the pending observation for bleeding
or peritonitis as an unjusti ed error of commission. These errors result in the critique
shown in Figure 7.12. The word \immediately" in the rst comment is part of the template
for critical errors of omission, which was added to convey the seriousness of the comment.
This is a good example of the drawbacks of using templates to generate output since in
this case it results in the confusing juxtaposition of \immediately" and \in about 6 hours."
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At this point the record of the case ends.

130

Chapter 8

Evaluation
Before putting a decision support system into use it is important to have some evidence
that its output is correct and has the potential to improve performance. In the past,
very few developers of critiquing systems did any kind of evaluation of the output of their
systems, with the notable exception of Van der Lei, who carried out an extensive evaluation
of his HyperCritic system 90].
There are a number of factors by which to evaluate a critiquing system.
1. Correctness: Are the critiques produced by the system correct?
2. Clinical signi cance: Do all the critiques generated by the system have the potential
to improve patient outcome?
3. Completeness: Does the system produce all the critiques warranted by the observed
behavior?
4. Timeliness: Is the critique generated quickly?
5. Means of communication: Are the critiques conveyed to the user in an acceptable
way, with an appropriate amount of explanation to back them up?
6. E ectiveness: Does the system actually inuence behavior and/or outcomes?
These questions can be divided into two categories: the rst four can in part be answered o -line, before the system is experienced by real users in the task it is designed
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for, while the fth and sixth must be answered through realistic eld experience with the
system.

8.1 Field testing of TraumAID and TraumaTIQ
The questions regarding the e ectiveness of TraumAID in real trauma situations will be
investigated in a future study in which TraumAID and TraumaTIQ will be installed in
a trauma bay at the Medical College of Pennsylvania. This will involve a comparison of
di erent modes of critique output, and observation of the users' interaction with the system.
As people have started to tackle the problem of having decision-support systems accepted
into routine clinical use, the importance of eld testing has become clear 26, 27, 95]. This
type of evaluation poses a number of challenges, some of which are discussed in 95]:
Representativeness of the setting: The setting in which the system is evaluated may
not be representative of the intended setting and/or users.
Measurement of e ectiveness: Ideally, the question of interest is whether the system
has a positive e ect on patient outcome. But this may be much more dicult to
measure than other items, such as its e ect on physician decisions or behavior.
Design of randomized trials: Care should be taken in the planning of controlled trials.
In evaluating a decision-support system, it may be necessary to randomize not only
patients, but also doctors or even hospitals.
Correcting for biases caused by the trial: The fact that an experimental trial is being
conducted may have certain biasing e ects on physician behavior. For example,
they may try to allocate certain cases to the decision-support group, their overall
performance may improve merely as a result of being studied. They may respond
negatively to the system if participating in the trial requires them to do extra work.
Another form of bias may occur on the part of the people assessing the outcome of
the experiment, particularly if they have preconceptions about the outcome.
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Correcting for biases due to the decision aid: The fact of using a decision-support
system may inuence performance in other ways than the intended e ect. For example, if the system has a tutorial e ect it may carry over to cases where the system
is not used. In addition, physicians using the system may be motivated to perform
better because their behavior is being more closely scrutinized.
Cases where advice is not used: All cases where the physician was given the opportunity to use the decision-support system should be included in the analysis, even if
the system was not actually used, or if the advice was ignored.
The evaluation paradox: Physicians may be reluctant to follow the advice of a system
that has not been shown to improve decisions, but this improvement cannot be shown
unless the advice is followed. Therefore, it is important to explain to physicians
participating in the trial the reasoning process used by the system as well as its
performance in retrospective evaluations. In addition, systems that back up their
advice with explanations are more likely to be followed 60, 86].
These problems will need to be addressed in the prospective evaluation of TraumAID
2.0 which is scheduled to begin shortly, with the purpose of examining when and how the
system can inuence physician's behavior. For the purposes of this evaluation, TraumAID's
recommendations will be presented to the physician in graphical form, in a manner designed
to make them as easy to interpret as possible. Actions will be linked to their intended goals,
important goals will be more prominent in the presentation, and actions that are contingent
on the outcome of other actions will not be presented.
Following this evaluation of the e ectiveness of displaying TraumAID's plans, the critiques generated by TraumaTIQ will be introduced. In order to evaluate the potential
advantages (or disadvantages) of employing a critiquing approach for conveying decision
support for trauma management, the physicians' reactions and behavior in response to to
the critiquing mode will be compared to their response to the graphical display of plans.
This proposed evaluation will also compare two modes of critique delivery to the physician: directly via synthesized speech, or indirectly via displaying the critique in text form
to the scribe nurse who can then convey its messages to the physician. The design of this
study is motivated by the understanding that interpersonal interaction and relative status
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of members of the trauma team will play an important role in TraumAID's acceptance.
The e ect of adding a computer to the trauma team cannot fully be anticipated in advance,
and it is important for the system to be able to assimilate into the social milieu of the
trauma bay.

8.2 Retrospective evaluation of TraumaTIQ
While this proposed eld study of TraumAID and TraumaTIQ will provide invaluable
information regarding the communicative needs of physicians in the trauma situation, as
a preliminary evaluation of TraumaTIQ I have concentrated on the questions that can be
answered o -line, before real experience with the system is possible. To do this, I made
use of data from the original validation study of TraumAID, which was mentioned in the
Introduction to this dissertation.
In the validation study, three trauma experts were given abstracted descriptions of 97
actual trauma cases involving penetrating injuries to the chest and abdomen that presented
consecutively at the Medical College of Pennsylvania. They were also given descriptions of
the management plan that TraumAID would have produced for those 97 cases. The judges
performed a blinded comparison of the two management plans in which they were asked to
give each plan a rating on a scale of one to four, with one being completely unacceptable,
and four being completely acceptable. When both plans were given the same rating, they
were asked to note which they preferred. The results of this study were that TraumAID's
plans were preferred over the actual care to a statistically signi cant extent.
During the validation study, the judges were also asked to identify the individual errors
of omission, commission, and scheduling that occured in each case. This information was
not used for the validation study, but we noticed that these comments were comparable
to the output of TraumaTIQ, and thus could be used as a source of data for evaluating
the comments produced during critiquing. It is important to remember, however, that the
judges comments were not produced during observation of the cases, and were not their
primary task. Thus they are likely to be incomplete and, occasionally, inaccurate.
To evaluate TraumaTIQ, I ran it in batch mode on the descriptions of these 97 cases,
resulting in a list of critique comments for each case. The case descriptions were in the form
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of lisp-readable lists of actions with their corresponding results when applicable. Figure 8.1
shows an example of one of these case descriptions. TraumaTIQ's batch mode di ers from
normal operation in the following ways:
The order of actions in the case corresponds to the order in which they were done.
There is no indication of when they were ordered, how much time passed between
actions, or where they were performed.
To critique these cases, TraumaTIQ processed them as if each action was ordered
just before it was done, and no other actions were ordered between the ordering of
an action and its performance. This means that the e ect on the critique of ordering
several actions at a time would not be captured.
In a real case, TraumaTIQ waits to comment on errors of omission until a certain period of time has passed. As described in Section 5.3, the amount of time is determined
by the urgency of the omitted goal: catastrophic goals are mentioned immediately,
unstable goals are mentioned after 2 minutes, and stable goals are mentioned after 5
minutes.
Lacking temporal information from the cases, errors of omission regarding actions
with the second and third levels of urgency were not commented on until the entire
case had been processed without observing that goal to be addressed.
When TraumaTIQ critiques an error of omission it often groups several actions together into one comment about failure to address a goal. If some of these actions
are subsequently done, another comment will be produced regarding the remaining
actions. The information in the earlier comment subsumes the later comment since it
contains all the same information. In batch mode, any comments that were subsumed
by other comments were removed from the output.
Repeated comments were removed from the output.
The result of running TraumaTIQ on a case in this manner was a list of unique comments regarding the management presented in the case.
In addition to TraumaTIQ's output on these cases, the evaluation also made use of
the judges' comments from the original validation study of TraumAID 18]. In that study,
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 This is the ACTUAL case from the EXCEL file.
 Data is from the file: #P"/tmp/excel-files/AP6-890613.excel"
 ----------------------------------------------------- The following are the INITIAL (ord = 0) findings:
(CASE_FORMAT "Validation Format Two")
(CASE_INFO (CASE_RECORD_ID . "X2rap6-890613") (AGE . 19) (SEX . "M")
(COMPLICATIONS . "None") (SURVIVED . T) (DISABILITY))
 ---------------------------------------------------(INITIAL_FINDINGS
(("Wound" (WOUND-TYPE . GUNSHOT)
(WOUND-LOCATION . "Left_Lumbar_Posterior")
(WOUND-DIRECTION . UNKNOWN) (SIDE . LEFT)
(LATERAL . TRUE) (NUMBER . 1))
. POSITIVE_FACT)
"No other wounds" (("Shock") . NEGATIVE_FACT)
(("Unconsciousness") . NEGATIVE_FACT) (("Obtundation") . NEGATIVE_FACT)
(("Decreased_Breath_Sounds" (SIDE . LEFT)) . NEGATIVE_FACT)
(("Decreased_Breath_Sounds" (SIDE . RIGHT)) . NEGATIVE_FACT)
(("Muffled_Heart_Sounds") . NEGATIVE_FACT)
(("Loss_Motor_Leg" (SIDE . RIGHT)) . NEGATIVE_FACT)
(("Loss_Motor_Leg" (SIDE . LEFT)) . NEGATIVE_FACT)
(("Urinalysis_Rbc" (TEST-RESULT . NEGATIVE)) . POSITIVE_FACT))
 ---------------------------------------------------(REST_OF_FINDINGS
(("Distended_Abd") . NO)
(("Tenderness") . NO)
(("Check_For_Laparotomy_Scar" (TEST-RESULT . POSITIVE)) . NO)
(("Loss_Sensation_Leg" (SIDE . LEFT)) . NO)
(("Absent_Rectal_Tone") . NO)
((TEST-INTERPRETATIONS-MENU ("Survey_Chest_X_Ray" NIL) NIL T T)
((TEST-INTERPRETATIONS-MENU ("X_Ray_AP_Abd" NIL) NIL NIL T)
("X_Ray_Bullet_Abd_Cavity_not_Midline" (TEST-RESULT . POSITIVE))
(("Bullet_Image" (AP-LOCATION . "Abd_Cavity_Not_Midline")
(LAT-LOCATION . "Abd_Cavity_LAT") (BULLET-ID . 1))
. POSITIVE_FACT)
((TEST-INTERPRETATIONS-MENU ("X_Ray_Lat_Abd" NIL) NIL NIL T)
("X_Ray_Bullet_over_Abd_Cavity" (TEST-RESULT . POSITIVE)))
(("Observation_For_Bleeding_Or_Peritonitis") . YES))

Figure 8.1: A TraumAID-readable actual case description
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the judges were given text versions of the actual management plans and the management
plans that would have been generated by TraumAID 2.0 on the same cases, and did a
blinded comparison of the two. For each case, the judges were asked to record errors of
commission, omission and scheduling, and to give the management an overall rating on a
scale of 1-4, with 4 being perfectly acceptable with no errors, and 1 being unacceptable.

8.3 Results
TraumaTIQ's output on the 97 actual cases is summarized in Table 8.1. The comment
types listed in the table correspond to the error classes enumerated in Chapter 5. Each
cell contains the total number of comments on the 97 cases of the corresponding type and
signi cance level.
The action of checking for medication allergies was not reported in the abstracted case
records and so was not involved in any of the errors noted by the judges. This action's
absence was responsible for 44 errors of omission and 109 precondition scheduling errors
noted by TraumaTIQ. In the remainder of this evaluation, comments having to do with
checking for medication allergies have been eliminated from consideration.

8.3.1 Correctness
The correctness of a critique involves both the correctness of its advice and the correctness
of its inferences. In TraumaTIQ, the correctness of the system's advice (what it presents
as the recommended course of action) is a matter of the correctness of TraumAID's plans
since its recommendations are based directly on those plans. As previously described
in Chapter 1, the management plans produced by TraumAID have been judged to be
acceptable by a panel of experts (cf. 75]).

8.3.2 Clinical signi cance
Another dimension on which TraumaTIQ's output can be evaluated is the sensitivity of its
judgments of the clinical signi cance of errors. The evaluation of the errors identi ed during
plan evaluation produces a measure of disutility for each comment. By combining these
individual disutilities we can get a measure of the overall disutility of the case according to
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Comment Level
Warn Inform Ignore
Errors of Omission
Goal partially omitted
13
10
50
Goal completely omitted
126
38
0
Bedside questions omitted 236
118
0
Errors of Commission
Unmotivated action
10
13
33
Premature action
4
41
14
Erroneous action
24
61
6
Redundant action
0
0
0
Prohibited action
0
2
0
Procedure Choice Errors
Prohibited action
1
0
0
Preferred action
0
12
0
Optimized action
1
0
0
Scheduling Errors
Urgency
0
14
0
Priority
0
45
0
Site
3
14
36
Precondition
0
111
0
Precedence constraint
0
4
0
Informational dependency
0
5
8
Comment Type

Table 8.1: Comments per case produced by TraumaTIQ on actual cases
TraumaTIQ. In this analysis I have used two di erent ways of combining disutilities and
compared the resulting numbers to the overall case ratings of the three judges.
The rst combination function I tested was the sum of the disutilities for all the comments made in the case. Looking at the resulting numbers shows that the mean total
disutility for the 97 cases is 104.7, with a standard deviation of 68.9. The maximum case
disutility is 389, the minimum is 1, and the median total disutility is 89. In 43 out of the
97 cases, the total disutility is greater than 100, meaning that the disutilities of all errors
in management added up to an experience worse than the worst possible single experience,
which was taken to be dying. This is an extremely harsh judgment, but if the management
was not really that bad, then what is going on? The answer is that by summing the disutilities we are treating them as if they are both independent and cumulative, when in fact
they are clearly not. For example, the disutility of failing to repair an injured kidney and
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failing to check for abdominal tenderness can easily be seen to be less than the sum of the
disutilities of the two errors since once a kidney injury has been diagnosed the abdominal
tenderness becomes irrelevant.
The second approach I took, therefore, is based on the idea that \a chain is only
as strong as its weakest link." In this model I simply take the error with the highest
disutility in each case to represent the overall disutility of the case. This makes the opposite
assumption of the previous approach { that the errors are all dependent on each other and
more serious errors subsume less serious errors { and thus provides a lower bound for the
case disutility. Using this measure for case disutility, the mean value is 32.8 (s.d. 18.31).
The maximum is 95, the minimum is 1, and the mean is 30.
We are interested in how well both disutility measures predict the overall evaluation of
cases by human experts. Table 8.2 shows the results of a regression analysis of the relationship between the sum of TraumaTIQ's comment disutilities and the judges' case ratings.1
As Table 8.2 shows, TraumaTIQ's total comment disutility is a signi cant predictor of the
ratings given to cases by Judges 1 and 2, but not for Judge 3 (p = 0:21).
Table 8.3 shows the results of regressing TraumaTIQ's maximum comment disutility
value on the judges' case ratings. The results in Table 8.3 show that the maximum disutility
is a signi cant predictor of all three judges ratings.
In both of these regressions, the low values of the adjusted R2, which indicates the
amount of variance in the judges ratings that is explained by the model (the total comment
disutility in Table 8.2 and the maximum comment disutility in Table 8.3), says that the t
between the dependent and independent variables is weak. The fact that the adjusted R2
value for Judges 1 and 2 goes down from the rst model to the second suggests that the
sum of disutilities is a slightly better model of those two judges overall case rating than
the maximum disutility. On the other hand, Judge 3 appears to prefer to judge a case on
the basis of its most egregious error. It appears that considering the disutilities of errors
somewhere between their individual and cummulative maximums has some correlation with
the judges' ratings. Consistent with estimates of disutility, di erent judges may assess these
overall disutilities di erently.
The dependent variable in each model is the judges' rating for the individual cases. Each model is
estimated on 97 cases. *** p < :01, ** p < :05
1
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Variable
Intercept

Judge 1 Judge 2 Judge 3
2.98*** 3.002*** 2.441***
(.184)
(.137)
(.192)
TraumaTIQ cost -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.002
(.001)
(.001)
(.002)
2
adjusted R
.13
.12
.01
Table 8.2: Models of Judges' Ratings using TraumaTIQ's total comment disutility.
Variable
Intercept

Judge 1 Judge 2 Judge 3
3.02*** 2.957*** 2.694***
(.210)
(.160)
(.212)
TraumaTIQ cost -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.014**
(.005)
(.004)
(.006)
2
adjusted R
.10
.07
.05
Table 8.3: Models of Judges' Ratings using TraumaTIQ's maximum comment disutility.
The judges seem to be quite di erent in what factors they use to evaluate management
plans. Looking at the judges' ratings in more detail, we see that the correlation between
the three judges is quite low, as shown in Table 8.4. There is only a signi cant positive
correlation between Judges 1 and 3 and between Judges 2 and 3.
Judge 1 Judge 2 Judge 3
1
(0.0)
Judge 2 0.0870
1
(0.397) (0.0)
Judge 3 0.322
0.215
1
(0.0013) (0.034) (0.0)
Judge 1

Table 8.4: Pearson Correlation Coecients / Prob > jRj under H0 :  = 0 / N = 97
It is also interesting to look at the occurrence of individual comment types, such as the
number of errors of omission and commission, to understand the characteristics of a case
that are predictive of the judges' ratings. In order to gain a better understanding of the
relationship between the judges' ratings and the errors they noted in the cases we estimated
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Variable
Intercept

Judge 1
2.990***
(.126)
Number of Errors of
-.184**
Commission
(.081)
Number of Errors of
-.327***
Omission
(.047)
2
adjusted R
.34
p value for Di erence Test
.12

Judge 2 Judge 3
3.022*** 2.750***
(.108)
(.169)
-.305*** -.144
(.081)
(.156)
-.154*** -.199***
(.033)
(.045)
.24
.16
.07
.72

Table 8.5: Models of Judges' Ratings using Judges' reported numbers of errors of omission
and errors of commission.
a set of regression models. These models regressed the individual judges' overall rating
of each case on the number of errors of omission and the number of errors of commission
which the judge attributed to each plan. The results of these models appear in Table 8.5.
In evaluating the results of the models presented in Table 8.5,2 there are a number
of di erent factors to consider. First, we are interested in the statistical signi cance and
magnitude of the parameter estimates for the number of each type of error (numbers
of errors of commission and omission) on the judges' ratings. We also want to test the
hypothesis that the marginal e ect of an error of commission is di erent from the marginal
e ect of an error of omission for each of our three judges. Finally, we are interested in the
overall goodness of t for each of our models of Judges Ratings.
From the parameter estimates for the impact of the number of each type of error
on overall judge ratings, we see that the number of errors of omission is a statistically
signi cantly predictor of the overall rating given to plans by all three judges. The number
of errors of commission is a statistically signi cant predictor of overall ratings for Judges 1
and 2.
For each of these models we tested the hypothesis that the marginal e ect of an error
of omission is di erent from the marginal e ect of an error of commission. The p value for
each of these tests is presented at the bottom of Table 1. We are only able to reject the
null hypothesis that there is no di erence in the marginal e ect for the two di erent types
The dependent variable in each model is the judges' rating for the individual cases. Each model is
estimated on 97 cases. *** p < :01, ** p < :05
2
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Figure 8.2: Frequency of disutilities for errors of omission

Figure 8.3: Frequency of disutilities for errors of commission
of errors in the model for Judge 2, in which the parameter value for errors of commission
is greater than for errors of omission.
The distribution of disutilities for errors of omission and errors of commission are shown
in Figures 8.2 and 8.3. TraumaTIQ tends to assign higher disutilities to errors of omission,
(mean = 15.85) than it does to errors of commission (mean = 3.33) In addition it identi es
many more errors of omission (5.64 per case) than errors of commission (2.14 per case).
Since the maximum possible disutility for an error of commission is 65 and the maximum
possible disutility for an error of omission is 95, this suggests that physician's tend not
to do costly actions unnecessarily, while they are more likely to commit costly errors
of omission. The focus of TraumaTIQ's critiques, therefore, will be more on reminding
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All comments TraumaTIQ yes
TraumaTIQ no
Commission TraumaTIQ yes
TraumaTIQ no
Omission
TraumaTIQ yes
TraumaTIQ no

0
345
NA
159
NA
186
NA

1
71
76
42
30
29
46

2
21
10
13
2
8
8

3
5
1
5
0
0
1

Table 8.6: Comment-by-comment agreement between TraumaTIQ and judges on actions
physicians about actions that they should be performing, rather than on informing them
of actions they should not perform.

8.3.3 Completeness
The completeness of a critique is a measure of whether the critique includes every item that
it should. One way to evaluate this is to compare the critiques produced by TraumaTIQ
to the comments of physicians on the same management plans. Table 8.6 shows the results
of a comment-by-comment comparison of TraumaTIQ's critiques on the 97 cases with the
comments made by the three local judges on the same cases.
This table includes only comments on actions, not bedside questions, since TraumaTIQ does not comment on errors of commission involving bedside questions. TraumaTIQ's
comments on errors of omission involving more than one action have been broken up into
individual comments for each action. Comments regarding omission of checking for medication allergies were not included because this action was not included in the abstracted
case descriptions.
I excluded comments regarding scheduling errors from this evaluation because TraumaTIQ does not comment on the relative order of two actions that have both been done, which
is what the judges did. Rather, TraumaTIQ's scheduling comments are designed to remind the physician of an ordering constraint if it seems that she is going to do the second
action without having ordered the rst. Since there is no information in the abstracted
cases about when, or in what order actions were ordered, it is impossible to evaluate
TraumaTIQ's scheduling comments in this way.
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The columns in Table 8.6 correspond to the number of judges making a particular
comment. It has been demonstrated 18, 90] that there is often little agreement between
physicians on what constitutes an error that should be commented on. I therefore hypothesized that the greater the agreement between judges on an individual comment, the
stronger the evidence that that comment should be included in the critique.
The rst two rows of the table show the comment by comment agreement of TraumaTIQ
with the judges on errors of omission and errors of commission. The rst column shows
that TraumaTIQ made 345 comments which were not duplicated by any judge. Possible
reasons for this disparity include:
Commenting on each individual action was not the experts' primary task in the
validation study, which was concerned with the overall rating of the case. The judges
tended to mark individual items sporadically, sometimes only marking one error on
a case that they rated as unacceptable or acceptable with major reservations. Had
they been asked to mark down every comment as if they were observing the case
being managed, they may have produced more comments.
The experts tended to make one high level summary comment on the conduct of care,
while TraumaTIQ lls in all the details. For example, a judge might comment that
the central action of a procedure, such as a tube thoracostomy, was omitted without
mentioning the other actions that should be done before or after that action, such
giving antibiotics or doing a post-tube X-ray to evaluate the position of the tube.
TraumaTIQ, on the other hand, would list every action in the procedure that had
not been done.
Columns 2-4 show that TraumaTIQ produced 70.3% of comments made by 2 or more
judges and did not produce 51.7% of comments made by only one judge. This crossover
e ect is signi cant by chi-square (2 = 6:215 df = 2 p < 0:05). This result indicates a
correlation between the importance of a comment (as measured by the number of judges
that made it), and the likelihood that TraumaTIQ will produce that comment.
The rest of the table shows the same comments divided into errors of commission and
errors of omission. This split shows that the crossover e ect is much stronger for errors of
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commission than for errors of omission. Even when two or more judges agree on an error
of omission, TraumaTIQ only produces that comment about half the time. In fact, the
correlation between the number of judges producing a comment and whether TraumaTIQ
produced the comment is signi cant for errors of commission (2 = 7:213 df = 2 p < 0:05)
but not for errors of omission (2 = 1:385 df = 2 p > 0:50). This observation suggests
that TraumaTIQ is more often in agreement with experts about errors of commission than
about errors of omission, an e ect that can be explained by the fact that comments on
errors of commission are constrained to be about actions that were done, but comments
on errors of omission can be about any action that was not done { a much larger set.

8.3.4 Discussion
One useful aspect of this evaluation is that it allows us to look at the cases in which
TraumaTIQ does not agree with the judges: both when it fails to produce a comment that
was made by more than one judge, and when it frequently produces comments that are
not produced by any judge.
In the category of comments that were made by more than one judge that were not
made by TraumaTIQ, it is most often the case (7 out of 11 times) that the discrepancy
arises from TraumAID having a more cautious diagnostic strategy than the physicians. In
two of the cases, the judges note that an operation was omitted (one thoracotomy, one
laparotomy), while TraumaTIQ comments that an assessment of an inconsistent number
of bullets and bullet holes has been omitted. TraumAID will not go on to call for an
operation until the bullet hole assessment has been done.
In three cases, the judges note an omission of actions related to doing a laparotomy,
while TraumaTIQ thinks that the operation is done prematurely and a peritoneal lavage
has been omitted. In two cases, the judges note an error of commission of a peritoneal
lavage, while in contrast TraumaTIQ agrees with the lavage but considers the operation
that followed an error of commission.
The other four disagreements are:
1. two judges say removal of a clotted hemothorax was omitted, which involves an
operation, while TraumAID does not recommend operating unless the hemothorax
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is persistent.
2. Two of the judges say a chest X-ray was omitted in a case of an abdominal wound
with no ndings in the chest. TraumAID does not recommend getting a chest X-ray
in such a situation.
3. Two of the judges say a naso-gastric aspiration was omitted in a case where it was
in fact done, and in which TraumaTIQ says it was an error of commission.
4. Two of the judges say a urinalysis was omitted in a case with a stab wound to the
upper posterior chest. TraumAID would not call for a urinalysis in such a case,
because the chances of abdominal injury are very low.
None of these discrepancies prompted changes in TraumAID's reasoner or planner.
Rather, we conclude that they represent philosophical di erences between the judges, who
seem to favor a more decisive approach, and the more cautious strategy we have undertaken
to encode in TraumAID.
Looking at the comments that were made by TraumaTIQ but not by the judges might
also suggest possible extensions or changes to the knowledge base. For example, TraumaTIQ evaluates 23 orders for naso-gastric aspiration as errors of commission. The only goal
in its knowledge base connected to that action is ruling out an esophageal injury. Since
the cost of doing a naso-gastric aspiration is above the threshold for comment, it often
appears in the critique with the explanation that ruling out an esophageal injury is not
motivated. However, it turns out that (1) naso-gastric aspiration is often done for another
reason, (namely to remove the contents of the stomach prior to doing a peritoneal lavage),
although this procedure is not considered necessary by TraumAID and thus does not appear in its knowledge base, and (2) performing an unnecessary naso-gastric aspiration may
not actually be signi cant enough to comment on. In response to this observation, it
may be necessary to include additional goals in TraumAID's knowledge base to explain
naso-gastric aspiration, and/or to lower the cost of the naso-gastric aspiration action.
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8.4 Timeliness of the critique
A nal area in which to evaluate the implementation of TraumaTIQ is how fast it generates
its critiques. In the current architecture the computational bottlenecks are plan recognition, plan generation, and calculating the informational dependencies between actions. I
have discussed the complexity of the plan recognition algorithm in Chapter 4.
Rymon 75] has presented an algorithm for Progressive Horizon Planning that he proves
to run in polynomial time assuming that plan sketching and optimization can both be
done quickly. In practice, however, this assumption depends on optimizing no more than
one step in the plan, which we have found to be too great a restriction. In the current
implementation, TraumAID's planner optimizes the rst ve goals in the plan. Fortunately,
working in batch mode on the 97 cases in this evaluation, the planner only has to plan for
an average of 3.24 goals at a time, and takes an average of .2 cpu seconds on a Sun 4 to
generate a new plan.
The total time taken by TraumaTIQ's plan recognition, plan evaluation, and critique
generation components when run in batch mode is an average of .124 cpu seconds per
critiquing cycle.
Checking the dependencies between actions in TraumAID's plan is exponential in the
number of actions in the plan. In this evaluation there was an average of 3.08 actions
per plan and dependency checking took an average of .267 cpu seconds per planning cycle. Therefore, in the average case when the system needs to generate a new plan, check
dependencies, and generate a critique, it will take just a little more than half a second.

8.5 Summary of the evaluation
In this chapter, I have presented a retrospective evaluation of TraumaTIQ that considers
the issues of correctness, clinical signi cance, completeness and timeliness of the generated
critiques.
As it depends on the correctness of the management plans generated by TraumAID, the
correctness of the critiques is implied by the approval of TraumAID's plans by the expert
judges in 18]. The ability of TraumaTIQ to generate clinically signi cant comments is
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supported by the fact that its case disutility ratings correlate signi cantly with the ratings
of two out of the three local judges. The completeness of TraumaTIQ was evaluated
by looking at the agreement between the system and three expert judges on individual
comments. Given that the inter-judge agreement is low (only 20% of judges comments
were produced by more than one judge), the fact that TraumaTIQ produces 53% of the
comments produced by at least one judge, and 70.3% of the comments produced by two or
three judges suggests that its output is quite complete. Finally, I have demonstrated that
TraumaTIQ generates its critiques in a timely manner.
Further evaluation of TraumaTIQ is needed to investigate the actual performance of
the system in the emergency room. Some of the issues to be studied during this prospective
evaluation will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 9

Conclusions and Future Work
9.1 Contributions
In this thesis, I have presented an argument for the claim that, in domains characterized
by (1) multiple interacting goals, (2) time-critical decision making, and (3) task-centered
activity, human-computer interaction based on a propose-and-critique model is preferable
to the traditional expert-system approach. The critiquing approach has advantages in
terms of psychological acceptability, as well as exibility in handling variations in practice
and subjective judgments.
I have shown how a combination of integrated knowledge structures and reasoning
capabilities can be used to produce and update critiques in real time, during the construction and execution of a management plan. The critiquing architecture I have proposed
comprises a cycle of plan recognition, plan evaluation, and critique generation. These
components are integrated with a goal-based reasoner and planner to provide them with
information about what goals are relevant and how best to pursue them in the current
situation.

9.1.1 Plan recognition
The plan recognizer uses knowledge about actions and goals in the domain, together with
information from the reasoner about the speci c situation, to infer a model of the user's
goals and intentions from his proposed actions. The plan recognition algorithm makes the
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assumption that the physicians are more likely to have appropriate goals but be addressing
them in a sub-optimal way, than to be pursuing the wrong goals altogether. This assumption justi es the strategy of giving the physician the \bene t of the doubt" when their
orders can be explained in terms of currently relevant goals.
By using the available evidence about what goals are relevant or almost relevant, and
thus likely to be pursued, the plan recognizer is able to quickly develop a model of the
plan to be evaluated. Other plan recognition systems that enumerate all possible plans to
explain the observations require signi cantly more computation.

9.1.2 Plan evaluation
The plan evaluation component makes use of knowledge about the utilities and disutilities
associated with domain actions and goals, together with knowledge of policy and practice
guidelines and how they should shape behavior in a given situation, in order to identify
errors that will then be mentioned in the critique.
The main contribution of the plan evaluator to the problem of decision support in
general is the idea that the potential signi cance of an error to the outcome of the task
should be considered in deciding whether to say something at all, and if so, how to say
it. A further contribution is the analysis of the relationships between di erent types of
error and the relevant evaluation functions and thresholds for comment. For example, it
is more important to say something when an entire goal is being omitted, than when it is
only being partially addressed, since in the latter case we can at least conclude that the
physician is aware of the goal.
A di erent kind of contribution of the plan evaluator is as a tool for evaluating protocols
for trauma management. Having developed a speci cation for evaluating errors, we can
potentially use that speci cation to automatically validate management protocols in the
future.

9.1.3 Critique generation
The critique generator converts the results of plan evaluation into a concise set of natural language critique comments. These comments include explanations regarding the
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goals associated with actions being critiqued or recommended, the reasons for suggesting
alternative procedures, and the reasons for recommending against certain actions.
It is very important for a decision support system functioning in a time-critical, complex
situation to be able to communicate concisely and naturally with its users. For this reason, I
have chosen to display the critiques in a series of short English sentences, which are intended
to be authoritative yet polite. I am not making any claims regarding other aspects of these
texts. In the next section I will discuss some future work which may be done in the area
of language generation in TraumaTIQ.

9.1.4 TraumaTIQ
This architecture has been implemented in TraumaTIQ, a real-time critiquing system that
can detect and respond to a range of planning failures in trauma management. Currently,
the TraumaTIQ system is capable of determining when the physician's plan does not
correspond to the standards set by TraumAID, and of responding appropriately and in a
timely manner.
An evaluation of TraumaTIQ shows that its comments correlate well with the comments
made by human judges, when the judges also agree with each other. The evaluation also
shows that the plan evaluation metrics are predictive of the ratings made by human judges
on actual cases: TraumaTIQ produces more warnings in cases that were given a low rating
by the judges.

9.2 Future Work
9.2.1 Extensions to the plan recognizer
The plan recognition system is currently able to ascribe goals to about 89% of actions in
actual trauma management plans, 15% of which are actions that are not in TraumAID's
plan at the time that they are ordered. Of the actions that are not explained, most of
them are broad diagnostic tests such as X-rays, or surgical incisions which could lead to
several therapeutic procedures. The goals underlying these actions could be understood
at a more abstract level than is represented in TraumAID's knowledge base. Expanding
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the representation of goals to include an abstraction hierarchy could thus improve the plan
recognizer's ability to explain such actions when they are ordered.
I have also discussed in Chapter 4 the possibility of using probabilistic reasoning techniques to get a broader understanding of goals that are partially or almost relevant in other
ways than the notion of potential relevance that I have used in TraumaTIQ.

9.2.2 Extensions to language generation
Explanation
The knowledge base developed for TraumAID 2.0 was designed for the purpose of generating quality decision support, not delivering it to physicians. As such, there are several areas
in which additional knowledge could enhance the communicative abilities of TraumaTIQ.
To provide for better explanations, the knowledge base could be enhanced with more
explicit information about the system's reasoning. This might include:
Justi cations for preferring for one procedure over another to address a particular
goal. Is the preferred procedure faster, cheaper, more accurate, etc?
Deeper explanations for contraindications and precedence constraints, so that TraumaTIQ can be clearer about why not to do an action.

Strategic generation
The focus of this dissertation has been on determining the content of the critiques, which
is the rst step in strategic generation. The sentences output by TraumaTIQ are sorted
according to their signi cance and topic, but as I have discussed in Chapter 6, and have
shown in the example in Chapter 7, in certain situations when these sentences are put together, the output can be somewhat redundant and lacking in coherence. Further work in
the areas of discourse and sentence planning is needed to address these problems. For example, a discourse model would make it possible to select appropriate referring expressions
for previously discussed entities to improve the overall coherence of the critiques over time.
Sentence planning would allow for more concise presentation of information by combining
related information into the same sentences.
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Tactical generation
In TraumaTIQ, sentences are generated using templates whose slots are lled with translations of TraumAID concepts. These concepts are single units, which are often quite long
and contain many sub-concepts. A more complex representation of these concepts would
allow variations in sentence structure which are currently not possible. They would also
make it possible to stress important sub-concepts in the output, either graphically or in
spoken output.

9.3 Further retrospective evaluation
The comparison of TraumaTIQ's output with the comments of three expert judges that I
presented in Chapter 8 indicates that TraumaTIQ does a fairly good job producing correct,
clinically signi cant comments. However, it may be dangerous to be overcon dent based
on these results, because the judges' data I used were collected for a very di erent study,
for which they were not asked to be complete in their notation of individual errors.
Additional evidence for this claim could be acquired by a more direct evaluation of the
critiques produced by the system, such as the evaluation of the HyperCritic system that
was done by van der Lei 90]. This evaluation was done in two stages: rst have a group
of judges and the critiquing system produce critiques for a set of cases, and then have the
judges evaluate the critiques produced by the other judges and the system. The results of
this study are an analysis of the quality of the critiquing system's critiques as compared
to the critiques produced by human experts on the basis of the same information about
the case.
Independently of an overall evaluation of the critiques, the plan recognition algorithm
might also be evaluated by asking judges to give their opinion as to what goal various
actions in a set of management plans were intended to achieve, and then comparing those
judgments to the results of TraumaTIQ's plan recognizer.

9.3.1 Experimental evaluation
Computer scientists and anthropologists working in the area of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) have pointed out the essential value of getting experience with a system in
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the environment in which it is intended to be used as part of the development process
27, 26, 95]. In the near future, TraumaTIQ is due to be deployed experimentally in the
Trauma Center at the Medical College of Pennsylvania. Experience with practicing trauma
surgeons, using the system should provide a wealth of useful information for improving the
system's performance and acceptability.

Mode of critique communication
The primary focus of this experiment will be the evaluation of alternative modes of communicating the critique to physicians. This will involve comparing the e ectiveness, in
terms of inuencing physician's behavior, of displaying the critique to the scribe nurse who
will then communicate it to the physician, versus using synthesized speech to communicate
the critique directly to the physician. The two critiquing methods will also be compared
to the direct presentation of TraumAID's plan to see if critiquing in general improves the
system's e ectiveness. There are both sociological and pragmatic issues inuencing the
choice of communicative mode.
On the sociological side, the scribe nurse has the advantage that she already has an
accepted role in the trauma team, and has experience asking questions and making suggestions in such a way that the physicians are most likely to respond. On the other hand, the
computer's lack of de ned social role in the trauma team may prove to be an advantage
in critiquing the physician's behavior. Since nurses traditionally have a subordinate role
and are not quali ed to o er medical advice, the physicians may not be willing to accept
critiques from them, whereas the computer may be seen as more quali ed by virtue of its
being programmed by an expert.
On the pragmatic side, the scribe nurse has the advantage of being more directly aware
than the computer of what is happening in the room. She can monitor the situation
and make decisions about what critiques are valid based on information that may not be
available to TraumAID. She can also more easily decide when and how to intervene with
a critique. On the other hand, since the computer will be an additional member of the
team, critiques coming directly from it via synthesized speech may be more salient to the
physicians than comments coming from the scribe nurse.
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Thresholds for evaluation
Another aspect of TraumaTIQ that may be adjusted as a result of experience with physicians is its \pickyness," or how many comments it produces. Physicians using the system
will be asked to evaluate whether it comments too often, not often enough, or what speci c
items comments it made that they considered inappropriate. The plan evaluation module
can then be adjusted if necessary. This could involve changing the thresholds for warning
or commenting on errors in general, or changing the disutilities associated with individual
goals. For example, if the physicians complain that TraumaTIQ is always telling them not
to do an action X, when they don't consider it a very serious error to do X unnecessarily,
it may be necessary to lower the cost of X in TraumAID's knowledge base.
It may also be necessary to adjust the timing of comments, particularly in the case
of errors of omission. Currently TraumaTIQ waits no more than ve minutes (depending
on the urgency of the omitted goal) before commenting on an omission. Experience with
physicians using the system should indicate whether this is an appropriate amount of time
to wait or if the comment should be produced sooner or later.

Plan Recognition
The correctness of the inferences made by the plan recognizer regarding the physician's
plans is an important issue that is dicult to assess with the currently available data,
since there is no evidence for what goals the physicians were actually addressing when
they executed particular actions. This question must therefore be addressed in future work
during the eld testing of TraumaTIQ. At that time, it will be possible to get information
from physicians regarding what goals they were pursuing by debrie ng them immediately
following cases. This information will make possible a stronger test of the plan recognizer's
correctness.

Interface issues
A number of aspects of the design of TraumaTIQ's output interface have necessarily been
speculative up to this point. Experience with physicians using the system should help
us determine the appropriate phrasing to use in the critique templates and the optimal
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amount of time to persevere regarding a critique that the physician does not respond to.

9.3.2 User modelling
I have side-stepped the question of user modelling in my system, on the assumption that
all of the intended users will have comparable expertise and knowledge and thus modelling
individual users is not necessary. Whether or not this assumption is valid, the question of
what a user model might add to the system in terms of tailoring the critique to a particular
user remains an open one. For example, the system could maintain a database of physicians
that it regularly works with along with, speci c information about their expertise with
various procedures, or their particular preferences for handling certain problems, or the
types of errors they tend to commit. This information could be used to interpret the user's
actions more accurately. For example, if the system knows that Dr. X prefers to address
goal G using procedure P rather than Q, it can better understand why P is done, even if
the system itself has a preference for doing Q to address G.
On a more general level, user modeling could be done to characterize the knowledge
and behavior of whole classes of users, from medical students to experienced residents.
This would allow TraumaTIQ to relax its assumption that the user has experience with
trauma management, which is currently crucial to both the plan recognition and critique
generation modules. A model of typical student reasoning, for example, would make it
possible to recognize behavior that a more experienced physician would be less likely to
exhibit, such as pursuing irrelevant or unjusti ed goals or using inappropriate procedures
to address her goals. Additionally, a model of the user's knowledge could ultimately make
it possible for the critique generator to produce explanations at di erent levels of detail
for users with di erent expertise.

9.3.3 TraumaTIQ as a tutoring system
A nal issue is the applicability of the critiquing architecture for use as a educational
tool. Many people have worked on systems for tutoring skills in a particular task using
simulations with automated feedback 19, 40, 48].
Trainees in the area of trauma care could use the TraumAID system to run through
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simulations of cases, receiving feedback from the critiquing module regarding the quality of
their management decisions. To this end, Professor Sandra Carberry has been developing
a technique for automatically generating cases during a simulation so that the outcome is
dependent on what the student does. In this way, it would be possible for the student to
experience the negative e ects of her errors more often than she would in real life (in the
simulation, the failure to pursue a diagnosis can cause the diagnosis to be true, whereas in
real life if the student fails to pursue a diagnosis, that diagnosis will not always be true.)
In order to be appropriate for this type of application, the critique would have to
assume a quite di erent stereotype of user, and thus would have to include more basic
explanations. It also might be the case that certain assumptions the plan recognizer
currently makes about the relevance of the user's goals would not be valid, in which case
the plan recognition component of the system would have to be signi cantly altered.

9.4 Conclusion
The critiquing approach encompasses a wide variety of domains and implementations.
What they have in common is the recognition that the traditional role of expert systems as
decision-making advisors must be questioned and reinterpreted if we are to bene t as much
as possible from the power of knowledge-based systems. The investigation of critiquing can
lead to a better understanding of how computers can interact e ectively with humans to
inuence their behavior, whether in urgent, time-critical situations or under less strenuous
circumstances.
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